There could be a heaven or a hell you don't know what you don't know.

[DogmaHunter]

Yes indeed. But in the sense that is really relevant, the "Fred as experiencer" lives on.

Not really. A copy of Fred does. This machine is not "Fred".
It's a machine who's "mind" is a copy of another actual person.
You could make a gazillion of them and not a single one would be "actual Fred".

Again, this is not the point! While it is an interesting question, the point is that "Fred as a subject of experience" lives on, even if there are 1000 copies. I simply do not seem to be able to get you guys to see what I consider self-evident: if there is an exact copy of me walking around, that has precisely zero impact on my subjective experience:

I heavily disagree.

Suppose we clone you and then super-impose your "brain state" upon that clone.
Is that clone now "you"?
I say, no, it's not.

It's a copy of you and anything that that copy "experiences" is not YOUR experience.
It's an experience of said copy.

If you are killed in the process, then YOU are dead and the copy lives on.
This copy has your memories, but it's not YOU.
YOUR consiousness is no longer present in this world.

Consider this, for clarity...
Suppose your clone goes out and robs a bank.

Who do we throw in jail? Your clone, you or both?

- it does not change the flavor of orange juice as I experience it.
- it does not change the feeling of being in love as I experience it.
- it does not change the joy of mastering a new craft as I experience it.

Sure. It's just that it won't be YOU who experiences those things. It would be the copy / the machine / the clone. Not YOU. YOU... you are dead.

Again, not the point for reasons just stated.

I disagree. You are talking about YOU "surviving" your biological death.
YOU aren't surviving.

I am not sure your question is internally coherent. More specifically, I do not see how we can transfer Fred's actual biological brain into a mechanical body without also transferring the "information" state of his brain.

The information state is part of the brain. There is no copying going on. There is just a transplant of an organ.

What I'm illustrating here is that YOU are your brain.

When we clone you and "copy" your brain state to the clone, then the clone is not YOU.

But when we replace all your body parts with robotics, but keep your brain intact, then the RoboCop is still YOU.

At that point, it would be no different then a liver transplant. Except now, it's a "body transplant".

Are you a fan of Futurama? Consider this, maybe that helps:

I am no neurologist but isn't the information state of Fred's brain reflected in the actual physical structure of his brain? I do not imagine how it could be otherwise.

The point is that, if you are your brain, then "you" will live on as long as your brain lives on.

 

[SamuelTP1977]

I just thought I would say what my intended point was in starting this thread. When atheists and theists debate metaphysics you can't prove you are right. God could have well in fact used natural processes to make humans and has a plan like that from the bible to resurrect the dead and take them to heaven on judgement day. I know I could be wrong, but I hope not, my money is on the divinity of Jesus Christ and I am open to other faith like beliefs even atheists, agnostics and ignostics, we all have something important to contribute to the debate. Hang in there and I do pray for you.

About Fred, I think there would be two Freds like a duplicate. So in Star Trek when some one uses the transporter they probably are destroyed and then reduplicated on another planet. That is my theory on it.

Sincerely,

Sam

 

[PsychoSarah]

I just thought I would say what my intended point was in starting this thread. When atheists and theists debate metaphysics you can't prove you are right.

That's why most atheists are agnostic.

God could have well in fact used natural processes to make humans and has a plan like that from the bible to resurrect the dead and take them to heaven on judgement day. I know I could be wrong, but I hope not, my money is on the divinity of Jesus Christ and I am open to other faith like beliefs even atheists, agnostics and ignostics, we all have something important to contribute to the debate. Hang in there and I do pray for you.

Statistically, it's unlikely that any deity specific to a particular religion exists (personal gods). I'm reminded a bit of Pascal's Wager here, actually. I hope there is an afterlife myself, but with no solid evidence for it, I don't believe that there is one. Belief isn't about being right, for I too recognize that it is very possible that I am wrong. However, that in and of itself certainly doesn't help to find faith, which I have been trying to do for 8 years.

On the matter of the Fred issue, I propose that ol' boat argument. Suppose that, rather than making a straight up separate copy of myself, I gradually replace my brain with a synthetic version that perfectly imitates the parts I have removed. Let's say I replace approximately 1 cubic centimeter of my brain in this manner every 3 months until my entire brain is synthetic. In between surgeries, my biological brain and the synthetic portions interact with each other just as my brain did when it was wholly organic. Is the me by the time the replacement process has made my whole brain synthetic just a copy, or is it the original? If the former, at what point did it cease to be me, and would it really matter in terms of my own perceptions?

