Free will and determinism

[stevevw]

The process is the same. You are determining preferences. Whether it's a new job or eggs instead of cereal

Ah thats where I think there may be a difference. Everyday stuff like food is sort of robotic. But contemplating a new job sort of moves into self reflection, reflection on life, meaning ect. Not always as some may just robotically work.

But we have the capacity to think deeper about these things which we can make meaningful choices that can have an influence on our reality. That we don't sometimes and fall into that roboitic mode doesn't mean we cannot snap ourselves out of this and be able to become part of the process of changing our reality.

No it's not. It's saying that if you dismantle the transmitter then it can't send out anything. If you dismantle the receiver it can't receive anything. It'll be, as they say, dead. But radio waves are still real. It's just that you won't be transmitting any.

Yes thats what I am saying. That consciousness can be like radiowaves and the physical brain can be the sender and reciever of consciousness. If the physical brain is damaged it may interfer with clear consciousness. If its complete severed it losses the signal of consciousness.

Another interesting aspect of consciousness is that it can still happen when unconscious or even clinically dead. So that would be like turning the radio off, unplugging it from the wall and still the radio working and recieving signals.

Everyone will. Including me. It feels exactly like I have some control. But I'll tell you the reasons I made a decision (that's why you were asking). At least the ones that I know of. The ones that determined my choice. I'm still waiting for you to give me an example that had no reason. An example that wasn't determined by antecedent conditions.

As I said I don't think its a case of a lack of antecedents but rather than we can make choices despite the antecedents. In other words there maybe antecedents associated with everything we do that may influence our choices to varying degrees.

But we have the ability to overide them at times and choose one set of action that may have been influenced by some antecedents over another choice that may have been influenced by some antecedents. We are still making one choice over another and I think what makes it one choice at least for important and meaningful stuff is that we inject ourselves, our mind and attention into that on a deeper level than the antecedents from which we gain knowledge the antecedents could not have given us which gives us that degree of control in certain situations.

I think primarily we are creatures determined by the antecedents as we are physical and the world is physical. That makes sense. But I think there is another aspect to us, call it spirituality, Transcedence, Consciousness or may intuition its real and unlike other species at lease to deminishing levels humans have the greatest capacity for this deeper understanding. Thats what makes us different.

You can't make a conscious decision on knowledge that you don't have. Free will doesn't live there. There may be circumstances about which you are unconsciously aware and your choice may be subconsciously determined by some of them. But then it won't be a free will choice.

I think we do have that knowledge but don't realise it in our conscious minds. Intuition is said to be the end result of our brains filtering a whole bunch of stuff we take in both at the conscious and subconscious level. Though we can get intuition or our sense of something wrong because its mixed with emotion we can and do get it astonishly right even beyond our ability to explain exactly how we were so right. I don't believe this is just coincident.

So I think we have more abilitythan we give ourselves credit. I think we do take in suff beyond what we see in the physical world due to consciousness. Some knowledge of reality that the physical world doesn't give us and its this dimension that I think is associated with agency, with being a part of reality rather than apart from reality where we can gain some insight or knowledge about reality that allows us to have some control.

The reality of the circumstances - which weren't under your control, your inbuilt instinctive behaviour - which is obviously nothing to do with free will,

I was going to agree but then I thought wait a minute. I know research shows that humans are more or less borm with a sense of empathy, kindness and justice. These are not basal instincts but higher order abstract cognitions. So as humans we have this animalistic side which relates to instincts and programmed behaaviour.

But we can also overcome these instincts determining our behaviour through the higher cognitions of mind which is beyond the physical drives.

the culture into which you grew up in - obviously not a conscious decision by you,

. This one I especially disagree with as I mentioned earlier cultural and other social behaviours are now being seen as a driving force within their own rights as directing evolution or rather determining the survival outcomes of each group.

This is evidenced in evolution beyond genes and how the type of behaviour one generation may have can positively or negatively effect future generations survivability (epigenetics). But also the direct benefits of how culture may influence certain higher order behaviours that are conducive of survival.

For example many Indigenous peoples have spiritual beliefs that connect them to the land and environment and nature. Living one with the land. These people have survived for millenia say compared to modern cultures that have raped and pillaged the land.

Humans especially have a deeper understand about the nature of things and can look beyond the environments pressures and deterministic processes to drive their own evolution and destiny whether positive or negative. So it may be that like individual entire cultures can overcome the antecedents through a deeper unified knowledge.

and knowledge and education that you have gained as you have grown - all that input you have been subjected to which was an accident of your particular circumstances. All those and more determine your actions.

I agree knowledge is a powerful force and as I mentioned in some ways can create reality. But I think despite knowledge and other determinants we have this deeper sense and consciousness that doesn't require education, culture, or our instincts.

A bit similar to humans common moral sense. We don't need culture or to be taught this sense. In fact we have to be born with this sense for culture and morality to make sense to us in the first place.

I've been explaining it for quite some time now. I'll grant that it can't be proved but to say 'there's no explanation' is completely nonsensical. Maybe what you meant to say was that you don't agree with any explanation that you've read or listened to.

Its more like no explanation has ever been able to explain there is no Free will or consciousness for that matter. They are inadequate, they still leave things unexplained. So we continue to look and as time goes by we seem to move away from material explanations and more towards something beyond.

