Free will and determinism

[durangodawood]

Arguments that free will does not exist? Do you mean the untestable OP assertion above? Or the other assertion, also untestable, "if you were me, you'd have done the same thing." Those aren't arguments. I haven't seen any arguments. Bye.

Yes, what you quoted is untestable. But its reasonable.

I'm just looking for a rational explanation for how it could be otherwise. I wouldnt insist on that being testable either. Just reasonable.

 

[durangodawood]

Personally, I don't assume we fully know the essence (or nature) of either free-will or determinism. But, that's just me being a skeptical heel since I have a difficult time accounting for and calculating the interactive probability of the whole of all of the interconnecting determinants within Reality. One might wonder as to why I'd have such a difficult time with that endeavor. Hopefully, no one will hold me responsible for my failure here.

Actually I think youve come closest to summarizing the reality of the issue here. As I said earlier: too soon to tell. Maybe someday we'll know enough about human consciousness to come down reliably on one side or the other of this question.

 

[zippy2006]

Maybe someday we'll know enough about human consciousness to come down reliably on one side or the other of this question.

If one understands what knowledge is, then they see the necessary truth that determinism cannot be known. For someone to know that determinism is true would be like someone knowing the Kantian noumenal, which is impossible. This creates insuperable problems, such as the fact that what we call "determinism" could never be true. If it were true then it would at best be an analogous reality. Then again, it's not at all clear that truth itself could exist on determinism.

 

[durangodawood]

If one understands what knowledge is, then they see the necessary truth that determinism cannot be known. For someone to know that determinism is true would be like someone knowing the Kantian noumenal, which is impossible. This creates insuperable problems, such as the fact that what we call "determinism" could never be true. If it were true then it would at best be an analogous reality. Then again, it's not at all clear that truth itself could exist on determinism.

Clearly I have a little homework to do before I can decide if I even agree with this.

 

[zippy2006]

Clearly I have a little homework to do before I can decide if I even agree with this.

More simply, my suggestion is that if we are careful with what we mean by "true" or "knowledge," then I do not think we will be able to say that determinism is true or can be known. What is likely happening with those who promote determinism is that they are adverting to somewhat strange views of truth or knowledge.

The more accessible and less rigorous way to see this is to simply note that it is impossible to affirm hard determinism in a practical sense. Hard determinists are therefore liable to say, "Well I believe that hard determinism is true, but I just have no ability to act upon my belief." It must at least be admitted that it is very odd to say that one believes that X is true if they are forced, every minute of their life, to assume that X is false. Simpler: we must act as if free will exists. This does not prove that free will exists, but it does show that there is something farcical or "academic" in claiming that free will does not exist. If someone cannot act on their belief then I am left to wonder whether they actually believe it.

 

[Bradskii]

Changes in my physical or mental states do not make me any more or less of a human being.

You have either completely misunderstood the point that was being made or you are deliberately avoiding having to address it. I think most people will conclude the latter.

 

[Bradskii]

Nor was my post a theological question but a moral question which bears on the existence of free will.

Sin is a religious concept.

Yes, that's correct. And we are still looking for an argument that free will in human beings does not exist.

There have been so many put forward. I can see you might want to disagree with them. But to say none have been presented is bizarre.

Your position seems to be that free will is but an illusion. We may think we are free; it may look like we are free; it may sound like we are free; we certainly feel like we are free; our common sene tells us we are free but all that is just an illusion. Hard determinists just want the rest of us to deny the obvious.

All correct except for the last part. Whether you accept it or not doesn't concern me. It doesn't really change anything. Hell, I have difficulty in changing my own behaviour. If there's one practical aspect of the matter it's that we should look closer at retributive punishment and address the cause of the problem rather than problem itself.

 

[Bradskii]

I'm sad that you are departing prior to presenting any reasoning that would overturn the determinist position. All you offer are assertions that, basically, "we just obviously have free will".

I say this as a free will believer who's looking for reasoning that will overturn the specific arguments Ive offered on the determinists behalf, and so far not finding it.

I think there are only two arguments for free will.

The first is that we possess a soul, or its secular equivalent. That's there's some other 'me' making decisions which are completely disassociated from all influences (else we're kicking the can down the road). That is, there is no other reason why I make a decision other than it's the decision I wanted to make. Which is just no more than saying 'there is no free will'.

The second is that the universe is not determinate. And I have never seen an argument that comes anywhere near convincing me of that.

My problem, for quite some years, has been apportioning blame (and praise). Surely the guy pulling the trigger is responsible for doing so. It's taken me some time to finally accept that, to put it in a way to which most people might agree...there but for the grace of God go I.

