Free will and determinism

[Akita Suggagaki]

All decisions we make are determined by existing and prior influences. There has been an effectively infinite chain of events which has resulted in me sitting here writing this sentence. They have all led to this point. From the major events - I was born at a specific time and place, to the minor ones - it's raining today, to the seemingly inconsequential - I broke a string on my guitar last night.

There is no way that existence cannot be described other than determined.

The question is then not whether we make decisions that affect the trajectory of future events - I obviously decided to do this rather than something else. But if free will is defined as the ability to make decisions that are not determined by prior events and we could rerun the last hour exactly as it happened and make a different decision, then something actually needs to be different. But rerunning it exactly as it happened means that nothing is different.

So free will cannot be compatible with determinism. And if existence is deterministic then free will is an illusion.

Maybe you are giving to much power to "prior influences". Did your broken guitar string last night determine your breakfast his morning?

 

[durangodawood]

All decisions we make are determined by existing and prior influences. There has been an effectively infinite chain of events which has resulted in me sitting here writing this sentence......

How do you know that theres not some emergent property of mind that could be the origin of new uncaused causes?

 

[Bradskii]

Externalities may influence but they do not determine one's acts. Even though influenced, one can, and often does, deviate from the received values, opinions, morals, etc. of others. "My parents, teachers and others told me to never steal but I just wanted that thing soooo badly ... I hated him sooo much ..."

Everything is external. That's the point. It may be raining, so you don't go to the beach. That's external. But you say that you may not go because you're in a bad mood. And that's not external. But you're in a bad mood because of...some condition, some event external to you that determined your mood. You can't decide to be in a bad mood. You can't choose it.

Then you might say that you're depressed. And that's internal. It's a fault within the brain itself. But you didn't choose that. It was outside your control. It's not a conscious decision.

In passing, France has often been associated with crime passionell, which reduces the punishment for crimes of passion. Hey, why didn't he just choose to not shoot his wife's lover? He had free will. Ah, but the conditions determined his actions and he was therefore less culpable. Southern states, where honour is paramount, hold similar views. Texas for example will reduce a murder charge to second degree as noted below:

'At the punishment stage of a trial, the defendant may raise the issue as to whether he caused the death under the immediate influence of sudden passion arising from an adequate cause. If the defendant proves the issue in the affirmative by a preponderance of the evidence, the offense is a felony of the second degree.' PENAL CODE CHAPTER 19. CRIMINAL HOMICIDE

So it's accepted in some societies that emotions do actually determine one's actions to the point where it discounts free will. The question is then, why stop there? Why discount other conditions that were beyond the control of the person involved and which determined their actions?

 

[Bradskii]

Those are the premises of the OP. He responded to the post where I challenged the testability of his premises but he did not give a reply to my challenge. I'm patient.

They are not the premises of the argument. They are hypothetical conditions to illustrate the argument. And yeah, they're imagined. They are not real. As Swampman is not real. As the brain in a vat is not real. Arguments on identity don't succeed or fail because there aren't any physical brains in actual vats. Good heaven's, it's a hypothetical.

 

[Bradskii]

Maybe you are giving to much power to "prior influences". Did your broken guitar string last night determine your breakfast his morning?

I had to drive to the guitar store to get another set of strings. It's about 15 minutes from my place. And I have to drive past a bakers which has the best pan de chocolate that you've ever had. So my wife told me to stop off and get some. We had them for breakfast.

 

[Bradskii]

How do you know that theres not some emergent property of mind that could be the origin of new uncaused causes?

You might say that consciousness is an emergent property of all that chemical and electrical activity happening in your brain. But all those neurons are firing because of some prior event. They were caused by some event. The process was determined by something.

The neurons themselves didn't make the decision to have croissants this morning. They just do what neurons do. Just like individual ants don't decide to build an ant hill. The result of all those neurons and ants doing what neurons and ants do is what might be described as an emergent artifact, but the process whereby it came into existence is still deterministic.

 

[durangodawood]

You might say that consciousness is an emergent property of all that chemical and electrical activity happening in your brain. But all those neurons are firing because of some prior event. They were caused by some event. The process was determined by something.

