Free will and determinism

[partinobodycular]

But if free will is defined as the ability to make decisions that are not determined by prior events

As a point of clarification, are we considering free will to apply only to those choices that we have conscious control over, or can our will be presumed to extend to things such as biases, over which we have little to no conscious control?

In other words... where does one's will actually begin? Shouldn't things such as biases be considered to be an integral part of what makes me... me, and therefore not an external cause of my will, but rather an active and internal participant in my will?

And can't this line of reasoning be extended outward indefinitely to the things which precede my biases? Aren't they also an integral part of what makes me... me. I am the sum of my experiences and the causes behind those experiences. This line of reasoning then blurs the line between 'me' and those determinate causes, because they can all be considered... at least in some manner... to be an integral part of what makes me... me.

Hence, those determinate causes aren't external causes to me and my free will, but rather they're innate components of me and my free will. Thus extending my free will beyond that which I'm consciously aware of... to essentially... everything... and inevitably to that first cause itself.

 

[o_mlly]

I obviously decided to do this rather than something else.

Methinks in the above statement you have resolved your own issue.

 

[o_mlly]

... can our will be presumed to extend to things such as biases, over which we have little to no conscious control?

? Our behaviors are determined by our attitudes, and our attitudes determined by our affections. Biases, our attitudes at a given point in time, are consciously controlled, ie., sustained or eliminated by freely willing to maintain or change our affections.

 

[expos4ever]

I think this is a fascinating topic. I will not attempt in this post to say anything more than this: I am not sure whether what I am about to write is relevant to the matter at hand, but I believe it may be. The use of the word "law" in relation to physics is, I believe, potentially misleading. I believe it would be more accurate to use the word "description", rather than law. I think we overstep with the use of the word law, I think all we can say is it physics describes our world, rather than having the prescriptive power of a law. Some may argue that this is not really relevant distinction to draw. Have at it.

 

[Ophiolite]

What do you mean by "free" there? Uncaused? Indeterminate until a decision decides what happens.

My post is intended to reflect my view that the topic is a veritable rabbit hole that, to mix metaphors, lies well above my pay grade. It was the most concise way I could express that thought.

 

[Maria Billingsley]

If something has happened which causes you to make a decision, then what has happened has already happened. It has, by definition, already been determined.

You do realize that this line of thinking completely undermines Christianity and our faith through the power of prayer. With is theological view there is no room for supplication, repentance or even conversionb ecause it is all predetermined. This is why Calvnism has no logic.
Be blessed.

 

[zippy2006]

My post is intended to reflect my view that the topic is a veritable rabbit hole that, to mix metaphors, lies well above my pay grade. It was the most concise way I could express that thought.

We have the things we take as evidence and then we have the conclusions we draw from that evidence. In the ancient world the primary evidence was taken to be volition (will), for humans obviously act from volition and our worlds are full of humans. Volition was then attributed to other things (or to the forces underlying them), such as thunder and lightning.

In the modern world the primary evidence is taken to be mechanistic interaction (efficient causality). Focusing on efficient causality is helpful to the scientific enterprise, and given the way we prize the scientific enterprise we are prone to favor efficient causality. Thus in the modern world the opposite move occurs. Instead of saying that lightning is a consequence of volition, modern people say that volition is a consequence of lightning (electricity, or efficient causality more generally, or abiogenesis etiologically).

Aristotle noted the obvious fact that volitional and non-volitional realities both exist, and are different. Reducing one to the other is irrational, and betrays bias. The corrective to idealism is to note that matter and its interactions do exist and do count as evidence. The corrective to determinism is to note that volition and its interactions do exist and do count as evidence. Only by superficially reducing one to the other does one arrive at these extremes.

 

[Bradskii]

What you are describing is simply not causal determinism, and thus my objection holds. See: Causal Determinism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

I've read that, and the very first line says exactly what I mean: 'Causal determinism is, roughly speaking, the idea that every event is necessitated by antecedent events and conditions together with the laws of nature.'

If the world works in some way that doesn't align with that then please let me know how you think it does work.

 

[Bradskii]

This seems as good a place as any to mention...

Daniel Dennett, philosophical giant who championed “naturalism,” dead at 82, best known for work on consciousness, free will.​

Well, that's sad news. I was only watching him a couple of days ago talking about this exact subject. Two horsemen down...

 

[Bradskii]

Determinism entails that, in a situation in which a person makes a certain decision or performs a certain action, it is impossible that he or she could have made any other decision or performed any other action. In other words, it is never true that people could have decided or acted otherwise than they actually did.

Indeed ... people are always in the position of choice ... that is what freedom is

I'm not saying that we don't make choices. We obviously do. But the decisions we make are determined by prior conditions. Run the film again and you'll make exactly the same decision every time.

Our brains can reveal our choices before we're even aware of them ... unconscious brain activity.

If you only find out why you made a decision after you made it then that can hardly be described as free will. And this happens a lot more than people realise. A decision will be made unconsciously (there's no 'you' making it) and then you'll convince yourself that it was what 'you' wanted to do post fact.