So yes we cannot fully explain how this works at the moment but we know we are on the right track due to the complete inability of the material paradigm being able to explain this. So the answers must lie within a different paradinamic explanation. We see glimpses such as how well the non material explanations fit into what we see with the higher order thinking and behaviours.

Thats why fields like evolutionary psychology, and extended synthesis are being developed. Thats why behavioural and consciousness sciences are becoming more popular.

I'd skip the evolutionary aspects of this if I were you. I don't want to be rude, but you've made a couple of dopey statements on it so far that weren't even wrong. Just accept that you are part of the evolutionary process and forget about the details as it relates to free will.

I don't think I have said anything wrong. Or at least nothing I havn't got evidence for. I don't usually say stuff I havn't researched and got evidence on. If I said it in relation to the OP then I said it because I think it relates. I'm pretty sure evolution relates to free will one way or another.

Whether you stayed where you were and the environment changed or you moved to a different environment for whatever reason, it makes no difference. You decide to move or you decide to stay. The environment changes or it doesn't. Either way it will affect the process. Or it won't. I mean, really, let's skip evolution.

THis is probably a good example of how evolution or at the the traditional view as compared to the extended view relates to free will.

You are correct that fundementally the Modern synthesis says that environments shape creatures. But what if it was the other way around where creatures shaped environments. Where they were able to direct their own evolution and act like natural selection but instead be the selector in how they evolve thus oriding the deterministic processes of bottom up evolution.

So you're going with free will in prehistoric times. Well, that's a big step. You'll be hard pressed to find anyone who thinks that present day chimps even have a theory of mind, let alone free will. But there you go, it's where your thought processes have taken you.

Its not prehistory times thinking but rather todays thinking. Things have changed as time has gone by. Its not so much about a theory of mind which is more about knwing what others are thinking. Which I think our closest ancestors would have some degree of as would other creatures to varying degrees. I am sure my dog knows what I am thinking somethings the way he looks me in the eyes lol.

Its more about each creature having the capacity to mentally inject themselves into their own evolution and rise above the deterministic processes. We see this in varying degrees across different species. They say even cells can sense their environments in a rudimentary way.

But humans are the most consciousness and aware on a level beyond the materail world and thus can move beyond the material processes. Science has always dumbed down the subjective human like it is some unreliable byproduct that has not influence or things. But when you factor back in the many beyond physical influences and capabilities we begin to see that humans are actually central players in the equation of what reality is made up of.

 

[Bradskii]

Ah thats where I think there may be a difference. Everyday stuff like food is sort of robotic. But contemplating a new job sort of moves into self reflection, reflection on life, meaning ect. Not always as some may just robotically work.

It's either instinctive or it's a conscious decision. Thinking a little 'deeper' about something doesn't equate to free will.

Yes thats what I am saying.

It really isn't. Because you go on to say....

That consciousness can be like radiowaves and the physical brain can be the sender and reciever of consciousness. If the physical brain is damaged it may interfer with clear consciousness. If its complete severed it losses the signal of consciousness.

But...

Another interesting aspect of consciousness is that it can still happen when unconscious or even clinically dead. So that would be like turning the radio off, unplugging it from the wall and still the radio working and recieving signals.

So you're playing both sides of the argument. It's like turning off the radio...but the radio is still working. You won't win, but at least you can't lose. Look, we're talking about the brain. Remove it and you're dead. Not alive. You have shuttled off this mortal coil. Gone to meet your maker. I'll stop there because it's turning into a Python sketch. Your mind, your ego, your consciousness is all in that stuff between your ears. Don't waste your time or mine on any other options.

I haven't responded to any other points you might have made because I really don't like responding to umpteen different points at one time. You are known for this gish gallop type of discussion, presenting multiple points and simply ignoring most responses. And I'm not interested. You had me answering nine different points from your last posts and now it's up to 26. Please try to focus on one matter at a time.

You've only got one matter to respond to in this case and it's whether there is something outside of our brain that can in any way be considered relevant to free will. Your task is to either put forward evidence for that or to accept that it doesn't exist.

 

[o_mlly]

But our scientist knows the exact neurological conditions that present when someone decides to break social norms and steal someone's property. So he flicks some switches and causes our hero to take my wallet. ... But what if the scientist was able to rearrange the various parts of the brain in advance. And then leaves the guy to his own devices. ... Now the neurological changes to the guys brain happened in the womb. As he was growing. Depending on what his mother was doing when she was pregnant. The changes happened due to the type of education the guy had. Whether he was assaulted as a child. Whether violence was a part of his upbringing. ...

The fundamental error in your hypotheticals is the underlying false assumption that the human brain is hard-wired. Neurologists recognize that that is not true. There is evidence of considerable indeterminacy in the brain's system of firing its neurons.

Even though his neurological states were exactly the same and in none of the cases did he have any control over them.

No. We are not automatons. In moral decisions we deliberate (act out of freedom). Our past experiences, our predispositions, our values, our genes, etc. may constrain our degree of freedom but they are not determinative. We, as moral agents, integrate all the above, dismissing some, valuing some higher than others, and develop our own self, ie., our own character. In moral decisions, we are in control.

 

[Bradskii]

There is evidence of considerable indeterminacy in the brain's system of firing its neurons.

