Free will and determinism

[Bradskii]

In the determinist view, blame can be considered not a fallacy, but a behavior reinforcement tool, setting up consequences that will help determine peoples behavior to society's advantage going forward.

Yes, I agree. You can punish someone by keeping them out of society if they are likely to keep offending. Or you can use punishment as a means to deter others. OK, that's unfair in a way, but it has to be such that it actually is a deterrent. And let's face it, one might enjoy an occasional (ahem) roll-your-own and consider it entirely harmless. But there are certain parts of the world where the punishment is exceptionally severe, but it most definitely determines our actions in that matter.

As regards retributive punishment, it has no place in a world without free will.

 

[Bradskii]

Hmm. I was careful about saying "decision making can originate at least somewhat in a sovereign self".

"Originate" is supposed to mean that some part of the decision can happen independent of antecedent conditions. That was my intent anyway.

This might sound like a tautology, but if conditions determine your choice then the conditions were the reason for that choice and there's no free will. If they didn't then the decision was made for no reason. And again, there's no free will.

 

[2PhiloVoid]

I gave a definition of causal determination waaay upstream. To you, if I remember. That will suffice. I'm not keen in getting into the semantic undergrowth.

But that's just the underlying philosophical point. I don't think the definition you offer provides an analytically justified conceptual referent that actually provides much in the way of a clear and distinct denotation, let alone comprehensive information.

I think that Sapolksy is tapping his foot over the epistemic line in the effort to secure support for 'empathy' on the grand scale. That's nice that he does so to encourage people to more equitably and compassionately administer justice, but he does so by what seems to me to be obfuscated language and exaggeration.

Anyway, unlike the others here, I think I'm done saying much else. It's a useless conversation that no one can win.

 

[Bradskii]

But that's just the underlying philosophical point. I don't think the definition you offer provides an analytically justified conceptual referent that actually provides much in the way of a clear and distinct denotation, let alone comprehensive information.

You are free to proffer your own.

 

[durangodawood]

But that's just the underlying philosophical point. I don't think the definition you offer provides an analytically justified conceptual referent that actually provides much in the way of a clear and distinct denotation, let alone comprehensive information.

I think that Sapolksy is tapping his foot over the epistemic line in the effort to secure support for 'empathy' on the grand scale. That's nice that he does so to encourage people to more equitably and compassionately administer justice, but he does so by what seems to me to be obfuscated language and exaggeration.

Anyway, unlike the others here, I think I'm done saying much else. It's a useless conversation that no one can win.

Yeah help us out by presenting a more useful definition! We could use a shake up.

 

[2PhiloVoid]

Yeah help us out by presenting a more useful definition! We could use a shake up.

Nah. I'll just use the same rhetoric that is used in this thread by saying, " I addressed this waaaay back up, earlier in this thread."

And again, I'm done. You all won't see me coming back into this specific thread. I can't hack the unilateral thinking here, whether from Christians or Atheists.

 

[2PhiloVoid]

You are free to proffer your own.

You said that before, Bradskii. And I explained 'why' I don't think I can.....or that anyone can.

Have a great day anyway! I'm outta here!

 

[durangodawood]

This might sound like a tautology, but if conditions determine your choice then the conditions were the reason for that choice and there's no free will. If they didn't then the decision was made for no reason. And again, there's no free will.

Theres an implied assumption there about what a self has to be, namely that its an object residing at one point which moves along the line of time.

My sense is that a self is a little different. In our capacity to scan back and imagine forward and bounce back and forth between the two, we create a little bubble where the self can work thats insulated from the flow of time. Sure time is still moving along when we do this, but the bubble itself is insulated.

Something like that.

 

[durangodawood]

Nah. I'll just use the same rhetoric that is used in this thread by saying, " I addressed this waaaay back up, earlier in this thread."

And again, I'm done. You all won't see me coming back into this specific thread. I can't hack the unilateral thinking here, whether from Christians or Atheists.

Those who know dont tell?

 

[Hans Blaster]

So, we should add some amnesia to your inattentiveness? Get serious or get lost but either way spare me your inept ad hominens.

I wasn't making an argument about free will. I was commenting on your tactics.

 

[o_mlly]

When new knowledge comes to light, sometimes the meaning of a word shifts, or we find the word is no longer useful at all.

You've just explained why this thread is in the "Ethics and Morality" forum instead of the "Physical Science" forum.

An intuition can only be considered naive if there is convincing evidence that the intuition is in error. Over in the "Physical Science" forum, they want evidence. This OP, so far, has none to offer us that would give us pause to accept the obvious to be true.

 

[Halbhh]

OK, so for the sake of this argument, we'll say that random elementary particles don't cause random behaviour at a macro scale. We'll say it's determinate.

See the problem?