 

[expos4ever]

On the matter of the Fred issue, I propose that ol' boat argument. Suppose that, rather than making a straight up separate copy of myself, I gradually replace my brain with a synthetic version that perfectly imitates the parts I have removed. Let's say I replace approximately 1 cubic centimeter of my brain in this manner every 3 months until my entire brain is synthetic. In between surgeries, my biological brain and the synthetic portions interact with each other just as my brain did when it was wholly organic. Is the me by the time the replacement process has made my whole brain synthetic just a copy, or is it the original? If the former, at what point did it cease to be me, and would it really matter in terms of my own perceptions?

Love the name "PsychSarah", by the way.

For some reason, people seem unable to understand that my emphasis has not been on the admittedly difficult "who is the real Fred?" question, but rather on the question "will the universe contain at least one 'being' that experiences itself as Fred?".

As far your version of the scenario goes, I think it is relatively obvious that, as far as "you" are concerned - as an experiencer - it is still you! In short, and to use your terms, "it would not really matter in terms of your perceptions".

 

[PsychoSarah]

Love the name "PsychSarah", by the way.

For some reason, people seem unable to understand that my emphasis has not been on the admittedly difficult "who is the real Fred?" question, but rather on the question "will the universe contain at least one 'being' that experiences itself as Fred?".

As far your version of the scenario goes, I think it is relatively obvious that, as far as "you" are concerned - as an experiencer - it is still you! In short, and to use your terms, "it would not really matter in terms of your perceptions".

Fabulous. And everyone loves my username (or tries to make judgments on my actual sanity or credibility based on it -_-) if they mention it.

As for the universe containing at least one being that "is" a person, to even ask that question is to ignore the fact that we are continuously changing. I am not the same as I was yesterday, and tomorrow I will not be the same as I am today. True, those changes are usually very marginal, excluding days with extreme impact, such as the day someone gives birth to their first child, or if someone changes their ideology after a lecture. Regardless, the Sarah in the year 2000 and the Sarah in the year 2016 are drastically different people beyond a few shared remembered experiences, and some emotional tendencies... many of those being common enough that I could say the same of multiple people. We don't experience the world in identical ways as we get older and accumulate experiences, so while it's likely that a computer save file of a person, even if put into a body exactly like the living one, will by chance experience the world in a different way than the "original". It would be within the parameters of how that "original" could potentially experience the world, as long as no programming or physical limitations of the artificial person were different than that of the original organic human. It's not really a way to defy death much more than having children is, though, because ultimately, what we want is for us to keep going, and a copy of a deleted "save file" is still a copy, not the original save file, even if everything it does is the same as what that original would do.

 

[expos4ever]

As for the universe containing at least one being that "is" a person, to even ask that question is to ignore the fact that we are continuously changing. I am not the same as I was yesterday, and tomorrow I will not be the same as I am today.

Well, obviously. But the relevant point is that as we go through life, we see ourselves as 'the same person' - there is a clear persistence of the self over time. I see no reason to doubt this self-evident truth just because this "self" evolves over time.

It's not really a way to defy death much more than having children is, though, because ultimately, what we want is for us to keep going, and a copy of a deleted "save file" is still a copy, not the original save file, even if everything it does is the same as what that original would do.

I am mystified that what seems obvious to me is disputed by you and by others. The relevant point is not that the copy is a copy - I obviously know that. But what really matters as far as the concept of life beyond the death of the body is what a subject who experiences actually experiences, not the trivially obvious fact that a copy is, in fact, a copy even if it identical to the original. I still submit that if the "information state" of my brain can be saved / transferred to a new host platform, the "I who experiences" persists, just as it persists over the course of my life in the here and now even though my body undergoes significant change - not least of which is that, if I have my facts right, I am composed of entirely different cells than the me who was alive a year ago. Yet - and this is the key point - I continue to see myself as a single "subject who experiences" over time despite all these changes.

If there were a copy of me, it would simply be the case that there would be two "I who experiences myself as expos4ever" walking around. So what?

 

[Chany]

Well, obviously. But the relevant point is that as we go through life, we see ourselves as 'the same person' - there is a clear persistence of the self over time. I see no reason to doubt this self-evident truth just because this "self" evolves over time.