Randomness? There is no free will there.

We, as moral agents, integrate all the above, dismissing some, valuing some higher than others, and develop our own self, ie., our own character.

I have no objection to that. Based on our culture, our education, our maturity, our upbringing (and many other variables), we each choose from the values that have been presented to us. Those values determine our character. Which then determines our choices when making decisions. As you imply, how could we do otherwise?

 

[Hans Blaster]

OK, now I'm going to dip my toe in the topic...

Ah thats where I think there may be a difference. Everyday stuff like food is sort of robotic. But contemplating a new job sort of moves into self reflection, reflection on life, meaning ect. Not always as some may just robotically work.

But we have the capacity to think deeper about these things which we can make meaningful choices that can have an influence on our reality. That we don't sometimes and fall into that roboitic mode doesn't mean we cannot snap ourselves out of this and be able to become part of the process of changing our reality.

Steve, do you have any supporting evidence that little decisions and big decisions are handled in a fundamentally different fashion from psychology, or neurology, or something like that? I know you often have references for stuff like this. It's not always the case, but sometimes I make bigger decisions, the kind that have a bigger impact on life, quicker than the little things like where should I go to lunch today. Thanks.

 

[o_mlly]

Randomness? There is no free will there.

The point I made demonstrates that your hypothetical of a hard-wired brain is unsupported by science. My point still holds. Your hypothetical, therefore, is not instructive.

I have no objection to that. Based on our culture, our education, our maturity, our upbringing (and many other variables), we each choose from the values that have been presented to us. Those values determine our character. Which then determines our choices when making decisions. As you imply, how could we do otherwise?

One basic problem with your position is twofold: 1) You make an a priori w/o evidence assumption that free will does not exist, 2) you then argue circularly from that unsupported position that because choice doesn’t exist in any prior instant, then you could have had no control over your own dispositions. The argument thus rests on the thing it’s trying to prove and begs the question.

 

[durangodawood]

1) You make an a priori w/o evidence assumption that free will does not exist,.....

I dont think so. In his argument the denial of free will follows in a reasoned way from these deeper a priori assumptions:

1. All events in time happen for prior reasons.
2. you cant go back in time and change things there

Those axioms are pretty fundamental. Typically, people only propose that the first one (cause-effect) fails to apply in a couple circumstances:

1. divine intervention
2. subatomic randomness

 

[Bradskii]

The point I made demonstrates that your hypothetical of a hard-wired brain is unsupported by science. My point still holds.

Perhaps you could support your claim (that there are random neurological events) and we can examine them. Maybe check out Penrose-Hameroff for some info on microtubules and quantum effects (orchestrated objective reduction or Orch OR), although it's mainly concerned with consciousness itself, which is another ball game for another time. See here: How quantum brain biology can rescue conscious free will. And see Churchland's response here: https://patriciachurchland.com/wp-c...onNeural-Theories-of-Conscious-Experience.pdf

I'll also quote this passage from here: A Summary of ‘Determined’ by Robert Sapolsky — Does Free Will Exist?Alexander Horwitz, M.D. — Psychiatry & Psychotherapy Podcast

'Sapolsky discusses quantum tunneling, which is illustrated by electrons being able to seemingly traverse physical spaces such as walls due to superposition. Quantum indeterminacy provides a lot of fodder for doubting the presence of free will. Maybe behavior is a product of the randomness of the previous ideas. Sapolsky ultimately argues against this. The idea of quantum effects bubbling up is considered through the work of Peter Tse with the neurotransmitter glutamate as well as the work of anesthesiologist Stuart Hameroff and physicist Roger Penrose with microtubules.

While a glutamatergic neuron has roughly 20-100 trillion glutamate receptors, it is unlikely that a little spontaneous release of glutamate can produce any meaningful effects. In addition, physicist Max Tegmark has shown that the time course of quantum states in microtubules is far too short to have a discernible biological effect. Although there is the potential for a staggering amount of subatomic indeterminacy, the major point is that it does not appear to manifest on the macroscopic level. If it did, Sapolsky notes that “you’d just be making gargly sounds because the muscles in your tongue would be doing all sorts of random things.” Interestingly, Sapolsky does not address string theory and the idea of multiple universes or the many worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics.'

See also Tegmark's rejection of the claim here: https://space.mit.edu/home/tegmark/brain.html

Plenty for you to check out I think. I might say 'Been there, got the T-shirt' as I've read all of the linked articles before. And mulled over the pros and cons. But there may be something you want to discuss.

One basic problem with your position is twofold: 1) You make an a priori w/o evidence assumption that free will does not exist, 2) you then argue circularly from that unsupported position that because choice doesn’t exist in any prior instant, then you could have had no control over your own dispositions.

As was pointed out in the post above, and has been explained to you previously, the a priori position was 'We have free will'. Coupled with a normal sense of puzzlement that anyone could argue against it. So...why not investigate the claim that we don't. And discovered it was based on determinism. Well, hey - I agree with determinism, but there must be room for free will in the deterministic world. I was a compatibilist. So I examined the literature. Classical, enlightenment and contemporary. Studied neurobiology. Looked at cause and effect. Looked at social conditioning. Spent quite a few years poking around and started to get to a point where the arguments for and against kept coming up wherever I looked.

And found that there was no room for free will anywhere.