 

[Bradskii]

If one understands what knowledge is, then they see the necessary truth that determinism cannot be known. For someone to know that determinism is true would be like someone knowing the Kantian noumenal, which is impossible.

To be clear, there is no connection between the two concepts. You are just saying that you consider determinism to be unproveable.

This creates insuperable problems, such as the fact that what we call "determinism" could never be true.

Yet again I'll have to ask you to give me an example of something that you think might not be determinate. To keep saying 'it might not exist' isn't exactly advancing the discussion.

 

[2PhiloVoid]

Then let's stick with one that you do have a clear perspective on.

Determinism: All outcomes are determined by prior circumstances. In other words, all effects have causes.

Again, you are free to dismantle that position with any example you care to give. I hope it's not along the lines of 'Well, I can make a free will decision'.

Bradskii, I think you know that I don't believe a demonstration for determinism or for free-will can be given, and this is due to all of the reasons I've already mentioned earlier in this thread.

What's more, I choose to remain aloof of making this ancient controversy a priority for my attention and use of time since, again, I don't think comprehensive evidence or proof can be given to establish either free-will or determinism as concrete or absolute descriptors of the state of human mental existence. If anything, both concepts suffer from being so loose, so semantically imprecise, that they are essentially "glittering generalities."

Still, even if determinism is an insufferably inflated and overused term, this doesn't mean Sapolsky hasn't offered some pertinent considerations in his long-time theorizing in neuroscience and psychology.

 

[Bradskii]

Simpler: we must act as if free will exists. This does not prove that free will exists, but it does show that there is something farcical or "academic" in claiming that free will does not exist. If someone cannot act on their belief then I am left to wonder whether they actually believe it.

It's not that we must. It's that we automatically do. I certainly do. Even those that have spent no little time trying to convince that it doesn't exist (Sapolski and Harris have been mentioned) still live their lives as if it exists. Except there are practical aspects which we can all address. The main one being retributive punishment.

Here's an interesting paper on the matter which argues against any changes in the justice system. I've only skimmed it so far (it's 20,000 words long), but it seems to argue that even if free will doesn't exist the concept of responsibility remains. I might comment further after I've had the chance to read it.

Criminal Responsibility and Neuroscience: No Revolution Yet

Since the 1990’s, neurolaw is on the rise. At the heart of heated debates lies the recurrent theme of a neuro-revolution of criminal responsibility. However, caution should be observed: the alleged foundations of criminal responsibility (amongst ...

www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov

 

[Bradskii]

Bradskii, I think you know that I don't believe a demonstration for determinism or for free-will can be given...

For or against free will? No. For or against determinism? Yes, of course examples can be given. I broke my guitar string, I had croissant for breakfast. There was a direct connection between the two. If determinism isn't true then there must be examples of non causal events.

 

[2PhiloVoid]

For or against free will? No. For or against determinism? Yes, of course examples can be given. I broke my guitar string, I had croissant for breakfast. There was a direct connection between the two. If determinism isn't true then there must be examples of non causal events.

I'm sort of confused by your insistence here since I've already cumulatively stated what I've stated in this thread.

Are you trying to suggest that just one single empirical, a posteriori example would be sufficient to establish free-will?

I mean, so far, I've said nothing about "non-causal events"... However, I have said a few things about how I think both the terms "free-will" and "determinism" are amorphous, polysemous types of terms, depend on larger contexts than their denotations or their wanton use imply and don't serve well if we're wanting to talk on a level befitting either the Philosophy of History or the Philosophy of Science. No, these two terms are just words we slap on some collections of bags at the airport and call it all "luggage" for the sake of convenience, despite the fact that it's rare that we find even two bags that are really alike or, with more complication, we realize that some bags in the collection may not really qualify as luggage of the sort that we expect to be identified as luggage...... and that we need to be careful with those 'bags.'

Y'know, I'm not trying to "dis" Sapolsky; no, what I'm suggesting is that he be taken along side, and in comparative tandem, even quasi-synthesis with, the horizons of knowledge we gain from many other neuro-scientists and psychologists.

 

[2PhiloVoid]

For or against free will? No. For or against determinism? Yes, of course examples can be given. I broke my guitar string, I had croissant for breakfast. There was a direct connection between the two. If determinism isn't true then there must be examples of non causal events.

In my view, for Determinism to become Dogma, I'd have to actually be able to comprehensively identify and know ALL of the causative factors involved in any one instance, such as when you broke your guitar string and ended up at the croissant shop. In other words, I'm going to come at this like a Modern student of Historiography and Historical accounts, where the debate over the nature of "causation" and its tension with reductionism is central.