If you mean for instance how the human brain works in this view, such as in decision making, then what I'm explaining is neither 'determinate' in the sense of fully predictable (as I was explaining above), nor are the choices the brain would make fully indeterminate like 'dice rolling' in the sense of just random choices. Neither one.
Instead, a different (3rd) picture is quite possible -- I was trying to explain that above.
Actually, weather forecasting is a useful analogy in one way. Currently it's all done in terms of probabilities, because we know that we cannot be sure it will rain, where and when, but only have a regional estimate, which might turn out entirely wrong in a dramatic decisive way in any given week, where an 80% chance of rain turned into zero rain across the forecast region, etc.
But weather is a useful analogy in this way: it's reasonably predictable (to a useful extent, even with errors), but may continue to fall short of being fully predictable at some meaningful timescale (like 3 weeks or instance, or 4) if nature has true quantum randomness. With that truly random elementary particle behavior, there is some timescale where the forecast is just failing (not even getting it better than a coin toss at that time scale). In this picture, longer term weather forecasting might hit a wall in a frame (like 3, 4, 5 weeks?), where no further increases in more extensive (fine grid, precise) observations (data for input) nor any further increase in of computing power (even as many orders of magnitude more computation as you wish) would ever improve the reliability of that x week out forecast past some point in time x weeks (so that it will never get to 100% precise with 100% reliability), but it would always just be some lesser percentage in actual outcomes, where it might not rain on a given day in a given region where the computation said it was very likely, even "90%" (of course such numbers are rounded), etc. Note that here is only addressed merely one aspect regarding determinism (how it a system might be fundamentally neither deterministic nor truly random, but something else). Of course, there is far more to consciousness than merely whether it's deterministic or not (and in spite of many ideas about consciousness presented over time, it's still sorta like the question of how to interpret quantum mechanics: definitely not yet settled and there are many competing theories.

 

[o_mlly]

Do you not think man is just a really smart chimp?

Yes. But to the extent that free will might be considered possible for us. But not for chimps. Instinct can take you so far. But you start to need second and third level thought processes at some point. So even if a negative act was instinctive, it gets to the point where 'I don't like that' isn't sufficient. And 'I'm going to react to that' still isn't. What you need is 'Even if the act was determined (perhaps instinctive) we need to apportion blame and act accordingly'.

Uhh? Do you wanna take another run at that one? The question did not imply that chimps are evil.

 

[durangodawood]

You've just explained why this thread is in the "Ethics and Morality" forum instead of the "Physical Science" forum.

An intuition can only be considered naive if there is convincing evidence that the intuition is in error. Over in the "Physical Science" forum, they want evidence. This OP, so far, has none to offer us that would give us pause to accept the obvious to be true.

Since when does naive mean wrong?

Naive intuitions are simply unexamined, typically because we lack the tools to get proper perspective on them. Some of them turn out to be wrong. Some dont. Our naive intuition that we have free will may turn out wrong, tho I dont think it will.

My point in all this is that "(almost) everybody thinks so" doesnt mean the case is closed.

 

[o_mlly]

Since when does naive mean wrong?

Who wrote that that's what "naive" means?

Naive intuitions are simply unexamined, typically because we lack the tools to get proper perspective on them.

And you consider free will to be a naive, ie., unexamined proposition? I think not. Here's just one link with ~ 20,000 words on the topic. See: Free Will (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Our naive intuition that we have free will may turn out wrong, tho I dont think it will.

And we're back to the extreme skeptic. Of course, all human knowledge is in the realm of doubt; however, we have degrees of certainty as to the truth of any particular proposition. How do we raise the merely subjective opinion to be probably objectively true? We can apply a pragmatic test.

The pragmatic test of the truth or falsity of particular opinions has significance for us beyond the yeoman service it performs in the refutation of skepticism. It raises a question about what is often called "prediction and verification" as a way of telling whether a particular opinion is true or false. If free will is false then surely after 500+ posts, one could predict another poster's next post. Go for it.

 

[durangodawood]

Who wrote that that's what "naive" means?

You wrote:

"An intuition can only be considered naive if there is convincing evidence that the intuition is in error."

Thats plainly false. We have plenty of correct but naive (unexamined) intuitions.

And you consider free will to be a naive, ie., unexamined proposition? I think not. Here's just one link with ~ 20,000 words on the topic. See: Free Will (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

You were appealing to what the bulk of people out there (not academic philosophers) believe about free will as support for your position. Among them, its a naive intuition, and not remotely examined per the Stanford Ency. I hold that naive intuition too - in addition to whatever reasoning I do on the topic. Its how situations feel to me when Im not thinking about them.

You should keep in mind the particular claim of yours that Im refuting when you critique my refutation.

And we're back to the extreme skeptic. Of course, all human knowledge is in the realm of doubt; however, we have degrees of certainty as to the truth of any particular proposition. How do we raise the merely subjective opinion to be probably objectively true? We can apply a pragmatic test.

Oh excellent! A pragmatic test! I cant wait.