And then spent not an inconsiderable amount of time trying to find an escape clause that will allow for personal responsibility. And found that there wasn't one. Which was by far the most difficult aspect of the matter with which to come to terms. But you get to a point where there's nowhere else to go.

 

[o_mlly]

Plenty for you to check out I think. I might say 'Been there, got the T-shirt' as I've read all of the linked articles before. And mulled over the pros and cons. But there may be something you want to discuss.

Apparently, you don't have all the necessary "T-shirts" to claim such expertise. Although it appears you would like to imply that the science is settled, clearly it is not:

• Can neuroscience enlighten the philosophical debate about free will?
  Delnatte C, Roze E, Pouget P, Galléa C, Welniarz Q. Delnatte C, et al. Neuropsychologia. 2023 Sep 9;188:108632. doi: 10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2023.108632. Epub 2023 Jun 27. Neuropsychologia. 2023. PMID: 37385373 Review.
• Free will: A case study in reconciling phenomenological philosophy with reductionist sciences.
  Hong FT. Hong FT. Prog Biophys Mol Biol. 2015 Dec;119(3):670-726. doi: 10.1016/j.pbiomolbio.2015.08.008. Epub 2015 Aug 11. Prog Biophys Mol Biol. 2015. PMID: 26276463 Review.
• How do we Sign a Contract if Everything is Predetermined: Does Compatibilism Help Preserve Agency?
  Gasparyan D. Gasparyan D. Integr Psychol Behav Sci. 2024 Jan 18. doi: 10.1007/s12124-023-09816-6. Online ahead of print. Integr Psychol Behav Sci. 2024. PMID: 38236376
• Compatibilism and Incompatibilism in Social Cognition.
  Turri J. Turri J. Cogn Sci. 2017 Apr;41 Suppl 3:403-424. doi: 10.1111/cogs.12372. Epub 2016 Mar 25. Cogn Sci. 2017. PMID: 27016174 Clinical Trial.
• The implications of advances in neuroscience for freedom of the will.
  Bok H. Bok H. Neurotherapeutics. 2007 Jul;4(3):555-9. doi: 10.1016/j.nurt.2007.04.001. Neurotherapeutics. 2007. PMID: 17599722 Free PMC article. Review.
  

  Perhaps you could support your claim (that there are random neurological events) and we can examine them.

  I don't have to support it. Sapolsky, your oft cited source, does so for me.
  
  
  I see two broad ways of thinking about how we might harness, co‑opt, and join forces with randomness for moral consistency. In a “filtering” model, randomness is generated indeterministically, the usual, but the agentic “you” installs a filter up top that allows only some of the randomness that has bubbled up to pass through and drive behavior. In contrast, in a “messing with” model, your agentic self reaches all the way down and messes with the quantum indeterminacy itself in a way that produces the behavior supposedly chosen.​
  
  Of course, Sapolsky terms the action as "messes with the quantum indeterminacy". More precisely, the agent self "takes advantage of the quantum indeterminacy" in order that the self, the higher-level organism, can integrate the under-determined lower-level forces to higher level needs with causal efficacy. As physicist and philosopher George Ellis explains:
  
  
  The Dynamical Emergence of Biology From Physics: Branching Causation via Biomolecules - PubMed
  
  The key feature allowing this to happen is the way biomolecules such as voltage-gated ion channels can act to enable branching logic to arise from the underlying physics, despite that physics per se being of a deterministic nature. Much randomness occurs at the molecular level, which enables higher level functions to select lower level outcomes according to higher level needs. Intelligent causation occurs when organisms engage in deduction, enabling prediction and planning. This is possible because ion channels enable action potentials to propagate in axons. The further key feature is that such branching biological behavior acts down to cause the underlying physical interactions to also exhibit a contextual branching behavior.​
  
  

  Plenty for you to check out I think.

  Yes. As mentioned at the outset, I think reading some other books looks to be good advice for you.
  
  

  As was pointed out in the post above, and has been explained to you previously, the a priori position was 'We have free will'. Coupled with a normal sense of puzzlement that anyone could argue against it.

  Those who claim that a self-evident fact is in error make an extraordinary claim. Such claims require extraordinary evidence. However, your citations of evidence are not only not extraordinary, they are, sorry to say, rubbish. I've already cited the poor design problems of some but there is more.
  
  For example, the study claiming that hungry parole judges are more likely to decide to deny parole because they are hungry suffers from its non-attempt to control for other explanatory variables. The fact is that defendants without representation, who are less likely to get parole, tend to have their cases scheduled right before lunch (because they’re quick). (The irrational hungry judge effect revisited: Simulations reveal that the magnitude of the effect is overestimated | Judgment and Decision Making | Cambridge Core).
  

  And then spent not an inconsiderable amount of time trying to find an escape clause that will allow for personal responsibility. And found that there wasn't one.

  Apparently, another look on your part is in order.

 

[Halbhh]

I'm not arguing that decisions are predictable. Far from it. They can be in the simplest of examples - she's hungry so she's going to eat something soon. But as I mentioned in a post a little ways back, the conditions which we need to consider that might determine a decision are limitless. Ranging from a split second ago, to a few minutes...back to a few million years. A time scale which might prompt some eye rolling as it sounds like hyperbole used for effect but what happened to your father during his life had a direct affect on you. As did what happened to a distant direct ancestor (your great x 1000 grandfather).

