Free will and determinism

[stevevw]

Then that would be an example of a choice that wasn't a free will one. We don't want those examples.

You missed the point. If there are situations where we can rise up above the antecendents then these are examples of free choice as they are not entirely dictated by the antecedents.

Your assuming because there are antecedents that we therefore have no free will and that we cannot rise above those antecedents through our agency and ability to freely choose in some situations.

 

[Bradskii]

You missed the point. If there are situations where we can rise up above the antecendents then these are examples of free choice as they are not entirely dictated by the antecedents.

Your assuming because there are antecedents that we therefore have no free will and that we cannot rise above those antecedents through our agency and ability to freely choose in some situations.

Well...yes. If a decision is not caused by antecedent conditions then decisions are being made with no consideration of any conditions that pertain to that decision. Does that make sense to you? It doesn't to me.

And it's a simple position to dismantle. If someone makes a choice then just ask them why they made it. The reason(s) given will pertain to those antecedent conditions. They determined the choice. Hence no free will. Else it was arbitrary. And again, hence no free will.

 

[stevevw]

What it's like to feel that we are the person we believe we are, what it's like to be stevevw, isn't the question. It's separate from the process of making decisions. The hard problem of consciousness and free will are two separate matters. Let's not conflate them. 'We have this sense everyday' is not something that anyone is going to accept as evidence. You'll have to do better than that.

It makes sense that consciousness is the ability to be conscious of what is happening event with the antecedents of physical factors. We can know we are subject to forces and also know that we can overcome them. Consciousness is vital to free will because free will requires conscious knowledge as opposed to unconsciousness which would be subject to antecedents and deterministic process but the fact they are subconscious or unconscious processes we cannot know about to intervene into and change.

Folk views of free will and moral responsibility accord a central place to consciousness. conscious action production is considered much more important for free will than is concordance with motivations, values, and character traits. Focusing in particular on two leading views of free will and moral responsibility, namely, Deep Self and Reasons-Responsive Views, I argue that these results present philosophers of mind and action with the following explanatory burden: develop a substantive theory of the connection between consciousness on the one hand and free will and moral responsibility on the other that takes folk views on this connection seriously.

Consciousness, free will, and moral responsibility: Taking the folk seriously

In this paper, I offer evidence that folk views of free will and moral responsibility accord a central place to consciousness. In sections 2 and 3, I contrast action production via conscious states and processes with action in concordance with an agent's ...

www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov

We suggest that the dominant, ordinary usages of ‘consciousness’ concern notions of being awake, aware, and exercising control, all of which bear a clear connection to free will. Based on this, we argue that findings purporting to show that people take the capacity for phenomenal consciousness to be necessary for free will are better interpreted in terms of a non-phenomenal understanding of consciousness. We explore this suggestion by calling on extant work on the dimensions of mind perception, and we expand on it, presenting the results of a new study employing a global sample.

http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/19556/

Scientists are not even close to discovering how the brain creates conscious experience. Somehow, brain processes acquire a subjective aspect, which at present seem impenetrable to classical science.

Consciousness, Free Will, and the Mind

Old-school neuroscientists have ascribed to the brain a singular and dominant importance that has long discouraged research into differences between brain and mind.

www.psychologytoday.com

Then give me an example where a decision was made without an antecedent cause.

Your once again assuming that the antecedents cause people to be totally devoid of the ability to overcome them in being a conscious agent. As consciousness agents we can even be aware of the fact that we are subject to outside forces and yet still are able to make conscious decisions that are meaninful and can overcome those forces.

Its more or less the forces of consciousness which can operate on a level beyond or outside the antecedents against the forces of antecedents. There is nothing stopping consciousness as a force overpowering some antecedents or deterministic processes.

The observer is part of reality and doesn't collapse anything. Random events many levels of magnitude below what we are discussing are not going to change your decision about going to the pub or the gym.

If quantum behaviour is fundemental that means its also fundemental to reality, to the macro world. All things are based on quatum physics at the fundemental level just like all solid objects are basically nothing 99% non physical at the fundemental level.

