This study will suggest that anarthrous predicate nouns preceding the verb may function primarily to express the nature or character of the subject, and this qualitative significance may be more important that the question whether the predicate noun itself should be regarded as definite or indefinite (
IBID, p. 75).
Harner says that qualitativeness may coexist with either a definite or indefinite semantic force. Though not explicitly stated, a close reading also indicates that he believed qualitativeness may exist by itself. When considering Mark 12:35, Harner says, "the predicate noun could be interpreted as defininte, indefinite, or qualitative, depending on the particular meaning or emphasis which we understand the passage to have" (
IBID, p. 79).
Harner found that 80% of anarthrous pre-verbal PNs in Mark and John are qualitative and 20% are definite. None are exclusively indefinite, which supports Colwell's conclusion as well. Harner notes that some qualitative nouns, such as HAMARTÔLOS ("sinner") in John 8:31, though best translated with the indefinite article due to English idiom, should actually be considered qualitative:
Again the qualitative aspect of the predicate is most prominent; they [the Jews] think that Jesus has the nature or character of one who is "sinner." There is no basis for regarding the predicate as definite, although in this instance we would probably use the indefinite article in English translation (
IBID, p. 83).
Harner stresses that when considering whether a pre-verbal predicate noun is definite, indefinite, or qualitative, it is important to consider how the writer might have expressed his intentions using another, and possibly less ambiguous, syntax as well as what he actually wrote. Thus, with John 1:1c, Harner notes the following possibilities:
A. hO LOGOS ÊN hO THEOS
B. THEOS ÊN hO LOGOS
C. hO LOGOS THEOS ÊN
D. hO LOGOS ÊN THEOS
E. hO LOGOS ÊN THEIOS
Clause A, with an
arthrous predicate, would mean that
logos and
theos are equivalent and interchangeable. There would be no
ho theos which is not also
ho logos. But this equation of the two would contradict the preceding clause of 1:1, in which John writes that`o logoV hn proV ton qeon. This clause suggests relationship, and thus some form of "personal" differentiation, between the two (
IBID, p. 84-85).
So, Harner, in agreement with Robertson, Dana & Mantey, and most other scholars cited above, notes that if both THEOS and LOGOS were articular, the two terms would be convertible. Since John did not use this syntax, his intended meaning must be something else. Harner continues:
Clause D, with the verb preceding an anarthrous predicate, would probably mean that the logos was "a god" or a divine being of some kind, belonging to the general category of
theos but as a distinct being from
ho theos. Clause E would be an attenuated form of D. It would mean that the
logos was "divine," without specifying further in what way or to what extent it was divine. It could also imply that the
logos, being only
theios, was subordinate to
theos (
IBID).
Thus, Harner notes that had John wished to express the idea that the LOGOS was "a god," or a divine being distinct from hO THEOS, he had at least two unambiguous ways of doing so. Since he did not, we may conclude that John in all likelihood chose the syntax he did because he wished to express something else with regard to the LOGOS.
Clauses B and C, with an anarthrous predicate preceding the verb, are primarily qualitative in meaning. They indicate that the
logos has the nature of
theos. There is no basis for regarding the predicate
theos as definite. This would make B and C equivalent to A, and like A they would then contradict the preceding clause of 1:1 (
IBID).
Note here that Harner equates a definite semantic force in a pre-verbal PN without the article to an articular noun. He sees both forms as examples of a convertible proposition. This is the major point of contention between scholars who regard THEOS in 1:1c as definite as opposed to those who see it as qualitative. Scholars on both sides interpret this clause in more or less the same way, as Harner himself notes: "In many cases their [commentators'] interpretations agree with the explanation that is given above" (
IBID). Those who agree with Harner reject a definite force because they view it as semantically the same as a convertible proposition, which would present problems with regard to the previous clause (1:1b). Those who view THEOS as definite believe the absence of the article precludes the the possibility of convertibility. Yet both generally agree that the meaning of 1:1c is as Harner himself translates it: "The Word had the same nature as God" (
IBID, p. 87).
Harner continues:
As John has just spoken in terms of relationship and differentiation between
ho logos and
ho theos, he would imply in B or C that they share the same nature as belonging to the reality
theos. Clauses B and C are identical in meaning but differ slightly in emphasis. C would mean that the
logos (rather than something else) had the nature of
theos. B means that the
logos had the nature of
theos (rather than something else). In this clause, the form that John actually uses, the word
theos is placed at the beginning for emphasis (
IBID, p. 85).