I am mystified that what seems obvious to me is disputed by you and by others. The relevant point is not that the copy is a copy - I obviously know that. But what really matters as far as the concept of life beyond the death of the body is what a subject who experiences actually experiences, not the trivially obvious fact that a copy is, in fact, a copy even if it identical to the original. I still submit that if the "information state" of my brain can be saved / transferred to a new host platform, the "I who experiences" persists, just as it persists over the course of my life in the here and now even though my body undergoes significant change - not least of which is that, if I have my facts right, I am composed of entirely different cells than the me who was alive a year ago. Yet - and this is the key point - I continue to see myself as a single "subject who experiences" over time despite all these changes.

If there were a copy of me, it would simply be the case that there would be two "I who experiences myself as expos4ever" walking around. So what?

The fact that a copy of a person with the same exact qualia, experiences, and sense of self can simultaniously exist indicates that your assumption (that the consciousness of the original transfers over to the duplicate and thus my qualia continues to persist) is faulity. My qualia's existence is entirely independent from the existence of a copy of me, meaning that when the brain ceases to function in my body, my qualia also ceases to exist. Even if you copy my brain waves and upload them into another body, my qualia is gone when my brain waves cease. Just because there is a new body who acts like me does not mean that this is now actually me; my qualia is gone.

I am incredibly skeptical (read- I cannot imagine, even in a weird thought experiment sort of way) how we could possibly transfer my brain state over to either another biological body or robotic platform. First, it assumes the brain (and the contents it produces) is all that is relevant to my identity, a statement I question. If my body is entirely different, I feel like I lose part of my identity. Second, I cannot think of a transfer method that would not result in some sort of elimination of my brain states.

In regards to qualia as the foundation to identity: I think the splitting problem (I can divide my brain into two parts and have two individuals who claim to be me and have the same qualia) and another one, which I will refer to as the Locke problem, show itnto be faulty. Imagine that we completely wipe Fred's memories, personality, likes, dislikes, and completely remove him from his environment so that he no longer bears a relationship with anyone who knew of Fred. In other words, we remove everything from Fred but the ability to experience. In other words, the person as a subject who experiences still exists. The new person becomes radically different from the old Fred in every way psychologically. Is this new persom Fred? It would appear not, but, since it is still the same experience faculties, it should be according to your theory.

 

[expos4ever]

The fact that a copy of a person with the same exact qualia, experiences, and sense of self can simultaniously exist indicates that your assumption (that the consciousness of the original transfers over to the duplicate and thus my qualia continues to persist) is faulty.

Where is the fault? If it is indeed the case that qualia reflect brain state, two different brains with the same "information state" would indeed have the same qualia. Are you sure you are bringing unsubstantiated assumption into the discussion? For my part, I concede that I am indeed assuming that qualia reflect brain state, but it certainly seems to be a plausible assumption.

My qualia's existence is entirely independent from the existence of a copy of me, meaning that when the brain ceases to function in my body, my qualia also ceases to exist.

Well, it depends on what you mean by "my" as in "my qualia".

If you mean that the qualia that are associated with the brain that has ceased to function, I agree with you but do not see how this challenges my central claims.

But if we identify me as the stream of qualia that "used to be hosted" in the brain that has ceased to function, I would suggest that very same stream has simply found a new home.

I am incredibly skeptical (read- I cannot imagine, even in a weird thought experiment sort of way) how we could possibly transfer my brain state over to either another biological body or robotic platform. First, it assumes the brain (and the contents it produces) is all that is relevant to my identity, a statement I question. If my body is entirely different, I feel like I lose part of my identity.

I am not sure what you mean here by identity. I think the following scenario is indeed plausible:

1. Qualia map to "information states": if two brains are in the some information state, there exist two subject in the universe who experience the same qualia, at least at the instant of "transfer".

2. You can have the exact same information state in an old dying brain as in a young brain with many miles ahead of it.

3. Information states can indeed be replicated - the information state in my old, dying (or diseased) brain can be "copied" to a new brain.

Obviously, I realize that none of these three points are self-evidently true! I, too, can think of reasons to doubt each of them. But I can also imagine that each is true.

Second, I cannot think of a transfer method that would not result in some sort of elimination of my brain states.

Can you expand? I am certainly not suggesting it is obvious that "information states" (note the distinction between "information states" and brain states; you may object to such a distinction and we can talk about that).

In regards to qualia as the foundation to identity: I think the splitting problem (I can divide my brain into two parts and have two individuals who claim to be me and have the same qualia) and another one, which I will refer to as the Locke problem, show itnto be faulty.