As mentioned there are some experiments that are applying quatum behaviour to the macro world. So already we are seeing its not just limited to the quantum world. Its just a matter of understanding at this time. But certainly if the macro and micro worlds are part of the same reality and that the micro world is actually fundemental to reality then they are connected.

The observers mind, consciousness is not part of the same kind of reality we apply to the macro world and is more in tune with the quantum world. I like what Stapp has to say on the observer.

He says that consciousness should be treated differently to the objective world of physical reality like the measuring instruments which are also part of the physiucal world we are measuring. The conscious observer can act on the physical world, comes in seperately, and is a different kind of phenomena.

In his seminal paper “Quantum theory and the role of mind in nature”, Henry Stapp argues: “From the point of view of the mathematics of quantum theory it makes no sense to treat a measuring device as intrinsically different from the collection of atomic constituents that make it up. A device is just another part of the physical universe… Moreover, the conscious thoughts of a human observer ought to be causally connected most directly and immediately to what is happening in his brain, not to what is happening out at some measuring device… Our bodies and brains thus become…parts of the quantum mechanically described physical universe. Treating the entire physical universe in this unified way provides a conceptually simple and logically coherent theoretical foundation…”(H. P. Stapp, 2001).

According to Stapp, two factors seem to be involved in any measurement: the observer (the one who is asking the question) and the observed (i.e., matter/nature). However, according to Stapp (who was a collaborator of Werner Heisenberg), quantum theory transcends this dualistic dichotomy between epistemology and ontology because it was realized that the only “thing” that really existed is knowledge. That is, ontology is always defined by epistemology which is primary. In simple terms, knowledge (a faculty of the human mind) is primary and matter secondary (i.e., Stapp argues for “the primacy of consciousness”
The Kochen-Specker theorem and the role of the observer in quantum physics | ॐ Homepage of Dr. Christopher B. Germann (Ph.D., M.Sc., B.Sc. / Marie Curie Alumnus)

The most radical change wrought by this switch to quantum mechanics is the injection directly into the dynamics of certain choices made by human beings about how they will act. Human actions enter, of course, also in classical physics. But the two cases are fundamentally different. In the classical case the way a person acts is fully determined in principle by the physically described aspects of reality alone. But in the quantum case there is an essential gap in physical causation.

This gap is generated by Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle, which opens up, at the level of human actions, a range of alternative possible behaviors between which the physically described aspects of theory are in principle unable to choose or decide. But this loss-in-principle of causal definiteness, associated with a loss of knowable-in-principle physically describable information, opens the way, logically, to an input into the dynamics of another kind of possible causes, which are eminently knowable, both in principle and in practice, namely our conscious choices about how we will act.

By virtue of this filling of the causal gap, the most important demand of intuition—namely that one’s conscious efforts have the capacity to affect one’s own bodily actions—is beautifully met by the quantum ontology.
https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-03633-1_14

The illusion of free will does give us a sense that we are autonomous. It is exceptionally difficult to live any other way. It's quite possibly an evolutionary disadvantage to think that we don't have free will.

Perhaps the illusion of free will isn't an illusion afterall. If we are free agents to some degree then our conscious experience that we are more than just passive and programmed entities and are actually participants in creating outcomes and reality then it makes sense that we also know this to be true and thats why we have this in our minds.

Otherwise we are actually denying our own agency, our own ability to make a difference which seems counter productive and unreal in that we actually can make a difference in real life.

 

[stevevw]

Well...yes. If a decision is not caused by antecedent conditions then decisions are being made with no consideration of any conditions that pertain to that decision. Does that make sense to you? It doesn't to me.

But your not considering that decisions can be made despite the antecedents which can break the antecedence. You assuming that free will must be based on no antecedence becauser antecedents must nullify the ability to make free choices.

But we can make free choices despite the antecedents and in absence of antecendents. In other words we are not entirely subject to antecedents. We can rise above this through our conscious awareness of ourselves, the world and even the fact that we are subject to antecendents.

And it's a simple position to dismantle. If someone makes a choice then just ask them why they made it. The reason(s) given will pertain to those antecedent conditions. They determined the choice. Hence no free will. Else it was arbitrary. And again, hence no free will.