Thus, Harner says that not only is John attributing the nature of THEOS to the LOGOS, but emphasizes that nature by placing THEOS at the head of the clause. The emphasis of THEOS would seem unaccountable if John intended an indefinite nuance, but is perfectly understandable if THEOS is qualitative, signifying that the Son's nature is that of God.
Paul Dixon
Dixon's
study is the first of several to challenge the popular application of Colwell's rule. Dixon notes that Colwell's data begins with definite PNs and demonstrates that these usually lack the article. However, those using the rule to "prove" that THEOS in John 1:1c is definite (including Colwell himself!) are not actually citing Colwell's rule, but it's converse:
The rule does not say: an
anarthrous predicate nominative which precedes the verb is definite. This is the converse of Colwell's rule and as such is not a valid inference....from the statement "Definite predicate nominatives preceding the verb are anarthrous," it is not valid to infer "Anarthrous predicate nominatives preceding the verb are definite" (
Dixon, pp. 11-12).
Colwell himself affirmed that the converse of the rule was as valid as the rule itself, and said that
anarthrous pre-verbal PNs would normally be definite (
Wallace, p. 259). Like Harner, Dixon considers qualitativeness a semantic force in addition to definiteness and indefiniteness. While Harner says that qualitativeness may exist either independently or along with definiteness or indefiniteness, Dixon argues that only one of these three semantic forces is the author's intended meaning in any given instance:
The whole notion that a noun can have two or more simultaneous nuances as used in a particular context is rather like saying a word can have two or more simultaneous meanings when used in a particular context. There is no question that a word can have two or more meanings, but when it is actually used by an author it almost always has a particular meaning, unless he is intentionally employing a double entendre (perhaps like KEFALÊN in 1 Cor 11:5). Likewise, we can assume an author has a particular nuance of a noun being used and is not intentionally being ambiguous so as to confuse the reader (Dixon, message posted on b-greek discussion list on the Internet, Friday, March 2, 2001).
Dixon's statistical methodology, unlike Colwells', was to begin with
anarthrous PNs (as opposed to only examining those PNs which were definite), and determine the semantic force of each. His statistical analysis substantiates Harner's findings: "When the
anarthrous predicate nominative precedes the verb it is qualitative in 50 of 53 occurrences, or 94% probability" (
Dixon). Dixon concludes:
We may conclude three things about John 1:1. First, Colwell's rule cannot be applied to the verse as an argument for definiteness. Colwell's rule says that definite predicate nominatives preceding the verb usually are anarthrous. The rule says nothing about definiteness. It does not say that anarthrous predicate nominatives preceding the verb usually are definite. This is the converse of the rule, and as such is not necessarily valid. Indeed, our thesis demonstrates just the opposite, that anarthrous predicate nominatives preceding the verb usually are qualitative, 94% of occurrences. Second, on the basis of the contrast with 1:14 (where the humanity of Christ is stressed), we conclude that THEOS in 1:1c stresses quality. Third, this thesis demonstrates that the statistical probability for THEOS being qualitative, rather than definite or indefinite, is quite high, 94% (
IBID).
Daniel B. Wallace
In his intermediate Greek
grammar, Wallace accepts Harner's definition of the qualitative semantic force, and provides a number of examples outside of John 1:1. Wallace, like Harner, advocates qualitativeness as a separate semantic category, either coexisting alongside definite or indefinite semantic forces or existing by itself. Citing Harner and Dixon, Wallace concludes that THEOS in John 1:1 is qualitative, and finds the indefinite semantic force the least likely for preverbal predicate nominatives. Though Wallace says that "the Word was divine" may be an acceptable translation, this is only acceptable if we define "divine" in such a way that it is only applied to true Deity. The import of the qualitative force goes well beyond what we commonly would refer to as "divine" in contemporary usage:
The
idea of qualitative qeoV here is that the Word had all the attributes and qualities that "the God" (of 1:1b) had. In other words, he shared the
essence of the Father, though they differed in person.
