Free will and determinism

[o_mlly]

You cant reach back into the past and tinker with any of those reasons.

Of course, you can and do exactly that.

Do you still reason like a twelve-year-old, or a twenty-year-old. Can right reason move the racist to become non-racist? Can the criminal be rehabilitated, can the addicted be set free from their addiction? This "ah-hah" moment can be proximate, but it is imo more often remote. But it is still a moment in time.

 

[durangodawood]

Of course, you can and do exactly that.

The past, everything until just now, is done and fixed... unless you got a time machine.

Do you still reason like a twelve-year-old, or a twenty-year-old.

I literally just explained how I think improvement of self is compatible with determinism. Right in the exact paragraph you're selectively quoting.

Can right reason move the racist to become non-racist? Can the criminal be rehabilitated, can the addicted be set free from their addiction? This "ah-hah" moment can be proximate, but it is imo more often remote. But it is still a moment in time.

No one is denying change. But change happens for antecedent reasons..... unless you deny the principle that events have prior causes.

I do appreciate that subatomic matter seems to exhibit some randomness. But at the macro scale that seems to be smoothed over and cause/effect rules the day.

.

 

[o_mlly]

The past, everything until just now, is done and fixed... unless you got a time machine.

The past is done but not fixed ... unless you're dead.

As an example, a white supremacist who has no affection for black people and on Monday marches in the KKK rally. Tuesday an African American fireman heroically goes into his burning house and saves his infant children from certain death. What are the chances that the supremacist's lack of affection for black people changed, and his racist attitude changed such that he would not (willed not to) march in Wednesday's KKK rally? He didn't need a time machine.

No one is denying change. But change happens for antecedent reasons..... unless you deny the principle that events have prior causes

... unless you deny the principle of human agency. You and I can change our mindset as the example above portrays.

I do appreciate that subatomic matter seems to exhibit some randomness. But at the macro scale that seems to be smoothed over and cause/effect rules the day.

I do not think there is any randomness in the physical universe. We simply have not yet identified the physical causes. However, materialists run into a stone wall when trying to explain man's existence or his moral acts. The theories they offer in this regard are just, well, incredible. They say, just give us more time (evolution) or, in this case, more brain cells (Laplace).

 

[o_mlly]

What I did object to (and you did not respond to, instead writing this) was your attempt to "win" the argument by definition. Defining a term (decision) such that it corresponded only to your position (the existence of free will) is an underhanded tactic.

Nope. I merely corrected your misquote as to what was being defined. See below:

If a choice from multiple options is definitionally an act of free will.

Your inattentiveness is quite annoying and leads you to wrongly accuse me of dishonesty. I offered that as a definition of "decision" not "free will".

 

[durangodawood]

The past is done but not fixed ... unless you're dead.

As an example, a white supremacist who has no affection for black people and on Monday marches in the KKK rally. Tuesday an African American fireman heroically goes into his burning house and saves his infant children from certain death. What are the chances that the supremacist's lack of affection for black people changed, and his racist attitude changed such that he would not (willed not to) march in Wednesday's KKK rally? He didn't need a time machine.

In no part of that did the past change. Only the future changed relative to the past. Monday still happened, and all the ugly Monday feelings were felt. The past is fixed.

... unless you deny the principle of human agency.

I do think the principle of cause-effect is more universally fundamental than the principle of human agency. And the principle of cause-effect is sufficient to explain human behavior and change. We do what we do for reasons that precede the act.

(Note that I do cling to the principle of human agency as a matter of faith. But the reasoning challenges it, as Ive shown).

You and I can change our mindset as the example above portrays.

Yes. Some reason for change comes along, then you change - and not before.

 

[o_mlly]

Only the future changed relative to the past. Monday still happened, and all the ugly Monday feelings were felt. The past is fixed. ... We do what we do for reasons that precede the act.

Semantics. The man freely changed his racist attitude. Some racists may not have done so with the same experience.

It's a foolish argument to claim he was changed because of Tuesday's events. As rational beings, we always have reasons to change our attitudes.

 

[durangodawood]

Semantics. The man changed his racist attitude. It's a foolish argument to claim he was changed because of Tuesday's events. As rational beings, we always have reasons to change our attitudes.