But your assuming the only factors involved are the antecedents. You deminishing the power and influence of consciousness itself. If consciousness is the the result of antecents then it can also in spite, above and over the antecendents.

Its the fact that we can inject a non antecendent aspect of ourselves, of reality into the equation which adds the dimension of our minds which expands the knowledge and ability of humans is what can overcome the antecedents. If you take the materialist view that all there is are physical and material causes and determinants then of course you will limit human ability to robotic mechanical processes of cause and effect.

But when you add the dimension and power of mind, of knowledge about reality beyond the materialist view you suddenly open up a deeper reality of human capacity that transcnds the material processes and allows us to act on and beyond these material processes. Its a matter of epistemology over ontology. A matter of assumptions and the paradigm you choose as to what is fundemental to how the world and humans work.

 

[Bradskii]

It makes sense that consciousness is the ability to be conscious of what is happening event with the antecedents of physical factors.

No problem. This is just comparing conscious decision making with an unconscious process.

conscious action production is considered much more important for free will than is concordance with motivations, values, and character traits.

I've mentioned first and second order decisions earlier. Motivation, value and character would be first order decisions. A conscious second order decision would be to override the first order. You feel like a cigarette as a first order desire but the second order desire is to stay healthy.

And as he goes on to say:

We suggest that the dominant, ordinary usages of ‘consciousness’ concern notions of being awake, aware, and exercising control, all of which bear a clear connection to free will.

It's hard not to put a 'Gosh...really?' at this point. Of course we assume that someone is 'awake, aware and exercising control' when we think about whether they are exhibiting free will. Or not. As he goes on to say: 'Most participants attribute free will to conscious agents, but not to nonconscious agents.' So the thrust of his paper is appears to be free will comparisons between conscious and non-conscious agents.

I'll read the paper this evening and comment further.

Scientists are not even close to discovering how the brain creates conscious experience. Somehow, brain processes acquire a subjective aspect, which at present seem impenetrable to classical science.

This is talking about qualia. Part of the hard problem. Not part of free will decision making.

Your once again assuming that the antecedents cause people to be totally devoid of the ability to overcome them in being a conscious agent. As consciousness agents we can even be aware of the fact that we are subject to outside forces and yet still are able to make conscious decisions that are meaninful and can overcome those forces.

There is a difference in an action being determined and one being forced. Antecedent conditions don't necessarily force one to act (unless it's something like a person holding a gun to your head). I'm not talking about conditions forcing a decision. The conditions lead invariably to the decision being determined.

This again relates to second order desires. There is a compulsion to have a cigarette, to have another drink, to look at inappropriate content, but yes, you can overcome those desires - those forces as you put it. Because you desire to overcome them. Conditions are such that your desire not to risk cancer is your predominant desire over and above that of having a cigarette.

Again, there is a reason for each decision. To stay healthy in this case. Which would be one of the antecedent conditions that overrides all others and determines your decision. And again, if you think we can act without involving antecedent conditions, then give me an example and we'll discuss it.

Its more or less the forces of consciousness which can operate on a level beyond or outside the antecedents against the forces of antecedents. There is nothing stopping consciousness as a force overpowering some antecedents or deterministic processes.

There are an infinite number of prior conditions. Going back for ever. You are rather obviously going to consider some more important than others.

If quantum behaviour is fundemental that means its also fundemental to reality, to the macro world. All things are based on quatum physics at the fundemental level just like all solid objects are basically nothing 99% non physical at the fundemental level.

As mentioned there are some experiments that are applying quatum behaviour to the macro world. So already we are seeing its not just limited to the quantum world. Its just a matter of understanding at this time. But certainly if the macro and micro worlds are part of the same reality and that the micro world is actually fundemental to reality then they are connected.

You keep pushing this. But by definition quantum behaviour is random. So forget about whether a quantum event can make you decide to go to the gym as opposed to the pub (it can't). It's random. Random events do not equate to free will.

The observers mind, consciousness is not part of the same kind of reality we apply to the macro world and is more in tune with the quantum world.

Which is random...

Perhaps the illusion of free will isn't an illusion afterall. If we are free agents to some degree then our conscious experience that we are more than just passive and programmed entities and are actually participants in creating outcomes and reality then it makes sense that we also know this to be true and thats why we have this in our minds.