So it's effectively a chaotic system. Like the weather. A tiny change, your great x 1000 grandfather turned left instead of right coming out of his cave and being attacked by a bear, can make significant changes to the world. But, if something is not predictable, it doesn't mean it's not determinate.

He turned left instead of right and you can't predict the outcomes. But it determined that you wouldn't actually exist.

Ah, but the decision making isn't necessarily (nor even likely) to be that randomized like as you are presuming here though, I was trying to point out. It's not that mostly a person does what we expect but then occasionally does a totally random other thing against their character -- that's not the model I'm thinking of at all. Rather, it seems more plausible that the brain is literally structured to use any randomness effects, literally that the design might rely on randomness instead of trying to reduce its effects -- that is, instead of merely being built to counter randomness, the brain might even be using it like a kind of energy source. Example (just a speculative example) -- an analogy to brainstorming: in brainstorming we try to think up a bunch of ideas and then discard most or almost all of them, saving the best one. The brain might do an analogous thing, at a more fundamental level, perhaps. (and this is just one idea. many are possible (others came to mind, but that's just because there is more then just 1 possible way randomness could be used instead of resisted)

Re: "But, if something is not predictable, it doesn't mean it's not determinate." -- as best I can guess, you might be thinking of how of course a system can be too complex to calculate within the time available, but that's beside our topic really. That something is too complex for us to calculate isn't what I meant by being unpredictable. I meant "unpredictable" in a more full way -- that infinite computing power and unlimited data/total input data (that fully captures all variables involved that affect a system, and fully) still would not allow calculation.

 

[Bradskii]

Can neuroscience enlighten the philosophical debate about free will?

This one takes the position that it exists and concludes that 'the current evidence is insufficient to undermine free will'. No details, so there's nothing I can comment on. Other than to say that they answered their own question with a 'No'.

Free will: A case study in reconciling phenomenological philosophy with reductionist sciences.

Again, no details, but: 'Still, origination of free will must be considered an unsolved problem at present.' Which is another way of saying that they couldn't find anything to show that it exists. Same as the one above.

How do we Sign a Contract if Everything is Predetermined: Does Compatibilism Help Preserve Agency?

No details, but this is in any case a paper discussing ethics on the understanding that determinism is true: 'It questions how individuals, particularly those adhering to deterministic viewpoints, can ethically navigate a world defined by causal relationships.' It's not concerned with trying to show whether free will exists or not. Rather it takes the basic premise of free will - determinism, and asks how that impacts morality (because it prompts the position of no free will).

Compatibilism and Incompatibilism in Social Cognition.

This is just testing people's views on whether they they think incompatibilism or compatibilism relates to moral responsibility. Not whether one is true or not. 'First, and most clearly, people are compatibilists about moral responsibility.' and 'The guiding question is whether patterns in our everyday social judgments reveal an implicit commitment to compatibilism, incompatibilism, or a hybrid account'. It's similar to the paper above. It's looking at ethical considerations and how people have a sense of compatibilism when it comes to morals. And you've been told umpteen times that we all do that anyway.

The implications of advances in neuroscience for freedom of the will.

Again, no details. But this isn't an examination of whether free will exists. Rather the implications of such a view: 'Some neuroscientists argue that advances in neuroscience threaten to undermine our freedom. The argument here is that those concerns are instances of a more general concern about the compatibility of freedom with causal determinism, and that denying that our choices are fully determined under causal laws presents a different set of problems for the claim that we have free will.' In other words, if free will doesn't exist, what are the implications.

I don't have to support it. Sapolsky, your oft cited source, does so for me.

I see two broad ways of thinking about how we might harness, co‑opt, and join forces with randomness for moral consistency. In a “filtering” model, randomness is generated indeterministically, the usual, but the agentic “you” installs a filter up top that allows only some of the randomness that has bubbled up to pass through and drive behavior. In contrast, in a “messing with” model, your agentic self reaches all the way down and messes with the quantum indeterminacy itself in a way that produces the behavior supposedly chosen.​

Of course, Sapolsky terms the action as "messes with the quantum indeterminacy". More precisely, the agent self "takes advantage of the quantum indeterminacy" in order that the self, the higher-level organism, can integrate the under-determined lower-level forces to higher level needs with causal efficacy.

It would be handy to see where that quote was taken from. It's originally from his book where he is setting out arguments against quantum indeterminacy. The first suggestion (by Dennett actually) was filtering. Sapolski sets out the argument and then dismantles it. Over a few pages, so I'm not going to quote whole chunks of it. Briefly, he wants to know where the filter actually comes from. Who is doing the filtering and why. On what basis are choices being filtered out or kept? It a classic case of can kicking.

The 'messing with the quantum indeterminancy comes from Peter Tse who proposed that 'you' somehow reach down and literally mess around at the quantum level and start selecting the actual process whereby neurons operate. But he offers no concrete mechanism for this. And it's nothing more than another version of dualism. There's a 'you' somewhere that somehow is shuffling quarks in some way that somehow filters up to enable neurons to fire in a way that you wanted them to fire. It's a ghost in the machine again.