Im baffled how you can say my claim that "the past is fixed" is essentially semantics. It should have passed by unchallenged.

And you know, because Ive told you every way possible, that I believe change going forward is basic feature of reality.

If the man changed his attitude its because he had reasons to do so. It did not happen for "no reason" - which would be arbitrary or random.. Maybe it took Tuesdays experience to awaken some empathy in him? Maybe an accumulation of other experiences contributed? Maybe he read something in the Bible that prompted moral self examination? Maybe he simply paid attention to how hating others felt viscerally, and disliked it? Whatever caused his change, it was a set of things that accumulated prior to his making the change - and not just "because of nothing".

And so on down the line all the way back, one event experienced, feeling felt, thing learned, behavior contemplated..... leads to another in a causal chain. This included reasoning. We dont just embark on a path of reasoning about things for no reason.

 

[durangodawood]

Oh and has this received its mandatory posting yet.....?

 

[Halbhh]

In which case it would be random. And I think that must exclude the existence of free will.

Randomness in behavior of elementary particles doesn't exclude highly ordered and reasonably reliable systems (on limited time scales) composed of such particles. Why? Because a system composed of a large number of particles acting together is can be structured to behave in a larger orderly way.

How? The macro structure averages out the randomness on the smaller scale (on a sufficiently limited time scale, but often plenty long enough for us!).

In other wording (from about 3 or 4 decades ago in another field but a good parallel) -- "order emerges out of chaos" (quite well).

Also that a macro object (composed of vast numbers of particles) -- such as a human brain -- is largely predictable (e.g. -- 'largely' could mean for instance more than 95% but less than 100%), that is sufficient for it to have a set of reliable characteristics.

In humans terms, we could call that "character" or "personality" -- stable, reliable... A person, distinct, distinct and mostly reliable characteristics....up to a point (less then 100% reliability) but only largely predictable instead of entirely predictable. So, this macro object has a clear consistent character, yet might at times do the unlikely thing instead of the more likely thing. And a structure (such as the human brain) could be built to control or even use the smaller occasional perturbations, mostly, most of them.

So, it doesn't follow that random elementary particle behaviors would necessarily cause a human personality to act random or chaotic, nor make many choices to be random, etc. The brain might (speculation) be structured, even, to take advantage of randomness.

 

[Hans Blaster]

Your inattentiveness is quite annoying and leads you to wrongly accuse me of dishonesty. I offered that as a definition of "decision" not "free will".

I'll send you a bill for my blown out irony meter later... (I wasn't talking about a definition of free will, perhaps you could reread my posts.)

It was your definition of decision or choice (I forget which) such that it was the product of free will by definition. This definition makes it hard for anyone to argue that a decision/choice is *not* from free will since you have defined such thing as intrinsically the product of free will.

I have no idea if you did this on purpose or not, but you did do it.

 

[Bradskii]

Yes so it makes sense that because we are conscious of what is happening, looking deeper, giving attention this implies some level of control because in having that deeper insight and knowledge also gives us agency.

Which is nothing more than making a choice. That in itself doesn't qualify as free will.

Yeah I thought I'd throw that in just to remind that science has not even worked out consciousness let along free will. The idea oThef there being no free will is premised on the assumption that consciousness is a by product of the physical brain.

Naturally. Remove the brain and you won't be conscious any more. Seems to be a link there somewhere...

So I am reminding that any arguement about there being no free will has no basis just like saying there is no consciousness beyond the physical brain. The only way we can ultimately know about free will and consciousness is to ask the subject, the observer who has the actual experiences and whether they believe they are an agent with control or not.

What you can do is ask them why they made the choice they did. Was it random or was it for a particular reason? Was it what they actually desired? Based on all the factors that they were aware of (and most they are not)?

When I say forces I don't mean forced but influential forces like conditioning or subcconscious processes that determine certain behaviours we have little control over. These are always operating in the background. I am saying that despite these influences we are not bound by them all the time.

So things that determine our actions of which we are not aware do not necessarily determine our actions. Can you explain how we overcome influences that we don't know about?

We can intervene and overide these factors. Its more a matter of degrees than an either and or situation. Either antecedents block our free will or are completely absent when they may be present while being able to override these factors in various degrees which may lead to bigger changes and different trajectories that overide these factors.