Are you sure you chose your words carefully here? Since I would expect that you (like me) believe that a split brain is only "half-a-brain", I would question whether a half-a-brain could have the same qualia as a full-brain. So I think you are changing the problem - I am talking about "capturing" the information state in a complete brain and replicating it in another complete brain.

Imagine that we completely wipe Fred's memories, personality, likes, dislikes, and completely remove him from his environment so that he no longer bears a relationship with anyone who knew of Fred. In other words, we remove everything from Fred but the ability to experience. In other words, the person as a subject who experiences still exists. The new person becomes radically different from the old Fred in every way psychologically. Is this new persom Fred? It would appear not, but, since it is still the same experience faculties, it should be according to your theory.

No. I agree that this "wiped" Fred would be different but I see no challenge to my view. I agree the "wiped" Fred has the ability to experience but this Fred's brain has a radically different information state than the brain of the "pre-wiped" Fred.

I get the sense that you do not accept something that seems obvious to me: the universe contains billions of "private qualia streams" - one for each person and perhaps for certian animals too - and that these qualia streams constitute what each of the billions of human beings and animals experience as "the self".

 

[Chany]

Perhaps it's just me, but I cannot see how you think a copy of Fred will become the new Fred. The fact that there can exist two individuals, an original and a copy, with the same qualia but two different consciousnesses indicates copying brain states into a new body does not magically transfer the consciousness from the original body to the copy: I think to say so is absurd. The death and nonexistence of the original Fred is irrelevant to the copy Fred. Each person has their own consciousness, sense of self, even if the qualia is identical. The content might be the same, but the fact that two agents have the same qualia content does not make them the same individual. When I die, my experience as a self ends. The fact that there is a copy of me with the same qualia content as me is irrelevant because my own consciousness (my own qualia and sense of self) is entirely independent from the copy's consciousness. The copy is an entirely new being who is tied to me only in the content of our consciousness, not our actual consciousnesses themselves. Thus, the copy is not me, so I am not gaining immortality.

To be honest, I do not believe there will ever be a theory of personal identity and conception of self that will ever work. It is just another human concept that we try to sharpen the edges and make a clear dividing line between the conception and its negation, but ultimately will find no such line.

 

[variant]

I feel the possibility of an afterlife is very real. Perhaps we are nothing more than sophisticated animals, but that isn't knowable. Think about the billions of people who believe in a higher power of some kind. Even Albert Einstein and Newton. Are all these people brain dead or is there something to it?

There is probably something about being human and being conscious that makes you want to deny that it will ever end.

That doesn't mean anything about reality though, it's just psychology, how an ego copes with being alive.

Metaphysics is not knowable that is some weird stuff once you start going down that road. Keep hope alive and try to be open minded is my best advice take it for what it is worth.

Sincerely,

Sam

The depth of unknown unknowns is much more so than you can possibly imagine. Your coping mechanism turning out to be right is still unlikely.

 

[expos4ever]

Perhaps it's just me, but I cannot see how you think a copy of Fred will become the new Fred.The fact that there can exist two individuals, an original and a copy, with the same qualia but two different consciousnesses indicates copying brain states into a new body does not magically transfer the consciousness from the original body to the copy: I think to say so is absurd.

I do not follow your reasoning, especially your view that "consciousness" cannot be transferred. Do you think it is implausible that qualia are fully determined by "information state" of the brain? I think this is indeed highly plausible and I know at least one expert who (I think) believes precisely this. I do not see why you have issues with the "two individuals". It seems to me that you think that it is somehow impossible for there to be - at the moment of "copy" - two brains with precisely the same information state. I am really mystified why you think this problematic. Obviously as the life experiences of the copy and original begin to diverge after the moment of transfer, their respective information states will differ and their qualia will differ. But I would bet that each of them would believe they are me. Why is that a problem? Yes, from an outsider's perspective, there is a huge issue - who is the real expos4ever. But from the point of view of the subjective experience of both the copy and the original there is no mystery at all.

 

[Chany]

I do not follow your reasoning, especially your view that "consciousness" cannot be transferred. Do you think it is implausible that qualia are fully determined by "information state" of the brain? I think this is indeed highly plausible and I know at least one expert who (I think) believes precisely this. I do not see why you have issues with the "two individuals". It seems to me that you think that it is somehow impossible for there to be - at the moment of "copy" - two brains with precisely the same information state. I am really mystified why you think this problematic. Obviously as the life experiences of the copy and original begin to diverge after the moment of transfer, their respective information states will differ and their qualia will differ. But I would bet that each of them would believe they are me. Why is that a problem? Yes, from an outsider's perspective, there is a huge issue - who is the real expos4ever. But from the point of view of the subjective experience of both the copy and the original there is no mystery at all.