The pragmatic test of the truth or falsity of particular opinions has significance for us beyond the yeoman service it performs in the refutation of skepticism. It raises a question about what is often called "prediction and verification" as a way of telling whether a particular opinion is true or false. If free will is false then surely after 500+ posts, one could predict another poster's next post. Go for it.

Thats your test??? Seriously?

How the heck am I supposed to know the all conditions within another posters mind that would lead to their determined response? Determinism doesnt mean that behavioral outcomes are predictable. It simply means they are completely set by prior conditions. Whether I have access to or whether I can even comprehend all those conditions has nothing to do with it.

Determinism in the world doesn't mean that I am omniscient. Its not about me.

 

[Bradskii]

If you mean for instance how the human brain works in this view, such as in decision making, then what I'm explaining is neither 'determinate' in the sense of fully predictable (as I was explaining above), nor are the choices the brain would make fully indeterminate like 'dice rolling' in the sense of just random choices. Neither one.

But weather is a useful analogy in this way: it's reasonably predictable (to a useful extent, even with errors), but may continue to fall short of being fully predictable at some meaningful timescale (like 3 weeks or instance, or 4) if nature has true quantum randomness.

I'm not arguing that decisions are predictable. Far from it. They can be in the simplest of examples - she's hungry so she's going to eat something soon. But as I mentioned in a post a little ways back, the conditions which we need to consider that might determine a decision are limitless. Ranging from a split second ago, to a few minutes...back to a few million years. A time scale which might prompt some eye rolling as it sounds like hyperbole used for effect but what happened to your father during his life had a direct affect on you. As did what happened to a distant direct ancestor (your great x 1000 grandfather).

So it's effectively a chaotic system. Like the weather. A tiny change, your great x 1000 grandfather turned left instead of right coming out of his cave and being attacked by a bear, can make significant changes to the world. But, if something is not predictable, it doesn't mean it's not determinate.

He turned left instead of right and you can't predict the outcomes. But it determined that you wouldn't actually exist.

 

[Bradskii]

Circumstances either permit a man to behave or act as he wills, or prevent him from doing so. The individual is either circumstantially free or unfree to act. If one is in prison then they are circumstantially unfree. However, society does not take away the convict's free will, the inherent ability to choose to be otherwise.

I know you have some reservations about hypotheticals, but I can't help that. I'm going to use one anyway.

Consider a scientist who has managed to work out how to prompt certain reactions in a person by operating some mechanism. It's not that far fetched as injections of various substances or the excitation of certain parts of the brain can do this. The part of the brain might be the anterior singular cortex which relates to social awareness, or the amygdala which controls emotions. The person is presented with an easy opportunity to steal some money. Normally he wouldn't. But our scientist knows the exact neurological conditions that present when someone decides to break social norms and steal someone's property. So he flicks some switches and causes our hero to take my wallet.

Is the guy to blame? He was literally being controlled by someone. He wouldn't have taken the wallet unless that happened. So there's obviously no culpability. He had no choice.

But what if the scientist was able to rearrange the various parts of the brain in advance. And then leaves the guy to his own devices. He still steals my wallet. Is he to blame? The same applies...he wouldn't have stolen the money if he hadn't been neurologically changed, outside of any control that he had. It wasn't his fault that that happened. How can he be culpable?

Now you can see where this is going. Now the neurological changes to the guys brain happened in the womb. As he was growing. Depending on what his mother was doing when she was pregnant. The changes happened due to the type of education the guy had. Whether he was assaulted as a child. Whether violence was a part of his upbringing. None of which were under his control. It wasn't his fault that that happened. How can he now be culpable?

Well, you think in the third example he can rise above everything, step outside of his character, reject what was inevitable in the first two. He must accept blame in the third instance but not in the other two. Even though his neurological states were exactly the same and in none of the cases did he have any control over them.

That seems to make sense to you. It makes none to me.

 

[Bradskii]

Do you not think man is just a really smart chimp?

Uhh? Do you wanna take another run at that one? The question did not imply that chimps are evil.

Evil chimps? What? No-one said that chimps are evil. Where on earth did that come from? I was explaining the possible development of the ability to consider someone else being a responsible agent for their choices. And thence apportioning blame.

Even if someone is not blameworthy there is a suggestion that punishment is still appropriate because it will cause others to reconsider their actions. Thus preventing others from doing the same.

 

[Bradskii]

If free will is false then surely after 500+ posts, one could predict another poster's next post. Go for it.

You still think that deterministic means one can predict the future? I'm beginning to think you have a blind spot about this matter to the extent that you can ignore basic premises. I think this is the third. See post 582 above for yet another explanation.

Making choices is not an example of free will. We all do it whether free will exists or not.

And people can and do change their minds. If the conditions are changed sufficiently then someone is quite likely to have their mind changed accordingly.

I hope you will now bear all that in mind.