As physicist and philosopher George Ellis explains:


The Dynamical Emergence of Biology From Physics: Branching Causation via Biomolecules - PubMed

The key feature allowing this to happen is the way biomolecules such as voltage-gated ion channels can act to enable branching logic to arise from the underlying physics, despite that physics per se being of a deterministic nature. Much randomness occurs at the molecular level, which enables higher level functions to select lower level outcomes according to higher level needs. Intelligent causation occurs when organisms engage in deduction, enabling prediction and planning. This is possible because ion channels enable action potentials to propagate in axons. The further key feature is that such branching biological behavior acts down to cause the underlying physical interactions to also exhibit a contextual branching behavior.​

I think you've taken that in isolation and thought it offered some rebuttal of free will. The paper is concerned only with causation. And there are numerous chapter headings such as 'Linking Physics and Biology: The Physical Basis'. He discusses relevant proteins, evolution, genetic selection and other determinants in the biological process. And this; 'Biological processes display a great deal of randomness, particularly at the molecular level where there occurs a “molecular storm”. The occurrence of this noise does not mean the outcome is random: reliable physiological function emerges at higher levels'. And if it was random...then no free will in that case either. Damned if you do and damned if you don't.

You didn't read anything but the intro, did you...

Yes. As mentioned at the outset, I think reading some other books looks to be good advice for you.

It would help if you offered some details that you'd actually read yourself. Or at least that we are able to read. The brief summaries I've given above (from the brief summaries that were available) shows that you've spent sometime looking for anything that you think might dismantle the argument but have selected papers that either have come to no conclusion or don't do what you thought they did. You can address any of the limited details in any of the articles if you think otherwise.

Likewise with the quote from Sapolski. You offer it as an example of the guy backing up what you think rejects the idea of free will when he is actually setting out his opponent's position, quite fairly in my view, so we can see how and why they have been rejected. As I say, it would help to know where you got the quote from so we can see the context. You were obviously unaware of that context.

For example, the study claiming that hungry parole judges are more likely to decide to deny parole because they are hungry suffers from its non-attempt to control for other explanatory variables. The fact is that defendants without representation, who are less likely to get parole, tend to have their cases scheduled right before lunch (because they’re quick). (The irrational hungry judge effect revisited: Simulations reveal that the magnitude of the effect is overestimated | Judgment and Decision Making | Cambridge Core)

If that was the only study on which the claim was being made then it would fail. I already linked to papers waaay back in this thread that showed that there were problems with the study. It was during a brief discussion about how, for example, low blood sugar can alter your mood. And about that there is no doubt whatsoever.

Apparently, another look on your part is in order.

I've looked at each of your selected papers (I assume they're the best you could find) and most have no details we can actually investigate. But two say that the jury is still out and the rest are investigating matters which are related to free will but which aren't determining its existence in any way.

 

[Bradskii]

Example (just a speculative example) -- an analogy to brainstorming: in brainstorming we try to think up a bunch of ideas and then discard most or almost all of them, saving the best one. The brain might do an analogous thing, at a more fundamental level, perhaps. (and this is just one idea. many are possible (others came to mind, but that's just because there is more then just 1 possible way randomness could be used instead of resisted).

That's pretty much what happens. We take all the available inputs and select the one that fits with what we want to do. No-one is arguing against that. What is being said is that the inputs will determine that decision. Different parts of the brain, your reptilian part, the amygdala, your frontal cortex etc, they are in effect 'brainstorming' the problem.

I've no argument with that.

Re: "But, if something is not predictable, it doesn't mean it's not determinate." -- as best I can guess, you might be thinking of how of course a system can be too complex to calculate within the time available, but that's beside our topic really. That something is too complex for us to calculate isn't what I meant by being unpredictable. I meant "unpredictable" in a more full way -- that infinite computing power and unlimited data/total input data (that fully captures all variables involved that affect a system, and fully) still would not allow calculation.

There are two definitions of chaotic. The usual sense of an incredibly complex system that is deemed unpredictable. But which is theoretically possible in some way - think of Laplace's Demon for example. And a more mathematical definition when you have a system that is literally impossible to predict.

So it could be possible for Laplace's Demon to predict the outcome of an action that your great great x 1,000 grandfather did as it relates to what you are doing right now. But it's effectively impossible. But even if it was theoretically impossible, it still doesn't mean that what you are doing wasn't determined by what your ancestor did. It's logically impossible for that not to be the case.

 

[o_mlly]

This one takes the position that it exists and concludes that 'the current evidence is insufficient to undermine free will'. No details, so there's nothing I can comment on. Other than to say that they answered their own question with a 'No'. ...

But two say that the jury is still out and the rest are investigating matters which are related to free will but which aren't determining its existence in any way.

Your examination of these citations must be dismissed as you have taken the wrong perspective in your criticisms.

The underlying problem in this thread is the framing of the question regarding free will. Against the self-evident fact that free will exists, you take the position that unless science can prove that free will exists, it does not. Then go on to claim (Sapolsky) that science has shown a naturalistic solution that completely undermines the notion of free will.

The citations I provided were to show those stipulations to be false which they did. Against your claim, the citations show there is evidence of randomness (indeterminacy) in the brain's decision-making process, and against Sapolsky's claim, science is not at all settled; a materialistic (deterministic) solution to explain decision-making is not only not in place, it is not even at hand.