And you don't get what I'm saying. It is entirely possible to happen. I am saying this fact means that immortality in the way you want it cannot occur. My consciousness is mine, not my copy's. Just because my copy has the same content of qualia does not make him the actual me. If I die, the actual me, my personal qualia, my consciousness, and my experience as a being ceases to exist. The fact that there is a copy of me is irrelevant to me because the copy is not me. Therefore, I am not gaining immortality through copying, and neither can anyone else.

 

[expos4ever]

The death and nonexistence of the original Fred is irrelevant to the copy Fred.

Agree.

Each person has their own consciousness, sense of self, even if the qualia is identical.The content might be the same, but the fact that two agents have the same qualia content does not make them the same individual.

Again, you appear to me to stuck on seeing this question from the "third-person" perspective. Of course you are right when the issue is seen from that perspective. But that perspective means nothing to the original and the copy in terms of what they experience. If information state fully determines subjective experience (qualia) then I do not see one can escape concluding that, at the precise instant of copy, the original and the copy will have identical "inner worlds" - identical memories, identical knowledge, and even identical qualia. But seconds after the copy has been completed, the information states of the brains of these two will diverge, and so will there subjective experience.

But, I think it is pretty clear they will each think they are the same person: If the original person was Fred Jones, 38, engineer from New York who loves Woody Allen films, the copy will see himself as this same Fred Jones in every respect.

The copy is an entirely new being who is tied to me only in the content of our consciousness, not our actual consciousnesses themselves.

But you are simply elaborating the different perspectives with this distinction you draw. Obviously from the perspective of every other human in the world, there are two versions each with their own consciousness (qualia)! But it is "content of consciousness" that determines the sense of self all conscious beings experience! Or at least I think this is so obvious that an exclamation is warranted. Again, if Fred Jones' brain's information state is copied to another brain that is inside the skull of a duplicate of Fred Jone's body, I think it is obvious that each will think they are Fred Jones.

I think I am just know recognizing the intuition that underlies your whole position. I agree that something seems "wrong" with claiming that I can gain immortality this way. After all, when I die, the fact there may be a copy of me walking around who thinks it is me, and experiences life as me, does not seem to change the fact that "I" - the original - am dead and gone.

I get that. But I think it is a misleading intuition. Consider sleep. When I fall asleep, my sense of existence dissolves into nothingness. During those eight hours, I entirely cease to exist as far as qualia are concerned (perhaps you will disagree, arguing that we do not remember qualia experienced during sleep). But then I awake, never doubting even slightly that I am the same person who fell asleep 8 hours earlier. What if I died at midnight instead of simply falling asleep. And what if I was instantly frozen so that my brain (and body) does not decay. And what if I am thawed out and "revived" at 8 AM (instead of waking from sleep)? My intuition is that the two situations are identical as far as I am concerned. And, in the scenario, when I died, have I not achieved "life after death".

I will close by saying what I think is obvious - we are dealing with one of the deepest questions there is. I am not a specialist in any respect - I am not a neuroscientist. So please don't presume that I really think that my arguments are anything more than "plausibility" arguments. And, as I think you are saying, we may never develop a workable model of what the "self" really is.

 

[expos4ever]

I think you will object to my example of dying and being revived by saying "Yes, but it is the original you and not a copy that is revived". I understand that distinction and I think my position needs a lot more support. I certainly understand the power of what I will call the "intuition" that the copy is "not really me, even if it has the same qualia". However, I still think that intuition is mistaken.

 

[SamuelTP1977]

I like your discussion of the self, what makes us exist. It is very interesting, please continue and may I add Jesus is open to people of other faiths and beliefs and loves you too, at least I hope so. I know I don't know that, but I hope so, hang in there.

Sam

 

[Hikarifuru]

I feel the possibility of an afterlife is very real. Perhaps we are nothing more than sophisticated animals, but that isn't knowable. Think about the billions of people who believe in a higher power of some kind. Even Albert Einstein and Newton. Are all these people brain dead or is there something to it?

Metaphysics is not knowable that is some weird stuff once you start going down that road. Keep hope alive and try to be open minded is my best advice take it for what it is worth.

Sincerely,

Sam

Uhm Einstein did not believe in a god. He believed in the never ending fascination of science.

Religions are based on NOTHING but a lack of ability to explain things and a HOPE for a happy ending. There is nothing else to base religions on.