Otherwise we are actually denying our own agency...

To an extent, yes. Hence the illusion. Because I don't think we'd have evolved to this point without thinking that we had agency.

 

[Bradskii]

But your not considering that decisions can be made despite the antecedents which can break the antecedence. You assuming that free will must be based on no antecedence becauser antecedents must nullify the ability to make free choices.

But we can make free choices despite the antecedents and in absence of antecendents. In other words we are not entirely subject to antecedents. We can rise above this through our conscious awareness of ourselves, the world and even the fact that we are subject to antecendents.

The prior conditions determine our actions. Determine our choices. They constitute the reasons why we do what we do. Otherwise...there is no reason. And yet again, you need to give me an example of a decision made without a reason which determined that decision. And if you do I'll explain to you that it was arbitrary.

But your assuming the only factors involved are the antecedents. You deminishing the power and influence of consciousness itself. If consciousness is the the result of antecents then it can also in spite, above and over the antecendents.

Consciousness is not the result of any antecedents. It's what enables us to ponder them. To consider the conditions. To weigh the pros and conns. To reach a decision about what we desire to do. To say 'it's wrong to assume that the only factors are the antecedents' is no more than saying it's wrong to consider the matter at all. Your choices can only be made in light of the the factors that affect it. How can you make a decision without doing that? It would be like me saying that you have to take the red pill or the blue one. 'But what does each do?' Hey, you'll need to make the call without that knowledge.

Its the fact that we can inject a non antecendent aspect of ourselves, of reality into the equation which adds the dimension of our minds which expands the knowledge and ability of humans is what can overcome the antecedents.

You yourself, your character, your wants and desires, your moral position, your beliefs, your knowledge, they are some of the antecedents.

If you take the materialist view that all there is are physical and material causes and determinants then of course you will limit human ability to robotic mechanical processes of cause and effect.

Pretty much. But you don't have to live like that. If it's too depressing a conclusion then reject it.

 

[Bradskii]

Having read that paper...


An early statement in it:

‘...the basic idea has been to identify a subset of an agent's motivating psychological elements as privileged for self-determination and responsibility, such that as long as one's actions are ultimately governed by this subset, they count as one's own and thus render one eligible for responsibility-responses to them.’

This is simply wrong. Our psychological make-up was determined by conditions over which we had no control. The decisions we make are themselves then partly determined by it whether we are conscious of that happening or not.

The author goes on to contrast first level desires with second level ones and claims that the latter has a greater impact. No surprise there and no argument from me.

‘I directly contrast behavior produced by elements of an agent's Deep Self—that is, by elements of an agent's interior life (e.g., motivations, values, and convictions) that the agent clearly endorses—with behavior produced by an agent's conscious mental processes (or Conscious Self).’

This appears to be the general thrust of the paper. That there is a general feeling (a folk view as he puts it) that people consider someone has greater responsibility when they make a conscious decision (second level) versus an inbuilt subconscious desire (first level). There was nothing else worth commenting on.

 

[o_mlly]

I have no power against you here. Nor do I want it. But I will call what I see, within the rules.

It really read like you said he is lying. But perhaps you didnt mean it that way? If so, my apologies.

"How many times will I have to repeat this: Making a decision does not equate with free will." The quote offered was a reply to the foregoing OP's contention that repeating his opinion often enough magically raises that opinion to become fact.

 

[o_mlly]

I've been intermittently reading this tread with a few "likes", but that was pretty low.

That kind of error often occurs when one just "intermittently" reads anything.

This is an attempt to "win" the argument by definition of terms. If a choice from multiple options is definitionally an act of free will then anyone even contemplating any alternative has not terms to use since it is the ability to make a choice freely that does or does not happen.

"If a choice from multiple options is definitionally" ... a decision. Do you have an alternative definition of choice?

Topping it off with your poor understanding of evolution, I see.

You are not keeping up with the literature, I see. Another symptom of being "intermittently" involved.

 

[2PhiloVoid]

If I wanted to poke holes in the Christian faith then struggling to convince people that there is no free will seems like a dumb way to do it. It's not like Christianity isn't riddled with other contradictions which I could spend umpteen threads discussing. Not that I'd want to.