In my opinion, If we can't account for all of the factors in a given scenario---i.e. in a more or less normal scenario---, and we can't identify which Praxis HAS to take the operative lead in that accounting, then I think it's a bit odd to apply a term [like determinism] that implies that we actually can do so without having done so. And yes, I know, my saying it like this seems to undercut the good ol' notion of Uniformitarianism that we all assume is present in the sciences. But we're just rubbing up against the boundaries of induction and abduction and thinking that by resorting to deduction, we've actually said something not just useful, but very compelling. Unfortunately, I don't go in much for mere deductive reasoning, so I don't find those sorts of arguments compelling all that often.

Did you by chance catch those threads I made recently on the problem with deduction and also the problem of the criterion? I think those sorts of philosophical problems put a catch in the middle of all of this talk about free-will and determinism. And for this existential reason, I have to play the role of 'the Jerk.'

 

[2PhiloVoid]

Actually I think youve come closest to summarizing the reality of the issue here. As I said earlier: too soon to tell. Maybe someday we'll know enough about human consciousness to come down reliably on one side or the other of this question.

I appreciate the comment, DW. And yes, it would be interesting, and maybe helpful, if neuroscientists really could someday concretely find out a whole lot more about the human mind and our consciousness than they currently do. We all could use some extra insight beyond what we currently have at the moment, even as impressive as it already is.

 

[Bradskii]

I'm sort of confused by your insistence here since I've already cumulatively stated what I've stated in this thread.

Are you trying to suggest that just one single empirical, a posteriori example would be sufficient to establish free-will?

No. One example is simply that. An example of what is being discussed. An example of how two seemingly unconnected events are linked, one literally causing the other. If the universe is determinate then there is no proof available. Just the opportunity to show that any given event is caused by a prior one. That's it. There is nothing more.

But it can be shown to be indeterminate by giving a single example of an event not caused by anything (and again, we can skip quantum mechanics because it operates at a scale many orders of magnitude beneath what we are discussing).

I mean, so far, I've said nothing about "non-causal events"...

You'll have to if you want to address the validity of the claim 'The universe is determinative'.

 

[zippy2006]

In my opinion, If we can't account for all of the factors in a given scenario---i.e. in a more or less normal scenario---, and we can't identify which Praxis HAS to take the operative lead in that accounting, then I think it's a bit odd to apply a term [like determinism] that implies that we actually can do so without having done so. And yes, I know, my saying it like this seems to undercut the good ol' notion of Uniformitarianism that we all assume is present in the sciences.

Quite right

See also:

We have the things we take as evidence and then we have the conclusions we draw from that evidence. In the ancient world the primary evidence was taken to be volition (will), for humans obviously act from volition and our worlds are full of humans. Volition was then attributed to other things (or to the forces underlying them), such as thunder and lightning.

In the modern world the primary evidence is taken to be mechanistic interaction (efficient causality). Focusing on efficient causality is helpful to the scientific enterprise, and given the way we prize the scientific enterprise we are prone to favor efficient causality. Thus in the modern world the opposite move occurs. Instead of saying that lightning is a consequence of volition, modern people say that volition is a consequence of lightning (electricity, or efficient causality more generally, or abiogenesis etiologically).

Aristotle noted the obvious fact that volitional and non-volitional realities both exist, and are different. Reducing one to the other is irrational, and betrays bias. The corrective to idealism is to note that matter and its interactions do exist and do count as evidence. The corrective to determinism is to note that volition and its interactions do exist and do count as evidence. Only by superficially reducing one to the other does one arrive at these extremes.

 

[Bradskii]

In my view, for Determinism to become Dogma...

That's like saying that accepting the fact of gravity is dogma. The term is simply not appropriate.

...I'd have to actually be able to comprehensively identify and know ALL of the causative factors involved in any one instance, such as when you broke your guitar string and ended up at the croissant shop.

No, you wouldn't. Even I don't know all the factors. It's not possible. They are literally without limit. The fact that an ancient ancestor of mine turned left instead of right when he left his cave might well have been one, as he didn't then walk into a pride of lions. If he'd turned right then I wouldn't have broken that guitar string as I wouldn't be here.

The argument is not 'we can identify all causes, therefore determinism is true'. All that's required is to recognise that there is always a direct link between cause and effect. That every single event is the result of something that happened at an earlier time. And all that's required to disprove it (like many things, one cannot prove it's true but one can prove it's not) then out of all the infinite number of events that take place every second, you just have to point to one that was uncaused.

 

[Bradskii]

Quite right.

See the above post.

 

[zippy2006]

You are just saying that you consider determinism to be unproveable.

Do you accept that it is unproveable?