That these weird scary or plain stupid stories of gods aren't real is what I'd hope in. Most of that stuff is dreadful.

 

[bhsmte]

I feel the possibility of an afterlife is very real. Perhaps we are nothing more than sophisticated animals, but that isn't knowable. Think about the billions of people who believe in a higher power of some kind. Even Albert Einstein and Newton. Are all these people brain dead or is there something to it?

Metaphysics is not knowable that is some weird stuff once you start going down that road. Keep hope alive and try to be open minded is my best advice take it for what it is worth.

Sincerely,

Sam

That's cool.

Let us know when you have something you can share to support you're opinion.

 

[SamuelTP1977]

That's cool.

Let us know when you have something you can share to support you're opinion.

I am trying to say and tell you the possibility of Heaven and Hell is real. If you go back to Socrates time and he questioned Greek mythology, there were a lot of interesting metaphysical discussions, nothing that anybody can prove. If you think about the science behind creation and anthropology which is highly conjectural: We either got really really lucky or there is a creator. Either way these are religious beliefs and cannot be proven to be fact, much like the idea we were created by merely natural processes.

I do pray for you lost souls, hang in there, Jesus loves you.

Sam

 

[bhsmte]

I am trying to say and tell you the possibility of Heaven and Hell is real. If you go back to Socrates time and he questioned Greek mythology, there were a lot of interesting metaphysical discussions, nothing that anybody can prove. If you think about the science behind creation and anthropology which is highly conjectural: We either got really really lucky or there is a creator. Either way these are religious beliefs and cannot be proven to be fact, much like the idea we were created by merely natural processes.

I do pray for you lost souls, hang in there, Jesus loves you.

Sam

Ah, lost souls.

Keep praying.

 

[devolved]

I am trying to say and tell you the possibility of Heaven and Hell is real. If you go back to Socrates time and he questioned Greek mythology, there were a lot of interesting metaphysical discussions, nothing that anybody can prove. If you think about the science behind creation and anthropology which is highly conjectural: We either got really really lucky or there is a creator. Either way these are religious beliefs and cannot be proven to be fact, much like the idea we were created by merely natural processes.

I do pray for you lost souls, hang in there, Jesus loves you.

Sam

I like to relay the following analogy to explain the issue:

Imagine that you are waking up in a bizarre culture where people take fairy creatures and comic books seriously. They debate about details of the comic books and vote on politics of the comic books and fairy tale fantasy as though these were a part of a reality.

You begin to notice the strangeness of such set up. You begin asking as to why they think any of it is real, and they begin attributing various things like lack of crime to the acts of Batman, and the miraculous stories of near-death situations that people experienced to the Flash and Superman. The blame the wrong things on their lives on Evil x-men, and they attribute the miraculous recoveries from sickness to the magical healing power of the Doctor Strange.

When you ask them as to why would they think that the stories in the comic books are real and not made up, they say things like... well there are real places and people described that we know existed in history, like presidents and celebrities, and cities. And that all of the comic books are based on collective eye-witness recollection with some help from professor X who joins minds together to form the best possible account of these events imaginable. Thus, they collectively think that you are insane for rejecting the "obvious" reality of their cultural mindset.

What would you point to in such case to convince these people that they are wrong about their belief system?


Essentially, that's what religion tends to do. It perpetuates a cultural mindset in which certain imaginary concepts that have no evidence in this world are treated as real, and thus the subjective interpretation of events that believers experience become "the modern day evidence" of the "acts of God". Someone got an unexpected check refund from IRS when they prayed for some financial help... miracle! Spontaneous recovery from cancer that falls in line with statistics of such cases... miracle! Someone beat a drug addiction... miracle!

Essentially, the religions, the way these are set up today are not very far from the bizarre scenario that I've described above. It's understandable as to why people would seriously consider certain propositions that otherwise should and would be utter nonsense fantasy... because politicians used religion as a tool to rule the masses, and thus spread and normalize the practice of religion in societies to the point where questioning religion became "odd" and "bizarre".

But, even in context of the thread... why would one think that any concept of "afterlife" should be of concern to anyone if the concept isn't falsifiable? People don't concern with them with idea like "before life"... which would be rather bizarre to a Christian. But, if "after life" is a possibility, wouldn't "before life" would be an equal possibility? Why not concern oneself with all of the possibilities then, no matter how bizarre these are?

We don't do that, because if there is no evidence for something being real... we don't treat it any different than non-existing. It really doesn't matter in scope of our reality.