For the umpteenth time, I remind you that you are in the "Ethics and Morality" forum, not the "Physical Science" forum. In this forum, philosophical arguments have as much (and often more) weight than the materialistic ones. The question of free will is not just an empirical one.

Imagine that the thread was, "Does life exist?" Your approach would be to deny the obvious reality of life until science can show a materialistic explanation for it. Framing the question in that manner would leave us all in a bit of a quandary as to what exactly is that we see in the mirror (or somewhere in the Matrix). Same problem with framing "Does free will exist?" as a purely empirical question.

You assume the individual cannot be the cause of their own behavior and then challenge us to prove you wrong.

... low blood sugar can alter your mood. And about that there is no doubt whatsoever.

Finally, as I don't care for long posts, I'll comment on this claim of certainty. Do you mean to imply that low blood sugar is the only variable that affects mood? If so then you are wrong. Sweet delusion. Glucose drinks fail to counteract ego depletion - PubMed

As with all of Sapolsky's "evidence", as the above citations shows, the fatal flaw is they all suffer from replication crisis.

However, since the underlying evidence is less compelling than suggested, replications are crucially required. ... Despite applying powerful research designs, no effect of sugar sensing or ingestion on ego depletion could be detected. These findings add to previous challenges of the glucose model of self-control and highlight the need for independent replications.​

 

[2PhiloVoid]

This might be a bit more of a philosophy question, compared to an ethics question. Free will has been debated for over 2.5 millennia, so I am afraid I wouldn't be able to help you, but maybe this PDF could: Robert Waxman PhD, Five Philosophers on Free Will: Plato, Hobbes, Hume, Leibniz, and Hegel - PhilArchive

I am tempted to give your question to the private, free, somewhat open source AI (Mistral Instruct 7B) that runs on my laptop, and see what answer it will spit out. It will spit the answer out in both a secular and Biblical perspective, as some Christians here, such as myself would like to see the theological side as well. My computer's CPU is probably gonna melt, but here goes it.

Hi Alex! ... I happened by this post you made and I wanted to take a moment to say that Ethics is, properly considered, an academic branch within Philosophy itself. So properly considered, any ethics question IS a philosophy question.

Peace.

 

[AlexB23]

Hi Alex! ... I happened by this post you made and I wanted to take a moment to say that Ethics is, properly considered, an academic branch within Philosophy itself. So properly considered, any ethics question IS a philosophy question.

Peace.

True, ethics is a subset of philosophy. My favorite ethics are the ethical implications of technology and hypothetical technologies. Peace be with you also.

 

[o_mlly]

Do you not think man is just a really smart chimp? And if so, does that belief underpin your dismissal of the existence of free will in man? If not, why not?

Yes. But to the extent that free will might be considered possible for us. But not for chimps. ...

Categorically, we are in agreement.

... Instinct can take you so far. But you start to need second and third level thought processes at some point.

Now, you will likely argue that those "second and third level thought processes" evolved in man.

If I am right then your position on free will derives from your position on man as evolved from bacteria, and that position derives from your atheism. Just like Sapolsky, you would not believe otherwise. Not because you don't have the free will to do so but doing so would render an incoherent philosophy of man. (Just wanted to finish this exchange.)

 

[Halbhh]

That's pretty much what happens. We take all the available inputs and select the one that fits with what we want to do. No-one is arguing against that. What is being said is that the inputs will determine that decision. Different parts of the brain, your reptilian part, the amygdala, your frontal cortex etc, they are in effect 'brainstorming' the problem.

I've no argument with that.

There are two definitions of chaotic. The usual sense of an incredibly complex system that is deemed unpredictable. But which is theoretically possible in some way - think of Laplace's Demon for example. And a more mathematical definition when you have a system that is literally impossible to predict.

So it could be possible for Laplace's Demon to predict the outcome of an action that your great great x 1,000 grandfather did as it relates to what you are doing right now. But it's effectively impossible. But even if it was theoretically impossible, it still doesn't mean that what you are doing wasn't determined by what your ancestor did. It's logically impossible for that not to be the case.

Ah, here you're helpfully laying out a basic concept of (one way of saying) what is determinism. That is very old to me, my own starting point actually about 40 years ago. Back then, and for quite a while I favored/expected there must likely be a full physics determinism, so I was at that time in favor of Einstein's view -- i.e., that seeming quantum randomness only meant we haven't yet found out the fully causal deterministic laws yet, so that classic quantum mechanics experiments (in Einstein's estimation) were not showing randomness in individual particle behavior necessarily, but we just need to discover what are the hidden variables, how things really work, deterministically.

....that was a long time ago for me, from my mid teens until I began to learn about quantum mechanics more in my 20s.

But, it seems likely that Einstein was wrong, today, due to Bell Test experiments.

If you can follow it even in just gist (as much as you can is good though), a wiki article or 2 might help you gain some a basic physics picture of where we are at on that old question. So, I want you to progress past the basics like understanding determinism as a basic idea, such as by Laplace's Demon, the 19th century idea determinism view that was popular. (so, you should now see I'd already know such a basic concept and the same determinism was what I was already talking about above, and won't be needing to have it explained....). Let's get closer to now in physics (we need to get into the 20th century at least).

