The Logical Problem of Evil: Mackie's World

[Chany]

Problem of evil is secondary to the question of existence.

If God indeed exists, then there may be other explanations as to why evil exists. I really wouldn't see it as a problem, because evil is a contextual in any perception. Even in Christian premise you have the idea of sacrifice, which is a fusion of greatest evil and greatest good concept.

If God doesn't exist, then it's not really a problem.

But, to say that God doesn't exist, because there's evil in the world is a poor premise IMO. I'm not defending God's existence in this case, but the logic that implies certain necessity seems to be false in his case.

It's not a premise, it's the conclusion. If the premises are true, then the conclusion follows. In fact, I would say the opposite is true; it is specifically because of the supposed power, knowledge, and loving nature of God that is supposed to eliminate any potential out possible. God can acheive any end, knows how to achieve said end, and desires to achieve said end without any evil, pain, and suffering involved. If God did exist, evil should not exist. Unless, that is, there is some necessary evil God must permit to achieve a certain end. But no such end has been illustrated. And because God is all good, all powerful, and all knowing, God would make such an end explicitly clear to us, lest we start to question his existence.

 

[ScottA]

Here, I will try to clearly articulate a common argument against the existence of God, the free will defense, and a reply to said defense. I will then argue that if you accept the premises of the argument relating to the nature of God, then you must follow the conclusion that God cannot exist. You will notice that put the word "logical" in the thread title. This simply means the version of the problem of evil being discussed tries to show God is logically incompatible with the existence of evil. In other words, the definition of God cannot coexist with the current (and present) existence of evil because their mutual existence logically contradict each other, much like a square-circle cannot exist.

To start:

1) Evil and suffering exists. (Justificaiton: prima facie true.)

2) God exist, a being who is: (Justification: Assumption)
a)omnipotent (able to do all things logically possible),
b)omniscient (knows all true and false propositions), and
c)omnibelevolent (wills the highest good of the other agent. For example, this
highest good can be achieving a relationship with God and getting into heaven).

3) The good agent wants to avoid as much evil and suffering as possible; the good agent wants avoid all unnecessary evil. For example, if the agent wants to teach someone something important, he strive for the path that causes the least amount of unnecessary suffering. If the agent can either teach me through non-painful tutoring or painful torture, the agent will always choose non-painful tutoring. (Jusitifcation: prima facie true)

4) God wants to avoid all unnecessary evil and suffering in achieving just ends; any unnecessary evil will be stopped by God. (Justification: 2c)

5) There exists no necessary evils in our world. (Jusitifcation: 2a and 2b. God can always teach us through non-painful ways, for example. There is no just end being served in allowing the torture of innocent people)

6) Therefore, God is incompatible with the existence of evil. Because evil clearly exists, God cannot exist. (Justification: All)

The obvious response is to reject Premise 5 and claim that God must respect the free will of agents as a necessary evil to achieve the just end of freedom. Here, I will respond to this claim.

1) God has divine-foreknowledge of the actions of free creatures. In other words, God knows what an agent with free will ultimately chooses before that agent even actually exists. God knows if I will freely rob the bank or refrain from do so, for example. (Justification: God's omniscience).

2) Mackie's world is possible. Mackie's world is a possible world where all free agents choose to do the morally good action with every choice. In other words, no one does anything evil, so evil does not exist. (Justification: prima facie true. Though it seems improbable and odd, it is logically conceivable, so it is, therefore, logically possible. There is no reason to believe such a world is not possible.)

3) God can actualize Mackie's world. (Justification: Premise 1, God's omnipotence and omniscience. God is aware of Mackie's world and create said world, as God can create all logically possible worlds).

4) Therefore, the free will defense does not stand, as the existence of free will does not necessitate evil existing. God could have created a possible world with both free will and no evil.

I admit that Premise 1 of the second argument is questionable. If you believe God cannot know actions that result from free will before they happen, then the argument does not apply to you. However, if you accept this premise, please explain where this Argument from Evil fails.

As most do, you simply misunderstand. Moreover, you have said "exist" umpteen times...and obviously don't understand your very own existence:

The world is not an existence...it is a creation - it is made up, non-fiction. History, is His story. Time, space, and matter are not real, but contrived...out of nothing. This would-be reality only exists within the mind of God, i.e., in His own image.

So...the evil that you consider real is not real, and therefore, does not exist...but rather, unbeknownst to many, God exists. And your dilemma...is a mere tangent.

