Can the Pro-Choicer be Rational?

[Yekcidmij]

One of my problems with abortion arguments is that rarely are the assumptions discussed. At the most fundamental level, everything seems to rest on the assumptions about the ontological status of the unborn. Is the unborn baby a human life? Is the unborn baby not a human life? Everything else one believes about abortion seems to follow from how one answers that question. Anything that ignores the assumptions will mis-characterize the position of the opponent. Anyone arguing against the other side, without taking their own assumptions into account will end up mis-characterizing the other side.

I think for many pro-lifers, such as myself, the unborn baby is self-evidently a human life, and little more than simple observation is required for this belief. Upon the uniting of egg and sperm, a new human life is created. If left alone, the cells will continue normal the human development process from zygote to old geezer. It seems the most straightforward way to understand the "thing" after uniting of egg-sperm is that it's just a human life undergoing the normal process of human development. We're also blessed with being able to know the counterfactual in this case; if egg and sperm hadn't united, the egg and sperm would have followed their respective biological processes resulting in their eventual discharges from the female and male. Terms like zygote, embryo, and fetus do not denote any sort of ontological status. Rather, these are simply descriptive terms for different stages of development. Other stages of human development include infant, toddler, child, pre-adolescent, adolescent, young adult, middle adult, and old adult.

So asking if we could abort a human life in the stages of zygote, embryo, or fetus is really equivalent to asking if we could abort a human life in any of the other stages of human development. We need not even argue the more difficult philosophical concept of personhood, it should suffice to just agree that it's a human life undergoing the earliest stages of human development. And is it morally acceptable to "abort" a human life based on where it is in a stage of development? I think not.

Given the pro-lifers beliefs about the ontological status of the unborn, the most common slogans, statements, objections, and arguments of the pro-choicers are easily rejected. It doesn't take much to think that since the pro-choicers moral reasoning doesn't apply to human development beyond a certain stage, and because the unborn baby is a human life, then the pro-choicers moral reasoning doesn't apply to the unborn either. The pro-choicer is simply inconsistent and arbitrary.

Of course, this line of reasoning is difficult for the pro choicer. Perhaps the pro choicer believes that the unborn isn't really a human? Perhaps the pro-choicer has a pre-commitment to the permissibility of abortion (whatever the reason)? And I'll ignore the possibility that a pro-choicer might just not mind killing humans.

For the pro-choicer that believes the unborn thing isn't a human life, I think an explanation is owed about the ontological status of the "thing" in question. What exactly is it? Is it a life of any sort? Is it morally permissible to kill any sort of non-human life for any reason whatsoever (is it morally permissible for me to kill my dog just because I'm just tired of taking it for a walk)? Whether it's a human or non-human life or whether it's not yet a life at all, is it morally permissible to destroy it while knowing that if left alone it will achieve the status of human life at some point? When does it become a human life and what transformation takes place to change it's ontological status? For me, there is a clear transformation in ontological status at conception that is observable in a change in the development process.

Maybe the pro-choicer finds the moral questions difficult, if not impossible to answer, and finds it persuasive that the "thing" in question looks like a human life based on the observation of the normal human process of development. But maybe the pro-choicer has a pre-commitment to the permissibility of abortion for other overriding reasons? Is there a way out of the conundrum?

I think there is a way for pro-choice adherents to both believe in choice regarding abortion and, at the same time, believe that the unborn baby is in fact a human life. And that is that they could consider the unborn equivalent to a parasite[1] and classify it as such. It would seem to fit the conditions. It's an organism, in this case a human life, that lives in it's host (the mother) and gets it's food from and at the expense of the host including lost ability to attend school or work, infection and disease (eg, gestational diabetes) changes in growth and health, and a serious economic burden (turns out health care and pre-born babies are expensive).

But there are problems with this view as well. One is that the process going on in the mother is better describes by the biological process of gestation and not a parasitic process. Two, is that this reasoning only shifts the ontological question to another form. At what point does the unborn cease to be a parasite? I mean, many of the conditions that would be met in the womb to classify it as a parasite would also be met outside the womb (perhaps even until it's 20+ years old these days). The born baby will still live off of mom and dad for food and at their expense. Especially during it's early development outside the womb, it will require mom and dad to lose time to attend to work or school. Mom and dad will contract various infections and diseases from proximity to or contact with the born baby. The born baby still presents an economic burden to mom and dad (turns out children are expensive). The health of mom and dad will change as a response to tending to the born baby (mom and dad may not be able to exercise or eat the way they used to). So at what point does the baby cease to be a parasite and what takes place to change that ontological status?