The neurons themselves didn't make the decision to have croissants this morning. They just do what neurons do. Just like individual ants don't decide to build an ant hill. The result of all those neurons and ants doing what neurons and ants do is what might be described as an emergent artifact, but the process whereby it came into existence is still deterministic.

I think its too soon to tell whether reflective consciousness can or cannot be the origin of a truly novel cause, which then effects "downward" causation upon various neurons. Im not saying this IS the case. Its just seems a bit overconfident to be sure its not.

 

[Bradskii]

I think its too soon to tell whether reflective consciousness can or cannot be the origin of a truly novel cause, which then effects "downward" causation upon various neurons.

Neurons do what neurons do. They are caused to do it. When an action potential is received by an individual neuron it causes neurotransmitters to be released to pass on a specific message. That is not in itself a decision. But enough neurons sending enough messages will result in a decision. It will cause a decision to be made. And that's the end of the process.

I don't really know what 'downward causation' could possibly be. An action eminating from...somewhere and somehow, that doesn't involve any known process that then works backward to cause the neurons to act in a certain way to then make the decision..?

At the very least all that's proposed there is kicking the can further down the road. If it's a deterministic universe - and I've never see any evidence to the contrary (except at the quantum level and that's very many orders of magnitude below anything we're talking about) then whatever that action was must have been caused by something.

There's just no room for free will anywhere in that.

 

[o_mlly]

You can't decide to be in a bad mood. You can't choose it.

Au contraire!

https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/science-choice/201712/choose-your-feelings.

So it's accepted in some societies that emotions do actually determine one's actions to the point where it discounts free will. The question is then, why stop there? Why discount other conditions that were beyond the control of the person involved and which determined their actions?

Emotions, as I already stated, may mitigate but not eliminate one's responsibilities for one's acts as both your examples show. The offending party in both examples is not acquitted; a lesser charge is applied.

They are not the premises of the argument. They are hypothetical conditions to illustrate the argument. And yeah, they're imagined. They are not real.

Not real? OK. So, you imagine and just feel like you don't have a free will but have no argument in support. Why did you not start your thread with that? No one will argue with how you feel, only with how you think. And those challenges -- show me an exact copy of me that could act differently, show me an exact future repeat of history that is different -- you threw out to posters to prove your feelings were wrong, well, that was just an inside joke, right? Or are you now backpedaling as fast as possible?

 

[2PhiloVoid]

Neurons do what neurons do. They are caused to do it. When an action potential is received by an individual neuron it causes neurotransmitters to be released to pass on a specific message. That is not in itself a decision. But enough neurons sending enough messages will result in a decision. It will cause a decision to be made. And that's the end of the process.

I don't really know what 'downward causation' could possibly be. An action eminating from...somewhere and somehow, that doesn't involve any known process that then works backward to cause the neurons to act in a certain way to then make the decision..?

At the very least all that's proposed there is kicking the can further down the road. If it's a deterministic universe - and I've never see any evidence to the contrary (except at the quantum level and that's very many orders of magnitude below anything we're talking about) then whatever that action was must have been caused by something.

There's just no room for free will anywhere in that.

In reflecting upon what you're saying here, the questions that come to my mind are: have you looked for evidence to the contrary? Or have you merely stayed within the confines of just one operative interpretive lens of study regarding how we perceive the operative nature of our universe and of our minds?

I'm just asking, Bradskii, because I know that from what you've shared in the past, the field of Evolutionary Psychology plays a big role in your overall thinking. I'm not sure I know what your view is on the Nature of Science, but I think we do make choices about which epistemic modus operandi (i.e. praxis) we'll employ at any given time, even if and when we're attempting to do science. Surely, at some level, even a minimal one, this also plays a role in 'how' we interpret the concept of determinism, or its converse.

On the other hand, I realize I may be asking you this out of my own preformed ideation about the nature of 'determinism' because I've never really liked the topic ever since it was briefly introduced to me in that 'Intro to Philosophy' course I took so long ago...

 

[Bradskii]

Au contraire!

https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/science-choice/201712/choose-your-feelings.

From the link:

'In short, we can liberate ourselves from destructive emotions, such as anger and disappointment, by developing a capacity to choose how to interpret and evaluate the situation...'

