I'm tiring of this assertive approach of yours. I'm going to be direct with you.
Your replies continue to fire off unsupported assertions while avoiding the actual point I have pressed from the beginning. You keep circling back to abstractions about "essentialism," "metaphysics," and "semantic fallacies," but none of these touch the argument I have explicitly grounded in the syntax of the text. At this stage, I'm not going to keep chasing every passing sentence you throw out
If you intend to continue, you need to engage the syntactical argument itself. If you will not, then this conversation has reached the end of its usefulness.
Here is the argument you must address:
- John predicates δύναται of the subject (οὐδεὶς). The construction expresses a personal capacity or incapacity, not an environmental condition. That is simply the function of δύναται in Greek grammar. "You're reading a non-standard understanding of "ability"" is an unsubstantiated claim. I already challenged you to defend it. You won't. You insist on reading English conceptual models into a discussion of Greek semantics and syntax. That's not a serious contribution to our exchange.
- John 6:44 presents a conditional structure: ἑλκύσῃ --> δύναται. The Father's drawing is the stated condition that generates the person's ability to come.
- John gives no secondary effect for drawing, no third category such as "general atmospheric possibility," and no indication that drawing may occur without producing the predicate ability he assigns to it.
- Therefore, if drawing occurs and ability does not arise, the conditional statement is false. The text leaves no space for a drawing that fails to accomplish the one effect John attaches to it.
- The final clause of the verse ("and I will raise him up on the last day") grammatically ties the raising to the granting of the capacity to come to Christ. It is the one who is granted this ability who is promised salvation.
That is the entire argument. It is grammatical, not metaphysical. It is structural, not theological. And it stands or falls on the text, not on accusations of "essentialism." Your use of that term reveals a fundamental misunderstanding -- either of my argument or of the concept itself. At no point have I argued that words possess immutable, metaphysical senses, or that meaning is fixed by nature rather than by usage. The argument I gave concerning δύναται was based on its
usage in Classical and Koine literature. Deploying terminology like "essentialism" here is just swinging a hammer in search of a nail. It attempts to land a critique where none exists and distracts from the syntactic reality the text actually presents.
The bottom line is there is no point to this exchange if you can't go to the text and deal with what's there in the grammar. I will not respond again unless you do so. Dispute the grammar. Show where δύναμαι functions as an imported condition detached from the subject. Show where John permits drawing without producing the predicate ability. Show where the conditional structure may be broken without rendering the sentence false. And show where the one raised is not explicitly identified as the one granted the ability to come.
If you cannot or will not do that, then the discussion is over. I'm not interested in an endless loop of assertions that never touch the text, and will regard the next round of them as a tacit concession to the argument I laid out above.