I think there are three ways all of this could be handled by the pro-choicer:

1) Abandon the-pro choice view
2) Inconsistently and arbitrarily hold to the pro-choice view regardless of rational considerations. (Of course, this means losing the debate)
3) Dismiss the ontological questions yet hold to a more rationally consistent position that would allow post-birth infanticide, filicide, prolicide, euthanasia, and senicide.
4) Identify the changes in ontological status and what affects those changes.

Thoughts?

(Also, this was a little stream-of-consciousness, so please disregard spelling and grammar errors)

[1] CDC - Parasites - About Parasites

 

[Arcangl86]

You are working on the assumption that a fertilized egg will always result in a live birth. However, that is not the case. About 20%, maybe more, or pregnancies end in spontaneous miscarriages and while I don't think there are anything like official numbers out there, it is also known that sometimes a fertilized egg simply fails to implant in the uterus. In fact that's a large part of the reason I don't believe fertilization is the start of life because that then means that God kills a fifth of all children every year.

 

[sfs]

Upon the uniting of egg and sperm, a new human life is created. If left alone, the cells will continue normal the human development process from zygote to old geezer.

That's usually the case. Sometimes, though, the human developmental process produces two humans from one zygote, and sometimes it produces one human from two zygotes. Those seem rather important edge cases if you're trying to assign ontological status.

 

[hedrick]

I find the anti-abortion position irrational. It is based on confusing various meanings of life and human. Obviously zygotes are alive, in some sense. But they aren't full human beings yet, and may well never become them. They may also become more than one, as noted above.

At the other end of life, most people accept the concept of brain-death. A brain-dead person is alive in the same sense as a zygote, but isn't a full human being. The term "human" is obvious ambiguous. My hair is a human hair, but it's not a human being. I don't think someone is a human being until they're conscious, or at least have the potential for it. This is, you don't stop being a human when you're asleep. Coma is more difficult. From a practical point of view judgements are made about whether it's likely to be temporary or permanent. Before birth, the full potential develops fairly late. Indeed I've seen arguments that they're not truly conscious until birth. That doesn't mean there's no response to stimulae, but animals have that.

 

[RichardY]

Can the Pro-Choicer be Rational? No.

1. Looking for endorsement of abortion. Pro-choice or not, obviously there are ugly methods.
2. Legal protection for abortion. Over paternal rights, or results of a miscarriage from assault.

Pro-life as far as it has no abortions either, isn't pro-life. Thinking of severe disabilities, affecting future fertility, mental, psychological and physical capacities of the embryo. The costs are incurred by someone.

Imho, abortion somewhere up to the first 3 months, to have some legal coverage.

 

[sfs]

Why do you assume that being human is a) an ontological status, b) a binary ontological status, or c) a status knowable by us?

 

[zippy2006]

Thoughts?

I agree that the pro-choice position is very weak, and that is why they are slowly but continually losing ground. It also explains why there is no consensus pro-choice position.

(The academic near-equivalent of your parasite example is Judith Thomson's violinist argument.)

 

[sfs]

I agree that the pro-choice position is very weak, and that is why they are slowly but continually losing ground.

Evidence for that last statement? My impression is that there's been very little change in public views on abortion, at least in the US. E.g.:

 

[zippy2006]

Evidence for that last statement? My impression is that there's been very little change in public views on abortion, at least in the US. E.g.:
View attachment 258519

According to the data you just presented the pro choice position lost 8 percentage points over the last 20-some years while the pro life position gained 15 percentage points.

 

[sfs]

According to the data you just presented the pro choice position lost 8 percentage points over the last 20-some years while the pro life position gained 15 percentage points.

Sure, but in the last 22 years, support for the two positions has hardly changed at all. That's not really evidence for a gradual loss of support for one position. I haven't found charts with longer term data on precisely the question of morality, but what I have found suggests that support has jumped around some, but not a long term trend. Thus, support for Roe v. Wade:

I'm open to evidence to the contrary -- the trends are whatever they are, regardless of how anybody feels about them. I just haven't seen such evidence yet.

 

[hedrick]

The big change is in the evangelical community. It used to be mainly a Catholic issue. Take a look at the chart here showing support by religious position: Public Opinion on Abortion. If this continues, as evangelicals become a smaller percent of the US, support for abortion will increase. Interestingly this is one of the few issues where views aren't strongly associated with age or gender.

 

[zippy2006]

Sure, but in the last 22 years, support for the two positions has hardly changed at all.

Sure, if you consider a 23% swing "not changing at all," then yes, it has not changed at all.

 

[sfs]

Sure, if you consider a 23% swing "not changing at all," then yes, it has not changed at all.

Huh? From mid-1997 to mid-2018 (sorry, that's 21 years, not 22), pro-choice support went up 1% and pro-life support went up 4%. Given the fluctuations year to year, that's essentially no change.

Do you have any evidence to offer or not?