It doesn't say that you can choose your emotions. It means that you can reinterprate them as an unbidden, and and often negative reaction and accept them as being something you cannot control. As he goes on to say:

'This cannot be accomplished simply by an act of will, by wanting them to go away.'

Exactly right. You can't will yourself to not be angry. But you can understand that anger, for example, is something outside of your personal control and adjust your reactions to it accordingly.

The author is not saying that you can control your emotions. But that you can decide how to react to them. He is supporting my position.

Emotions, as I already stated, may mitigate but not eliminate one's responsibilities for one's acts as both your examples show. The offending party in both examples is not acquitted; a lesser charge is applied.

Just extrapolate. What you're effectively saying is that 'well, you're kinda correct, up to a point, in some circumstances, under certain conditions'. And some people are indeed considered to be judged innocent when there are mitigating circumstances.

Not real? OK. So, you imagine and just feel like you don't have a free will but have no argument in support.

Whose posts are you reading? I've never said I don't feel like I have free will. I said just the opposite. It feels exactly like I have free will. Everyone feels the same. It's the very reason why it's so difficult to the convince anyone that it doesn't exist.

And those challenges -- show me an exact copy of me that could act differently, show me an exact future repeat of history that is different -- you threw out to posters to prove your feelings were wrong, well, that was just an inside joke, right? Or are you now backpedaling as fast as possible?

Good grief...

No-one has asked for anyone to show a concrete example of history exactly repeating. Or examples of an exact copy of anyone. They are thought experiments for heaven's sake. Hypotheticals to consider. You really don't seem to understand the concept. How many times are you going to illustrate it?

 

[Bradskii]

In reflecting upon what you're saying here, the questions that come to my mind are: have you looked for evidence to the contrary? Or have you merely stayed within the confines of just one operative interpretive lens of study regarding how we perceive the operative nature of our universe and of our minds?

This has been the result of very many years of investigation of the pros and conns. And a very gradual change of opinion. There has been no single eureka moment when the pieces all fell into a place. It's been a very gradual realisation. To the point, relatively recently, when I decided that a position of agnosticism on this matter was no longer a valid option. I'm now firmly in one camp.

But I'll gladly admit that I'm arguing for a position that I don't actually feel is correct. And I find it more than difficult to come to terms with the consequences.

 

[2PhiloVoid]

This has been the result of very many years of investigation of the pros and conns. And a very gradual change of opinion. There has been no single eureka moment when the pieces all fell into a place. It's been a very gradual realisation. To the point, relatively recently, when I decided that a position of agnosticism on this matter was no longer a valid option. I'm now firmly in one camp.

But I'll gladly admit that I'm arguing for a position that I don't actually feel is correct. And I find it more than difficult to come to terms with the consequences.

That makes sense and I can understand the ambiguous feelings that can exist in that position. And admittedly, maybe I don't know enough about determinism to have a firm opinion on it either way, or maybe I'm just too skeptical about too many things, but I do know that I have a difficult time perceiving that any one conceptual position in the free-will vs. determinism debate is comprehensive and by which the pieces all "fall into place." I wish I could be in one camp or another, but I can't help myself from having a knee-jerk reaction to this whole debate. In my more existential view--one resembling Kierkegaard's Subjective contestations with Hegel but with more modern forms of consideration---I've always felt it is a mix of both states at the same time and that we have little to go on by which to make any clear and discernible identification between points at which some state of mind is either determined or free.

But again, maybe you know something I don't since you've been studying it a long time.

So, what insight enabled you to decisively land on one side of this debate, Bradskii?

 

[Akita Suggagaki]

I had to drive to the guitar store to get another set of strings. It's about 15 minutes from my place. And I have to drive past a bakers which has the best pan de chocolate that you've ever had. So my wife told me to stop off and get some. We had them for breakfast.

Let's not confuse influence with coercion.


But I thought this would all take another turn toward brain processes, social programing and genetics. But even there I think we have the option to come off automatic pilot and live a more conscious life. And we have deeply imbedded routines, practices and habits. But we also have the power, though it may take tremendous strength, to change those habits. This is why I think it is so important to instill virtue and values into children as early as possible.

 

[o_mlly]

From the link:

'In short, we can liberate ourselves from destructive emotions, such as anger and disappointment, by developing a capacity to choose how to interpret and evaluate the situation...'