 

[FrumiousBandersnatch]

The only intention of Mackie's world is to show that having agents with free will does not necessarily mean they will choose to perform evil. It is to show that the free will defense against the problem of evil does not show evil is a necessary but unfortunate consequence of agents with free will.

Yes, I see that, and the argument holds in that respect.

I'm just questioning the response premise (2) that, "... no one does anything evil, so evil does not exist". As I pointed out, even if we discount natural evils, it is still possible that some evil can result from even the best moral choice or action.

 

[Chany]

Yes, I see that, and the argument holds in that respect.

I'm just questioning the response premise (2) that, "... no one does anything evil, so evil does not exist". As I pointed out, even if we discount natural evils, it is still possible that some evil can result from even the best moral choice or action.

Give an example. The examples I can think of are the result of moral dilemma due to things like disaster or limited resources, something which is not a problem if we put God into the picture.

 

[FrumiousBandersnatch]

Give an example. The examples I can think of are the result of moral dilemma due to things like disaster or limited resources, something which is not a problem if we put God into the picture.

I'm thinking of the kind of thing characterised by the rail track dilemma where you must act to save many lives, but by doing so, you seal the fate of a few.

Clearly, it would be possible for an omnipotent God to ensure that the best moral choices and actions never result in 'collateral damage', or to ensure that such situations cannot arise in the first place; but if we allow this, we must admit that it would be equally possible for such a God to ensure that morally bad choices or actions never result in evil, or to ensure that situations never arise in which morally bad choices or actions are available or possible, respectively.

In other words, we don't need Mackie's world for this argument if we allow that God could prevent evil regardless of the free actions of free agents, moral or immoral. If we put God into the picture as an active agent at all times, anything goes.

Just sayin'

 

[Chesterton]

No response to my objections in post #11?

 

[zippy2006]

Thanks for taking the time to write this. Some objections:

5) There exists no necessary evils in our world. (Jusitifcation: 2a and 2b. God can always teach us through non-painful ways, for example.)

Are there lessons that can only be learned through suffering? Common sense would say that there are. That is, not everything can be learned through non-painful ways.

3) God can actualize Mackie's world. (Justification: Premise 1, God's omnipotence and omniscience. God is aware of Mackie's world and create said world, as God can create all logically possible worlds).

4) Therefore, the free will defense does not stand, as the existence of free will does not necessitate evil existing. God could have created a possible world with both free will and no evil.

Although free will does not necessitate the existence of evil, it is not clear that God can actualize Mackie's world. According to a common understanding of free will, such an actualization would only come about cooperatively between God and all other free agents.

I admit that Premise 1 of the second argument is questionable. If you believe God cannot know actions that result from free will before they happen, then the argument does not apply to you. However, if you accept this premise, please explain where this Argument from Evil fails.

Agreed.

Unless, that is, there is some necessary evil God must permit to achieve a certain end. But no such end has been illustrated. And because God is all good, all powerful, and all knowing, God would make such an end explicitly clear to us, lest we start to question his existence.

Historically dualistic polytheisms precede monotheism, and the argument you enunciate only really begins to materialize in the Christian and post-Christian world, especially with the advent of modern ethical theories. Such an objection cannot be formulated except in a world so thoroughly influenced by the love of God manifest in Christ's sacrifice and the darkness of sin which it illumines.

 

[zippy2006]

I'm thinking of the kind of thing characterised by the rail track dilemma where you must act to save many lives, but by doing so, you seal the fate of a few.

Clearly, it would be possible for an omnipotent God to ensure that the best moral choices and actions never result in 'collateral damage', or to ensure that such situations cannot arise in the first place; but if we allow this, we must admit that it would be equally possible for such a God to ensure that morally bad choices or actions never result in evil, or to ensure that situations never arise in which morally bad choices or actions are available or possible, respectively.

In other words, we don't need Mackie's world for this argument if we allow that God could prevent evil regardless of the free actions of free agents, moral or immoral. If we put God into the picture as an active agent at all times, anything goes.

Just sayin'

In these discussions a common distinction is made between moral evil and natural evil (intentional evil and evil intended by no volitional being, respectively). The rail track dilemma would seem to be a case of natural evil rather than moral evil. Therefore your objection only shows that natural evil is compatible with Mackie's world. Neither moral nor natural evil are necessitated by free will, and Mackie's world is meant to address the relation between free will and moral evil. Your objection based on natural evil is true, but besides Mackie's point.