So it's not that you could be wrong. You are wrong.

Ok. That's fine if I'm wrong on this point. I'll assume I can take you at your word on this count.

 

[o_mlly]

So you think that you can freely choose to do an immoral act yet you could not be culpable for that act?

Already explained. It is possible.

Surely we determine culpability by the freedom someone had in choosing to act. If someone was forced to steal because his family were threatened then we'd absolve him of responsibility. It was not a free decision. So if you say that a person's upbringing might eliminate their culpability for an act then you are granting that his actions were not entirely free.

If you insist that he was free in making the choice, then you'd have to accept that the guy robbing the bank was free in the same sense.

You can't have it both ways...

No two ways about it. There is both free will and there is also the free act.

The freedom to do otherwise requires not just that an agent could have acted differently if he had willed differently, but also that he could have willed differently. Coercion is a strong impediment to the latter.

If the person was the cause of the determination of his own will, he was free in that action, and blame is justly imputed to him. But if another being was the cause of this determination then the determination is the act and deed of that being and blame is solely imputed to him.

 

[Bradskii]

The freedom to do otherwise requires not just that an agent could have acted differently if he had willed differently, but also that he could have willed differently.

But we were talking about someone whose upbringing was so horrendous that it undoubtedly would have had an affect on him. And as you said in regard to that:

'Some through no fault of their own lack the complete freedom to will otherwise. Such constraining conditions may mitigate or even eliminate the person's culpability for bad choices.'

So there was no third person forcing a decision. It was his alone. But we agree that culpability was at a minimum mitigated and possibly eliminated. There was no coercion as regards his will or his act. In fact, we can exclude acts that are coerced - they aren't the type of acts with which we are concerned. They are obviously not prompted by free will choices. There's no dispute so nothing to discuss.

So...if an obviously horrendous set of circumstances, beyond a person's control can determine his or her decisions, if as you said 'through no fault of their own lack the complete freedom to will otherwise' then those decisions are patently not free will decisions.

The point being made is that it's not just a lack of education or a lousy family life that determines our decisions. It's also a world class education and a fantastically loving and caring house and home. If we had a pair of twin boys and one was brought up in one situation and one in the other, then do we say that one set of circumstances determined the decision making process and the other didn't?

 

[o_mlly]

So...if an obviously horrendous set of circumstances, beyond a person's control can determine his or her decisions, if as you said 'through no fault of their own lack the complete freedom to will otherwise' then those decisions are patently not free will decisions.

No, that's not my position. The free will to act is a separate from the issue of determining the actor's culpability for the act.

The person who hands his wallet over to the robber that holds a gun to his head makes a free will decision. As always, we choose the apparent good. The person believes his life a higher good than his wallet.

He could have done otherwise:

The person who steals that wallet also makes a free will decision to rob another. In determining the robber's culpability, circumstances may or may not affect the determination as to the extent of the robber's culpability. However, whatever mitigating factors there may be, the robber's act remains a free will act to steal.

 

[durangodawood]

....
He could have done otherwise:
....

At any decision making moment, the reasons for choosing X are what they are: external facts, internal state of mind. On what basis can a person make a different decision resulting from those same reasons?

Thats what Im looking for here.

 

[Bradskii]

No, that's not my position. The free will to act is a separate from the issue of determining the actor's culpability for the act.

But you literally said 'through no fault of their own lack the complete freedom to will otherwise'. You are agreeing that a damaged upbringing causes a lack of free will.

The person who hands his wallet over to the robber that holds a gun to his head makes a free will decision.

I note that you need to differentiate between what you class as making a free will decision from simply making a decision. If they were one and the same thing then the addition of 'free will' would never be required. That said, there has never been anyone who would accept that making the decision (which one is obviously doing as there are two options available) whilst being constrained in such a manner could ever be described as one made with free will. You have taken a liberty with the definition which simply does not hold.

In both cases we have people making a decision. It has already been agreed that in the first example there is a lack of free will. And there most definitely is in the second. Read any literature by anyone on either side of the debate and you'll see such situations being used as examples of a decision which has been coerced to plainly illustrate a lack of free will. You are welcome to find any similar situation described by anyone at any time that says differently.