It doesn't say that you can choose your emotions. It means that you can reinterprate them as an unbidden, and and often negative reaction and accept them as being something you cannot control. As he goes on to say:

'This cannot be accomplished simply by an act of will, by wanting them to go away.'

Good try to bury the lead of the article but nope. The article concludes:

"By exerting free will, a person expands his or her options and freedom."​

Just extrapolate.

Another good try but no can do. Extrapolation, as any good statistician knows, can with some confidence extend an existing trend line into the future but can never disclose a novelty that does not exist in the actual data used. Evidence of mitigation cannot be extrapolated to include elimination.

Whose posts are you reading?

Yours.

I've never said I don't feel like I have free will. I said just the opposite. It feels exactly like I have free will. Everyone feels the same. It's the very reason why it's so difficult to the convince anyone that it doesn't exist.

? Then kindly give us your rational argument that free will does not exist.

I'm OK that you may feel like you're not in charge of or responsible for your acts but if you are to convince others (we are in a debate forum) you must have an argument.

 

[partinobodycular]

And we have deeply imbedded routines, practices and habits. But we also have the power, though it may take tremendous strength, to change those habits.

Alas, this doesn't amount to free will. It simply means that the brain has evolved a subroutine by which it contemplates and evaluates the implications and potential outcomes of its actions. But it doesn't mean that that contemplation isn't itself the result of deterministic processes.

But it seems to me that you're at least looking in the right place. Specifically, even if that contemplative subroutine is the result of deterministic processes, is that subroutine itself deterministic? I mean there are several potential alternatives... the process could be chaotic, or random, or probabilistic, or stochastic, or heuristic... any of which would break the deterministic chain. Unfortunately, none of them, would at first glance seem to lead to free will. At best they would simply seem to introduce a degree of uncertainty, in which the initial conditions don't directly determine the outcome, but unpredictability isn't the same as free will. However we've at least broken the chain of direct cause and effect... given a subroutine that isn't itself deterministic, a specific input wouldn't necessarily lead to a specific outcome.

Now all that you have to do is to figure out a way to shove free will in through that 'contemplative crack'. For example, let's assume for the sake of discussion that that subroutine can develop a bias, or even a number of biases... one might even dare to suggest that it could develop a mind of its own. And voila, you've got yourself something that looks like free will. You've got a ghost in the machine.

So, to summarize, you begin with a deterministic process, which gives rise to a 'contemplative subroutine' that isn't deterministic, but is instead chaotic, or heuristic, or whatever... just not deterministic. That subroutine then develops biases that effectively give the subroutine a 'mind' of its own.

The odd thing is that people do seem to behave just as if there was a ghost in the machine. They can take totally logical arguments and reject them out of hand, while at the same time taking totally illogical arguments and accepting them without question. If that's not evidence of a ghost in the machine then I'm not sure what to call it other than nuts.

Anyway, this is just me contemplating the possibilities... because that's what I do.

 

[Akita Suggagaki]

Alas, this doesn't amount to free will. It simply means that the brain has evolved a subroutine by which it contemplates and evaluates the implications and potential outcomes of its actions. But it doesn't mean that that contemplation isn't itself the result of deterministic processes.

But it seems to me that you're at least looking in the right place. Specifically, even if that contemplative subroutine is the result of deterministic processes, is that subroutine itself deterministic? I mean there are several potential alternatives... the process could be chaotic, or random, or probabilistic, or stochastic, or heuristic... any of which would break the deterministic chain. Unfortunately, none of them, would at first glance seem to lead to free will. At best they would simply seem to introduce a degree of uncertainty, in which the initial conditions don't directly determine the outcome, but unpredictability isn't the same as free will. However we've at least broken the chain of direct cause and effect... given a subroutine that isn't itself deterministic, a specific input wouldn't necessarily lead to a specific outcome.

Now all that you have to do is to figure out a way to shove free will in through that 'contemplative crack'. For example, let's assume for the sake of discussion that that subroutine can develop a bias, or even a number of biases... one might even dare to suggest that it could develop a mind of its own. And voila, you've got yourself something that looks like free will. You've got a ghost in the machine.

So, to summarize, you begin with a deterministic process, which gives rise to a 'contemplative subroutine' that isn't deterministic, but is instead chaotic, or heuristic, or whatever... just not deterministic. That subroutine then develops biases that effectively give the subroutine a 'mind' of its own.

