Well then, if by "compare" you mean "point to two things/concepts and describe their similarities," that can be done with the theological term "beget." We have to remember that a great deal of theological language is used analogically, which just means that theological terminology is similar to, though not exactly like, things and concepts that we know and that we experience. So, to return again to "beget," if we allow for the analogical use of language, we can say, "Do you want to know what the relationship between the first two members of the Trinity is like? It's like the relationship between a father and son."
Note the key words here of "like" and "similar to". This is "simile", and is precisely the sort of poetic usage I talked about earlier.
If you are saying "the relationship between the Son and the Father is
like the relationship between sons and fathers" you are talking poetry.
There are important similiarities between a human father and son, and between the first two members of the Godhead, similiarities which would've been especially clear to people living in the culture of first-century Palestine. For example, in that culture, firstborn sons were given the place of prominence and authority, especially over inheritance; likewise, Jesus has the place of prominence and authority over creation. Second, human fathers and sons (usually) love each other; in the same way, we learn that the members of the Trinity actually feel emotions for one another (e.g., love). Third, human sons often reflect the characters of their fathers ("like father, like son"); just as this is the case humanly speaking, Jesus reveals the character of the "invisible God" more fully than ever before. So, it's possible to say, then, in response to the question, "How do the first and second members of the Trinity relate to one another?" to say, "Well, do you see that man and his son? It's a lot like that." Keep in mind, since theological language is very often analogical, this means that there are also big differences, like, according to the Bible, the fact that Jesus is not a created being, whereas human sons are, and like the fact He and the Father never disagree, whereas humans sons and fathers quite often do so. But, in allowing the context to tell us the similarities, we must also allow the context to tell us the differences.
All you are doing is saying you aren't using "beget" is a statement of a state of affairs, but only as a poetic usage. In fact, all you are saying is that one should apply the emotions they have when the consider the relationship between human sons and fathers to the relationship between the Son and the Father.
Actually you aren't even saying that, probably. What you are saying is the a person should apply the emotions
society tells them the should apply to the human relationship to the divine one, as you wouldn't want some man whose father abused him to apply his feelings about father/son relationships to the divine.
The point is none of this requires that the Father or the Son exist. You could just as well say "Pink unicorns are like warm puppies". I can apply my reaction to warm puppies to these "pink unicorns" without them having to even exist.
Now, I still don't have a way to empirically verify all of that. I mean, I can't take you to God and say, "Prove to him that this is really the way it is," or anything like that. I can point you to a collection of documents (the NT) which claims to be a divine revelation (or testimony, if you prefer that term) of such things, and then urge you to accept its testimony on the grounds that a.) it's internally consistent
Hold on here, you can't establish it is "internally consistent", all you can establish is that there is a reading of it which makes it consistent. There is still the open question as to whether that reading corresponds in the case of each text to what the author intended. It is entirely possible that although you can construct the "internally consistent" reading, that it doesn't correspond to the writer's intent in the various cases.
And merely exhibiting such a reading isn't enough. You'd also have to indicate that it is a relatively "natural" reading.
I'd argue that you could give me any set of texts and I could come up with an "internally consist" reading of the entire set. It might be awkward and reaching in places, but it would be consistent.
and b.) it's historically reliable.
Again, this means a reading of the text that agrees with our present conclusions about history. There is again the question of whether that reading is a correct reading.
But that's all I can really do. Does that remove every possible doubt? Probably not. But it does mean that the acceptance of Christianity's truth claims is not unreasonable, as a great many objectors would claim. In fact, I would say Christianity is the most reasonable worldview, and the objections brought against that I'm aware of are ultimately unreasonable, so I have no problem accepting it.
If you accept Christianity based on its reasonableness, then you are committed to accepting any new religion you come across which is more reasonable.
As I suspect you aren't prepared to do that, your belief on Christianity goes beyond mere issues of reason.
In fact, since I think most of the theological claims of Christianity fall under "poetry" as I stated above, I'd have to argue that it isn't reason as much as an emotional reaction to particular poetic similes and metaphors that forms the basis of the religion.
Theology is a kind of poetry, and the believer likes the way it makes them feel.
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One other note, which I think is important here, is that I've repeatedly stated a willingness to listen to other accounts of how we know what a statement means and whether it is true.
I never said it was impossible for there to be other accounts, only that I don't happen to know of any.
You have yet to try to develop one. All of what you've said boils down to "we Christians think X is true" without getting at why or how.
I think the fact that you are reduced to asserting that certain statements are true and meaningful without giving an account of why and how one should believe that is telling.