That said, there is obviously no culpability if someone is coerced in that way to commit a crime, simply because and only because it is deemed to not be a decision made with free will. So if neither examples have free will then neither person is culpable.

The person who steals that wallet also makes a free will decision to rob another. In determining the robber's culpability, circumstances may or may not affect the determination as to the extent of the robber's culpability. However, whatever mitigating factors there may be, the robber's act remains a free will act to steal.

You seem to want your cake and eat it. If there is no free will, then there is no culpability. Because they, 'through no fault of their own lack the complete freedom to will otherwise'. If there is free will then the person must be culpable. Because he freely chose to steal. Nothing determined his actions. Oh, except maybe they did and there could be circumstances which partly determined the act.

Seems like you're covering all bases...

 

[o_mlly]

At any decision making moment, the reasons for choosing X are what they are: external facts, internal state of mind. On what basis can a person make a different decision resulting from those same reasons?

Let us call one's "internal state of mind" -- one's affections and attitudes -- as one's present preferred or habitual response to the same or similar externalities.

Sometimes called "moral freedom," virtue consists in our having a will that is habitually disposed to will as it ought. Virtue is an acquired liberty which frees us from our disordered appetites or passions. What responsibility does one have to develop virtue?

With our innate power of free choice, each human being is able to change his own character creatively by deciding for himself what he shall do or shall become. We are free to make ourselves whatever we choose to be. Proximately, in the moment, acting freely from our "internal state of mind" is very difficult to do. Remotely, we are far freer, and I would argue, far more responsible to acquire a virtuous character.

 

[durangodawood]

....With our innate power of free choice, each human being is able to change his own character creatively by deciding for himself what he shall do or shall become. We are free to make ourselves whatever we choose to be......

Thats the crux of it right there.

But, that decision to overcome past conditioning is itself the result of reasons: suffering has reached an intolerable threshold, acquired knowledge of the causes of this suffering, capacity to imagine a better way, etc. And a combination of those reasons, which accrue prior to the decision making moment, result in your course of action. You cant reach back into the past and tinker with any of those reasons. Thats the determinist argument, and it seems to incorporate your objection re self-improvement.

All effects, including self-improvement decisions, have causes that precede them in time. To start a new uncaused cause in the world or in your life is to be a sort of god. (It is however what I believe in against all the reasoning Ive presented.)

 

[stevevw]

No problem. This is just comparing conscious decision making with an unconscious process.

Yes but its not "just' comparing but an important destinction. A conscious deliberation is different to an unconscious one. The main difference is that unlike most unconscious ones consciousness involves a deeper level of awareness, of self in the equation and of certain knowledge about reality that non conscious process don't have which can make a difference to reality. .

I've mentioned first and second order decisions earlier. Motivation, value and character would be first order decisions. A conscious second order decision would be to override the first order. You feel like a cigarette as a first order desire but the second order desire is to stay healthy.

And as he goes on to say:

It's hard not to put a 'Gosh...really?' at this point. Of course we assume that someone is 'awake, aware and exercising control' when we think about whether they are exhibiting free will. Or not. As he goes on to say: 'Most participants attribute free will to conscious agents, but not to nonconscious agents.' So the thrust of his paper is appears to be free will comparisons between conscious and non-conscious agents.

I'll read the paper this evening and comment further.

Yes so it makes sense that because we are conscious of what is happening, looking deeper, giving attention this implies some level of control because in having that deeper insight and knowledge also gives us agency.

This is talking about qualia. Part of the hard problem. Not part of free will decision making.

Yeah I thought I'd throw that in just to remind that science has not even worked out consciousness let along free will. The idea of there being no free will is premised on the assumption that consciousness is a by product of the physical brain. Hense if the subjective belief and experience of consciousness is caused by a physical antecedent or mechanism then so is free will. If consciousness is something beyond the physical brain which enables agents to have a degree of control over the physical then free will makes more sense.