 

[FrumiousBandersnatch]

... your objection only shows that natural evil is compatible with Mackie's world.
... Your objection based on natural evil is true, but besides Mackie's point.

My objection includes moral evil: "...it would be equally possible for such a God to ensure that morally bad choices or actions never result in evil, or to ensure that situations never arise in which morally bad choices or actions are available or possible, respectively."

 

[zippy2006]

My objection includes moral evil: "...it would be equally possible for such a God to ensure that morally bad choices or actions never result in evil, or to ensure that situations never arise in which morally bad choices or actions are available or possible, respectively."

How do you understand yourself to be intersecting Mackie's point?

Theist: God allows moral evil because he desires free creatures.
Mackie: You can have free creatures without moral evil.
Frumious: God could remove natural evil without removing moral evil, or he could remove moral evil indirectly.​

How is your point supposed to relate to Mackie's thesis?

(As an aside it would seem that moral evil presupposes natural evil, but that is for another day)

 

[FrumiousBandersnatch]

How is your point supposed to relate to Mackie's thesis?

I was suggesting it wasn't necessary in the context.

 

[zippy2006]

I was suggesting it wasn't necessary in the context.

Okay.

As an aside, I think that the philosophical strength of a forum could be measured by the degree to which the participants are able to argue the opposing viewpoint. For example, make a thread in which atheists have to defend Christian claims and Christians have to defend atheist claims. Probably CF ranks fairly low according to such a criterion, although not necessarily lower than any other popular religious forum.

 

[FrumiousBandersnatch]

...I think that the philosophical strength of a forum could be measured by the degree to which the participants are able to argue the opposing viewpoint. For example, make a thread in which atheists have to defend Christian claims and Christians have to defend atheist claims.

It's good to try playing devil's advocate every now and then - it's important to try and see from the other person's viewpoint, but I'm not sure an inverted thread would work so well; I suspect both sides would cry foul for misrepresentation...

 

[zippy2006]

It's good to try playing devil's advocate every now and then - it's important to try and see from the other person's viewpoint, but I'm not sure an inverted thread would work so well; I suspect both sides would cry foul for misrepresentation...

Yes, I don't think it would work either, although a cry of misrepresentation would belie a lack of effort in actually trying to defend the thesis in question.

 

[FrumiousBandersnatch]

... a cry of misrepresentation would belie a lack of effort in actually trying to defend the thesis in question.

Or a lack of understanding.

 

[zippy2006]

Or a lack of understanding.

(When I said "belie a lack of effort," I was speaking of the accuser, not the accusee)

Only if "misrepresentation" is an observation more than an accusation. If the participants are doing what they are supposed to do--focusing on defending their thesis against an opponent--then they will not be concerned about the particular flavor he is endorsing. If the theist representing atheism is crying about the atheist misrepresenting theism, then he is simply not doing what he is supposed to be doing. If the atheist oversimplifies theism then the theist should rejoice, for his job is made easier. And if the atheist thinks that by presenting a strawman he somehow undermines theism, then the "philosophical weakness of the forum" that I spoke of earlier is manifest.

That said, I grant that it would devolve very quickly, but only because the members are not capable of doing what they are supposed to be doing. As noted earlier, "the philosophical strength of a forum could be measured by the degree to which the participants are able to argue the opposing viewpoint." By this "ability" I did not mean only knowledge, but also and primarily sincerity/effort. Lack of knowledge impedes ability, but the lack of knowledge is often due to lack of sincerity in the first place, and the lack of sincerity also affects the ability directly.

 

[lesliedellow]

The fallacy is in the assumption that God's one and only concern is to feather bed our lives.

One of the points made by the book of Job in the Bible is that such is not the case.

 

[ToddNotTodd]

The fallacy is in the assumption that God's one and only concern is to feather bed our lives.

One of the points made by the book of Job in the Bible is that such is not the case.

So the Christian god desires suffering?

 

[lesliedellow]

So the Christian god desires suffering?

The Christian God desires to fulfil his plans for his creation, and that might possibly involve suffering for some of his creatures. Not that that excuses us of our duty to try and relieve that suffering.

 

[Picky Picky]

The Christian God desires to fulfil his plans for his creation, and that might possibly involve suffering for some of his creatures. Not that that excuses us of our duty to try and relieve that suffering.

What excuses him of the same duty?