The construction the evangelist chose to express this idea was the most concise way he could have stated that the Word was God and yet was distinct from the Father (
Wallace, p. 269, emphasis in original).
Don Hartley
One of the possible objections to Wallace's advocacy of qualitativeness as by far the most likely semantic force (apart from a concurrent definite or indefinite nuance) is that most of the examples he provides are "mass" nouns. Mass nouns are those that cannot be semantically indefinitized or pluralized (that is, that cannot be used with the indefinite article, and for which there is no plural form). "Flesh," is a mass term - we would not say "a flesh," nor "fleshes." A "count" noun, on the other hand, is a noun that can be used with the indefinite article and for which there is a plural form. "Dog" is a count noun - we can say "a dog," or "dogs." Simply put, a count noun is something that can be counted; a mass term is one that cannot. We can count dogs but not flesh. Some have argued that mass terms differ dramatically from count terms in the semantic force they can convey (it is sometimes argued that count terms must always be definite or indefinite and that there is no such thing as a "qualitative count noun").
1 Because it is generally conceded that mass terms can exude a qualitative force, it has been argued that the statistical analyses of Harner and Dixon are weighed unfairly towards qualitative nouns, particularly when applying those statistics to THEOS, which is a count noun.
Don Hartley, a student of Dan Wallace's and research assistant on Wallace's
grammar, wrote his Master's of Theology thesis at Dallas Theological Seminary on the topic of Colwell's Construction and mass / count nouns. He also published a
paper derived from his thesis. Hartley's methodology is to examine every example of Colwell's Construction in the Greek New Testament. Hartley purposely leaves controversial or questionable nouns out of this sample. He then eliminates all factors that would unfairly weigh the sample towards one semantic force, such as mass terms. He carefully identifies all potential semantic forces - following Wallace, Hartley advocates qualitativeness as either a standalone semantic force, or as one that can coexist alongside definite or indefinite forces. He notes that all mass terms exude a purely qualitative force (John 1:14, for example, does not teach that the Logos became The Flesh or a flesh, but rather "flesh," signifying that all the Logos possesses all the qualities or attributes of "flesh"). He therefore concludes that qualitativeness is a valid semantic category apart from definiteness or indefiniteness, and argues that this force may be applied equally to mass or count terms.
Hartley's results demonstrate that in John's Gospel, a preverbal PN is usually qualitative (56%), as opposed to definite (11%), indefninte (17%), or qualitative-indefinite (17%). He concludes that from the standpoint of pure statistical analysis, THEOS in John 1:1c is most likely qualitative: "Thus, Jesus is God in every sense the Father is" (
Hartley, p. 40).
Conclusion
While the scholars we have considered have some differences with regard to the applicability of Colwell's Rule to John 1:1c and the particular semantic force of THEOS in this clause, they are unanimous in regarding the proper understanding of John's meaning: The Word has all the qualities, attributes, or nature of God, the same God referenced in the previous clause. The absence of the article, all agree, is purposeful; John intends to remove any possibility of a convertible proposition. The definite article signifies a
personal distinction, thus the Person of God is in view in John 1:1b. The absence of the article signifies that the nature or essence of God is in view in 1:1c. John is not teaching that the Logos is the same Person as the Father. Nor, do the scholars believe, is John teaching that the Logos is a second god. All agree that the indefinite semantic force is unlikely.
It is my view that those who argue that the definite semantic force would signify a convertible proposition have the best case. The purely qualitative nuance is well-attested in the Greek New Testament, as has been demonstrated by Harner, Dixon, Wallace, and Hartley. The latter has demonstrated its application to both mass and count terms, and thus its application to THEOS in John 1:1c. It is important to note that even those scholars who maintain that THEOS is definite nevertheless argue that the significance of John's words are virtually identical with those who argue for a qualitative nuance.
Based on the evidence presented here, we may confidently take John's meaning as:
"In the beginning of all creation, the Word was already in existence. The Word was intimately with God. And the Word was as to His essence, God."
_______________________________
Notes
1. This line of argument is addressed in the Jehovah's Witness/John 1:1c section of Other Views Considered (below). It has been thoroughly
debated by Don Hartley and Jehovah's Witness apologist, Greg Stafford. I had a brief
interaction with Greg Stafford on this subject as well.
For an Answer: Christian Apologetics - John 1