So I am reminding that any arguement about there being no free will has no basis just like saying there is no consciousness beyond the physical brain. The only way we can ultimately know about free will and consciousness is to ask the subject, the observer who has the actual experiences and whether they believe they are an agent with control or not because that is 1st hand evidence and not 3rd hand rationalisations based on a limited measure of quantity of a qualitative experience.

There is a difference in an action being determined and one being forced. Antecedent conditions don't necessarily force one to act (unless it's something like a person holding a gun to your head). I'm not talking about conditions forcing a decision. The conditions lead invariably to the decision being determined.

When I say forces I don't mean forced but influential forces like conditioning or subcconscious processes that determine certain behaviours we have little control over. These are always operating in the background. I am saying that despite these influences we are not bound by them all the time.

We can intervene and overide these factors. Its more a matter of degrees than an either and or situation. Either antecedents block our free will or are completely absent when they may be present while being able to override these factors in various degrees which may lead to bigger changes and different trajectories that overide these factors.

This again relates to second order desires. There is a compulsion to have a cigarette, to have another drink, to look at inappropriate content, but yes, you can overcome those desires - those forces as you put it. Because you desire to overcome them. Conditions are such that your desire not to risk cancer is your predominant desire over and above that of having a cigarette.

Again, there is a reason for each decision. To stay healthy in this case. Which would be one of the antecedent conditions that overrides all others and determines your decision. And again, if you think we can act without involving antecedent conditions, then give me an example and we'll discuss it.

I'm not saying we can act without involving antecedent conditions. I am saying we can act despite these antecendent conditions to various degrees. It doesn't have to be complete absense of antecedents and complete and total control. Its a bit of both depending on the individual and in some cases people can lose all control and be subject to the prior conditioning which makes it harder for them to have control and agency.

But at the same time others can have more control. I think its a case of aligning yourself with reality, tuning in so to speak which allows a person to gain a deeper level of agency and control. Thats why I think the spiritual and transcendent needs are important as they help develop that part of self which rises above the material world and gives more ability and control to be in touch with self and reality.

This actually has some support in that those with belief in spirtuality have better health, wellbeing and life outcomes and are not subject to pathologies but rise above. Any great achievement in life though physical ability is important really comes from the inner strength, the mindset that overcomes all odds and gives almost superhuman ability.

You keep pushing this. But by definition quantum behaviour is random. So forget about whether a quantum event can make you decide to go to the gym as opposed to the pub (it can't). It's random. Random events do not equate to free will.

Quantum physics is random until the observation and measure is taken. Its also about how we measure and the type of questions we ask of reality. So in that sense though it is random at the quantum level we find it collapses into a non radom state when consciously observed and measured.

In that sense the observations and choices we make about reality, about the world, about our world and lives in some aspects collapse down into certain outcomes over others. So you can choose to get fit or choose to be a slob and this will have a real consequence in the world and create a certain reality.

This same idea can also be applied to groups of conscious observers culturally and socially. How we choose to set ourselves up, treat the world, see the world have a bearing on the world and how we see the world.

Which is random...

But our minds cannot be reduced to the quantum world like all physical aspects which contain particles and physics. Our conscious observations are not physical or measured in physics. Rather its a direct conscious experience of the physical world. So in that sense when we make choices and measures of what we observe we are injecting our consciousness into the physical and creating the state as a result.

We can observe directly the quantum world through an apartus but we are not reducibel to the aparatus or the physical constitutes of what we are measuring. In that sense what we choose to measure and observe, the questions we ask are what creates reality.

To an extent, yes. Hence the illusion. Because I don't think we'd have evolved to this point without thinking that we had agency.

I don't know, evolution doesn't really care as far as survival of life. The most proficent and robust life are bacteria who I don;t think have agency. Yet they perform better evolutionary than eukaryotes.

So I don't think its about agency as far as survival is concerned as other creatures with no agency or less agency have done just as well in survival terms. We have only been around a fraction of the time.

Its more than agency and consciousness are a qualitative aspect rather than a necessity for quantative evolution. We have evolved to a higher level of quality that enriches our lives as opposed to other creatures. The question of why is still an ongoing research. But certainly evolution is inadequate to explain consciousness and agency considering that it deals with the physical aspects like genes, proteins, DNA ect and theres no genes for consciousness or subjective experiences.