'Jonathan Haidt of New York University has shown that often, cognitions are post-hoc justifications for feelings and intuitions, to convince ourselves that we have indeed rationally put our finger on why.' Why Your Brain Hates Other People

 

[Bradskii]

-
​

I have done this on a few occasions, one relating to art another to God;s creation

Yes, but something(s) caused you to do it.

 

[Bradskii]

You do realize that this line of thinking completely undermines Christianity and our faith through the power of prayer.

Yes. I can't see a way around that.

 

[d taylor]

Yes, but something(s) caused you to do it.

-​

The cause is seeking in art, growth or a closer approach to representing realistic truth in painting.
In The Bible a better understanding what The Bible was saying about God's creation.

 

[Bradskii]

As a point of clarification, are we considering free will to apply only to those choices that we have conscious control over, or can our will be presumed to extend to things such as biases, over which we have little to no conscious control?

If we have no control over a decision then it obviously cannot be described as free will. The vast majority of the decisions 'we' make are made subconsciously. Just consider exactly what you are doing at this instant. Did you run your hands through your hair? Tap the table? Look across the room? Chew your lip? Whatever you are doing, did you make a conscious decision to do it? Most of the time we're on automatic pilot.

In other words... where does one's will actually begin? Shouldn't things such as biases be considered to be an integral part of what makes me... me, and therefore not an external cause of my will, but rather an active and internal participant in my will?

And can't this line of reasoning be extended outward indefinitely to the things which precede my biases? Aren't they also an integral part of what makes me... me. I am the sum of my experiences and the causes behind those experiences. This line of reasoning then blurs the line between 'me' and those determinate causes, because they can all be considered... at least in some manner... to be an integral part of what makes me... me.

That's where it's led me. From realising that a lot of what I do is when I am on automatic pilot and then trying to work out at what point the 'me' is actually making decisions that are not connected, and in fact not dependent upon, prior conditions. There's input, both realised and unknown, macro and micro, mechanical and biological all dictating the output.

Hence, those determinate causes aren't external causes to me and my free will, but rather they're innate components of me and my free will.

I see literally everything to which I am connected - internal and external, as determining my decisions. What I do is the 'me'. There's no mini-me anywhere, no ghost in the machine.

Methinks in the above statement you have resolved your own issue.

As I said earlier:

'But if free will is defined as the ability to make decisions that are not determined by prior events...'

If you can give me an example of a decision that isn't, then you might be on to something.

 

[Bradskii]

-​

The cause is seeking in art, growth or a closer approach to representing realistic truth in painting.
In The Bible a better understanding what The Bible was saying about God's creation.

So your actions were determined by that cause.

 

[Mark Quayle]

Then you're not a determinist. Something with exceptions is not "comprehensively pervasive."

All one sentence —comprehensively, except. I doubt you were very much confused.

Truth is, as I suppose you suspect, determinism itself is, like reality itself, dependent on first cause.

 

[Jonaitis]

"...then everything that will occur is exactly how it should be."? Have you found the solution to the ' "is—ought" problem'?

Ha! Good point.

 

[o_mlly]

'But if free will is defined as the ability to make decisions that are not determined by prior events...'

If you can give me an example of a decision that isn't, then you might be on to something.

Free will applies only to moral acts. Moral acts (actus humanus) are those human acts upon which one deliberates to an intended effect. Bodily process acts (actus hominis) are all other acts which do not engage reason or will, eg., blinking, digesting, snoring, etc.

While we cannot change history (what has been shall always be), we also cannot replicate exactly a prior historical condition in the future. This is so since having chosen to act in some way at time t, I am affected by the effects of my act at all subsequent times, t +1. One of two changes are possible: in experiencing the effects of his act, the virtuous man is confirmed, or the vicious man is converted.

For instance, at one time my affection for people of Irish descent is negative, my attitude toward them is biased (they are all lazy drunkards), and I publicly berate a particular Irishman who is begging in public. I see the effect: by my act the man is humiliated and departs empty-handed. I learn later that the man was begging in order to feed his children. I freely change my prior affection, my prior attitude changes, and my future behaviors change. So, yes -- all human acts are determined by prior events but that does not negate free will.

 

[d taylor]

So your actions were determined by that cause.

My actions were determined by the belief. That what i was seeing and being explained to by an painter who painted this way. That this was the best way to approach realistic painting.

 

[expos4ever]

I've read that, and the very first line says exactly what I mean: 'Causal determinism is, roughly speaking, the idea that every event is necessitated by antecedent events and conditions together with the laws of nature.'

I have not been reading other posts so perhaps you have covered this "objection": Could it not be the case that "human agency", floating freely from the rest nominal set of physical law, contributes causally to the actions we take? Stated otherwise, what solid arguments are there that exclude the possibility of an "I" inside each of us that is not slavishly obedient to the presently known laws of physics? Note that I am fully aware that we have causal mechanistic explanations for how neuronal activity in the brain is connected to what we do. But is it clear that there is not something else at work?