So what are you making decisions on? On what basis, for what reason do you decide to do A instead of B?

I'm not saying we can act without involving antecedent conditions. I am saying we can act despite these antecendent conditions to various degrees.

Again, what are you basing your choices on? Look, it's not being argued that every single condition is directly responsible for making a decision. It seems that if think that if you can overcome some desire or compulsion that that exhibits free will. It doesn't. Quite often you have desires that contradict each other. I want a cigarette but I want to be healthy. I want to finish this book but I need to make dinner. You need to make a choice. You always need to make a choice. But that doesn't equate to free will. I mean, if it was that simple then there wouldn't have been arguments about this from antiquity onwards.
Plato: There's no free will.
Cephalus: But I just made a conscious decision not to have another glass of wine.
Plato: Darn it! So there IS free will...

I don't know, evolution doesn't really care as far as survival of life.

That would have come as a surprise to Darwin, whose book title included the phrase ...'and the Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life'. Likewise Spencer would have been confused as he coined the term 'Survival of the fittest'.

 

[Bradskii]

But, that decision to overcome past conditioning is itself the result of reasons: suffering has reached an intolerable threshold, acquired knowledge of the causes of this suffering, capacity to imagine a better way, etc. And a combination of those reasons, which accrue prior to the decision making moment, result in your course of action. You cant reach back into the past and tinker with any of those reasons. Thats the determinist argument, and it seems to incorporate your objection re self-improvement.

All effects, including self-improvement decisions, have causes that precede them in time. To start a new uncaused cause in the world or in your life is to be a sort of god.

I read that and I think 'Hey, that's it. We're making progress. He sounds convinced'. But then...

(It is however what I believe in against all the reasoning Ive presented.)

And there's a 'Doh!' moment...

 

[Bradskii]

Let us call one's "internal state of mind" -- one's affections and attitudes -- as one's present preferred or habitual response to the same or similar externalities.

Sometimes called "moral freedom," virtue consists in our having a will that is habitually disposed to will as it ought. Virtue is an acquired liberty which frees us from our disordered appetites or passions. What responsibility does one have to develop virtue?

With our innate power of free choice, each human being is able to change his own character creatively by deciding for himself what he shall do or shall become. We are free to make ourselves whatever we choose to be. Proximately, in the moment, acting freely from our "internal state of mind" is very difficult to do. Remotely, we are far freer, and I would argue, far more responsible to acquire a virtuous character.

Maybe you should think about decision making that doesn't involve the virtuous, the good, what you think we ought to do. It seems that once you attach a moral component to an act then it's free will almost as a matter of course. So what about deciding to eat in or go out? Read the book or watch tv? Stay in bed or get up?

Sure, it's more mundane. But the principles and the process and the antecedent conditions and the decision making, they're are all still there. It can't be different just you think there's something one should do. It can't be the case that there's only free will regarding moral quandaries.

 

[durangodawood]

I read that and I think 'Hey, that's it. We're making progress. He sounds convinced'. But then...

And there's a 'Doh!' moment...

Haha. Well earlier I did explain to you my objection to the determinist argument against free will. I just want to see if any other free will believers have anything better to offer. So far not. Really not.

 

[Bradskii]

So, it doesn't follow that random elementary particle behaviors would necessarily cause a human personality to act random or chaotic, nor make many choices to be random, etc. The brain might (speculation) be structured, even, to take advantage of randomness.

OK, so for the sake of this argument, we'll say that random elementary particles don't cause random behaviour at a macro scale. We'll say it's determinate.

See the problem?

 

[Bradskii]

I'll send you a bill for my blown out irony meter later... (I wasn't talking about a definition of free will, perhaps you could reread my posts.)

It was your definition of decision or choice (I forget which) such that it was the product of free will by definition. This definition makes it hard for anyone to argue that a decision/choice is *not* from free will since you have defined such thing as intrinsically the product of free will.

I have no idea if you did this on purpose or not, but you did do it.

As I said above, there have been countless hours, acres of paper and barrels of ink wasted if free will was simply defined as 'making a decision'. Ah, but not just any decision. But a conscious, internally coherent decision not swayed by conditions or personal first order preferences. Which would then be classed as...a free will decision.

So a free will decision is then defined as a decision one makes with free will. That's a circular argument with quite a tight radius.