The odd thing is that people do seem to behave just as if there was a ghost in the machine. They can take totally logical arguments and reject them out of hand, while at the same time taking totally illogical arguments and accepting them without question. If that's not evidence of a ghost in the machine then I'm not sure what to call it other than nuts.

Anyway, this is just me contemplating the possibilities... because that's what I do.

Don't forget, You and I are that process, and/or 'contemplative subroutine'. It is not all something imposed on us. Perhaps it helps to recognize different levels of identity. Id, Ego and Super Ego as example. There are several such models of consciousness.

 

[durangodawood]

Neurons do what neurons do. They are caused to do it. When an action potential is received by an individual neuron it causes neurotransmitters to be released to pass on a specific message. That is not in itself a decision. But enough neurons sending enough messages will result in a decision. It will cause a decision to be made. And that's the end of the process.

I don't really know what 'downward causation' could possibly be. An action eminating from...somewhere and somehow, that doesn't involve any known process that then works backward to cause the neurons to act in a certain way to then make the decision..?

At the very least all that's proposed there is kicking the can further down the road. If it's a deterministic universe - and I've never see any evidence to the contrary (except at the quantum level and that's very many orders of magnitude below anything we're talking about) then whatever that action was must have been caused by something.

There's just no room for free will anywhere in that.

I agree neurons are caused to act. I'm just saying in certain cases the cause may be influenced by an emergent free will process thats untethered to physical causation.

When (and if) we get to the bottom of understanding consciousness and subjectivity and we find theres no room for such a thing, then I'll consider the case closed. As for now, it seems way too soon to tell for sure.

 

[Akita Suggagaki]

"From this perspective, your brain’s decision to eat a packet of crisps was launched as a plan for action before your brain made itself (you) aware of this plan. So this action, like most of your actions, was guided by predictions that were under the automatic control of your memory and your current surroundings. This description of your brain’s inner workings certainly seems to suggest an absence of free will."

"Your brain predicts (in large part) by reassembling your past experiences that are similar to the present moment. That means every new experience you cultivate for yourself – every new thing you read, every new person you talk to, every new thing you learn – is an opportunity to change what your brain will predict in the future, and which actions you may take.

"In other words, your brain (meaning you) can nudge its future predictions in various directions, right now, by investing in new experiences. You are continually cultivating your past as a means of controlling your future. This may be a form of free will, but it’s extended over time and therefore different from how we usually think about free will in the moment. If you practice a skill, whether it’s riding a bicycle, or talking to someone who believes things that you abhor, you hone your brain’s predictions until that skill becomes automatic and likely to be repeated."

https://www.sciencefocus.com/the-human-body/free-will

 

[Bradskii]

So, what insight enabled you to decisively land on one side of this debate, Bradskii?

Going back to people like Aristotle (it's compatible) and the Stoics (oh no it isn't) and working your way through and you'll get a mixture of views. You swing from one position to the other depending on who you are reading (here's an interesting anthology of various positions if you're interested: https://www.amazon.com.au/Free-Will-Derk-Pereboom/dp/1603841296).

And religion was almost always part of the answer. Often the starting point. If the writer believed in God then free will was a given and what followed often seemed to be an attempt to justify the original belief. But I wanted some expertise as to the process, not just opinions. So neurology was important. As was some insight into consciousness itself.

So we then have people like Sam Harris (it's incompatible) and the now late Dan Denett (oh no it isn't). And I disagreed with Harris a lot less than I disagreed with Dennett. So I'm then finding it more and more difficult to put forward an argument for free will. Then...along comes Robert Sapolski. I'd read and listened to him for a few years (his freebie Stanford lectures on Youtube on Human Behavioural Biology are outstanding). And he'd been skirting around free will questions for sometime. Then last year he bit the bullet and published Determined (https://www.amazon.com.au/Determined-Science-Life-Without-Free/dp/0525560971).

It's over 500 pages and I read it in 2 sessions. When I put it down I realised I'd made my mind up. So it wasn't a single insight. It's more the gradual weight of arguments that keep nudging you in one direction. Sapolski made me realise that I can't be agnostic anymore.