I'm fine with both of your definition adjustments, as they are actually more exclusive than the ones I gave. There are no other terms that I think need clarification. We all know what "justification" means, although we may disagree on what constitutes justification.
The floor mat example was simply to demonstrate that, without knowing whether you were actually interested in doing the debate, hammering out details like definitions is putting the cart before the horse. My initial post was not intended to be entirely sufficient. It was simply designed to see if there was anyone with interest in doing the debate. When that person presents himself or herself, we can then further hit the details.
Let me clarify the issue of justification. We probably agree that knowledge requires belief, justification, truth and some sort of anti-luck trait to cover Gettier-type cases. Not all beliefs, however, have any sort of justification. So, for example, I may believe that the President's favorite color is blue even if I've never learned anything about the President's color preferences. There is nothing inherent in belief that requires justification -- we can believe whatever we want for any reason at all. However, in order have a justified belief, we must have come to hold that belief via a process that is likely to produce true beliefs and not produce false beliefs. For example, if I were to flip a coin and determine that it is currently raining in Canada because the coin landed on heads, even if it is raining in Canada, I don't have justification for that belief. A coin flip is not a method that is likely to produce true beliefs and not produce false beliefs. On the other hand, if I call up a meteorologist in Toronto and he tells me that Canada is experiencing strong rain in multiple provinces, my belief that it is raining in Canada is suddenly justified. As a third example, if I were to drive to Canada and witness the rains myself, my belief would have even stronger justification. These examples represent three different points on the spectrum of justification.
Perhaps a good metric for what counts as "sufficient justification" would be the following: Smith's justification for belief P is sufficient in the case that, if P were true, Smith would have knowledge of P (excluding Gettier cases). In other words, the standard for "sufficient justification" is essentially the standard for justification as it pertains to knowledge, although here we are obviously excluding considerations such as truth and Gettier-type anti-luck factors.
Well, what are we debating then? What if my belief why the existence of God is justified, is not something you argue against. What if you argue some point I already agree upon, that wouldn't, even to me, count as justification? You see what I am saying?
We aren't looking at a specific argument in isolation. We are looking at the totality of considerations, just as we do when evaluating whether we should believe any proposition. We wouldn't say that any belief is justified simply due to their being a certain argument for it if there is an even stronger argument against it. Again, there is no reason why I need to lay out my initial argument here. No debate requires participants to do that. I agree that there are many arguments for god and many arguments against god, but it is my job to show that either the arguments against god are compelling enough to overcome any merit of the arguments for god or that the arguments for god fail to constitute sufficient justification.
So are you wanting to debate an actual theological issue, or to debate a theory of justification for the belief in God? Or both? I think either way youd have to make clear of your intentions, and state your position on a theological issue as well as your position on a theory of justification.
The existence of god is not a theological issue. It is a philosophical issue. Theology presupposes the existence of god.
I'm wanting to debate the philosophical issue of whether belief in god is justified. That involves debating the arguments for and against god as well as what our standard of justification should be when evaluating such arguments.