Actually, best might be if you begin to understand why full determinism isn't a sure thing, so before the more advanced summary wiki articles, here's another wiki that will help catch you up on competing theories that are trying to go past the Copenhagen Interpretation, and seek an ultimate answer to go past the debate between Einstein and Bohr -- where in view of seeming randomness in the behavior of an individual particle, the debate began long ago (which got going starting in the 1930s and continued until John Bell figured out a key way to test who might be right), and physics has progressed a lot in the many decades since.. Interpretations of quantum mechanics - Wikipedia

 

[Bradskii]

Your examination of these citations must be dismissed as you have taken the wrong perspective in your criticisms.

The underlying problem in this thread is the framing of the question regarding free will. Against the self-evident fact that free will exists, you take the position that unless science can prove that free will exists, it does not. Then go on to claim (Sapolsky) that science has shown a naturalistic solution that completely undermines the notion of free will.

Him and many others. You should not be taking the position that 'This guy wrote a book and now we're supposed to believe that there's no free will'. That's a pretty narrow view of the discussion. There's a boat load of literature challenging the idea yet you seem determined to ignore it. Because...well, it's 'self evident'. I'm afraid that's the only position you've presented so far so I haven't had much to argue against. Oh, plus the risible 'you're an atheist so you must think there's no free will'.

So let's do it. We'll use one of the links you gave to a paper that we can actually access: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/cogs.12372

Please let me know exactly what you think is in that paper that supports the position that free will exists. It discusses what people believe in various situations as regards compatibilism or incompatibilism so you'll be hard pressed to find anything, but you've tossed it out as a case for the prosecution, so let's examine it.

The citations I provided were to show those stipulations to be false which they did. Against your claim, the citations show there is evidence of randomness (indeterminacy) in the brain's decision-making process...

Before we start a deep dive into examining any evidence that it exists in a way that might affect one's decision making abilities, could you explain how random events are applicable to the idea of free will?

Finally, as I don't care for long posts, I'll comment on this claim of certainty. Do you mean to imply that low blood sugar is the only variable that affects mood? If so then you are wrong. Sweet delusion. Glucose drinks fail to counteract ego depletion - PubMed

If you're going to make up what I've written then maybe you should write my posts for me. It'll save us some time. No, I did not 'imply' any such thing. I said what I meant and meant what I said. That low blood sugar affects your moods. No-one said or implied that it's the only variable. My blood sugar is fine but my mood is frustration at the moment having to point out that you are literally making things up. Please stop.

The fact that it's a perfectly understood and non controversial statement shows some desperation that you'd even try to counter it. With a paper that doesn't even address it.

However, since the underlying evidence is less compelling than suggested, replications are crucially required. ... Despite applying powerful research designs, no effect of sugar sensing or ingestion on ego depletion could be detected. These findings add to previous challenges of the glucose model of self-control and highlight the need for independent replications.​

Maybe you don't know what ego depletion is. From wiki: 'Ego depletion is the controversial idea that self-control or willpower draws upon a limited pool of mental resources that can be used up (with the word "ego" used in the psychoanalytic sense rather than the colloquial sense). That paper has nothing to do with hypoglycaemia at all.

 

[Bradskii]

Now, you will likely argue that those "second and third level thought processes" evolved in man.

Well, there's no evidence that they have evolved anywhere else. And we have them. So logic dictates...

If I am right then your position on free will derives from your position on man as evolved from bacteria...

I think you'd like to believe that. Possibly because it would then make it easier for you to dismiss. It's the second (or third) time you've tried to claim it. This will be the second (or third) time I'm going to reject it. And as I said before...

...I believed that we had free will for decades. It wasn't based on my lack of a belief in God or gods. It appeared to be a common sense position. The reasons why I gradually changed my mind have been explained. I've even given a list of some of the people that have influenced me (including Augustine, for heaven's sake). Notwithstanding that there are many Christians - Lutherans and Calvinists for example, that also reject free will. So you don't need a belief in God to think it exists and you don't need a lack of belief to think that it doesn't.

And as I have mentioned, if it exists then it would be because it was evolutionary beneficial. But believing it exists would have the same effect. So Occam's razor comes in handy here and the second option is the simplest.

There won't be a fourth time by the way.

 

[Bradskii]

Ah, here you're helpfully laying out a basic concept of (one way of saying) what is determinism.

I've got to be careful here when talking about quantum mechanics. As my avatar, Richard Feynman once said: 'If you think you understand quantum mechanics then you don't understand quantum mechanics'. He was one of the smartest guys around and even he admitted he found it exceptionally difficult. So getting into technical details is not an option.

What is possible is to read what others have said as regards quantum mechanics and free will and see if they think it's applicable. The main point usually addressed is that quantum indeterminacy seems to counter the claim that the world is determinate.

The problem is that the discussion doesn't revolve around determinacy or indeterminacy. It revolves around compatibilism or incompatibilism. Whether free will is compatible with a determinate world or incompatible with it. For the rather obvious reason that if the world was not determinate then it is obviously random. That somehow cause and effect don't hold. In which case free will would not be possible. Decisions themselves would be random.

There are libertarians who hold that free will can still exist but I've not been able to find an argument that explains how in a manner that doesn't include some type of dualism or backward causation down to the quantum level (see following post for details). But if you want to suggest that the world is not determinate and can find a good argument how free will works in such a world, then I'll be keen to hear it.