 

[Silmarien]

I think there are three ways all of this could be handled by the pro-choicer:

1) Abandon the-pro choice view
2) Inconsistently and arbitrarily hold to the pro-choice view regardless of rational considerations. (Of course, this means losing the debate)
3) Dismiss the ontological questions yet hold to a more rationally consistent position that would allow post-birth infanticide, filicide, prolicide, euthanasia, and senicide.
4) Identify the changes in ontological status and what affects those changes.

Thoughts?

As a somewhat Kantian ethicist, this is my position:

It is always immoral to treat another human being as a means to an end. Abortion is therefore highly immoral, because it necessarily entails a woman treating her unborn child as a means to an end (whether that be her own convenience, comfort, health, life, etc). However, if a government (or private individual) were to intervene and force a woman to carry a child to term, it would in turn be treating the woman as a means to an end, which is equally immoral.

Therefore, abortion is immoral, but government interference is similarly immoral. It may seem paradoxical, but I think adequately captures why both sides are both correct and horribly wrong.

Other potential positions one might take:

1. The right to bodily autonomy supercedes the right to life in all cases. (This is inconsistent in late term abortions, where the fetus's bodily autonomy is directly violated, but that objection is much more difficult to apply to non-invasive drug-induced early term abortions.)

2. Address the question of whether it is an undue invasion of privacy for the government to intervene in this particular question of an individual's health. (This was the actual reasoning at play in Roe v. Wade--many pro-choicers do not like it because it falls far short of framing abortion as a human right. I think that is actually its strength, since privacy concerns are very real and lead to a number of side issues. Criminalization of miscarriage, for one.)

I do agree with earlier posters that situations like the development of identical twins present serious problems for granting ontological status at conception. (From a legal perspective, the concept of legal personhood at conception is even more problematic, since it would entail granting legal protection before it is even confirmed that a person exists at all.)

I agree that the pro-choice position is very weak, and that is why they are slowly but continually losing ground. It also explains why there is no consensus pro-choice position.

(The academic near-equivalent of your parasite example is Judith Thomson's violinist argument.)

I find the violinist argument quite powerful. It sidesteps the various problems that plague the parasite comparison and directly addresses the question of whether one person can have legal rights to the usage of another's body.

It falls apart with the question of late-term abortion, but is otherwise difficult to get around. I suppose you could try to argue that the unborn deserve special protections we would not ordinarily grant to people, but that's as arbitrary as claiming that they are ontologically sub-human.

 

[zippy2006]

I find the violinist argument quite powerful. It sidesteps the various problems that plague the parasite comparison and directly addresses the question of whether one person can have legal rights to the usage of another's body.

It falls apart with the question of late-term abortion, but is otherwise difficult to get around. I suppose you could try to argue that the unborn deserve special protections we would not ordinarily grant to people, but that's as arbitrary as claiming that they are ontologically sub-human.

Why does it fall apart in late-term abortions? It seems to me that the obvious problem is the idea that pregnancy is analogous to an accident, as if sex and procreation have no relation. If women just magically woke up pregnant for no reason the violinist argument would hold up better. (My information about this argument comes from secondary sources)

 

[Silmarien]

Why does it fall apart in late-term abortions? It seems to me that the obvious problem is the idea that pregnancy is analogous to an accident, as if sex and procreation have no relation. If women just magically woke up pregnant for no reason the violinist argument would hold up better. (My information about this argument comes from secondary sources)

The potential problem with the violinist argument is that it doesn't involve violently murdering the violinist--you simply unhook him, and his death follows as an unavoidable consequence. Surgical abortion where the fetus actually is killed by the doctor is not exactly analogous. Drug induced abortion, on the other hand, I think is quite similar.

I don't see the question of accidentality as being overly relevant, though I'm not entirely sure in what sense you mean that. Pregnancy as a result of rape, for example, could easily be considered "accidental" in one sense, but carving out exceptions there makes the pro-life position incoherent. Unless you are thinking more along the lines of a natural law argument?

(Fair warning that I'm not going to be able to discuss this issue in any real depth. I was too deeply committed to the pro-choice movement in my secular days, and the irrational moral outrage over a position that ended up being morally reprehensible was damaging. I dislike both sides pretty intensely these days, but running with old arguments like the violinist one is not terribly pleasant.)

 

[zippy2006]

The potential problem with the violinist argument is that it doesn't involve violently murdering the violinist--you simply unhook him, and his death follows as an unavoidable consequence. Surgical abortion where the fetus actually is killed by the doctor is not exactly analogous. Drug induced abortion, on the other hand, I think is quite similar.

Oh, so basically the question of viability?

I don't see the question of accidentality as being overly relevant, though I'm not entirely sure in what sense you mean that. Pregnancy as a result of rape, for example, could easily be considered "accidental" in one sense, but carving out exceptions there makes the pro-life position incoherent. Unless you are thinking more along the lines of a natural law argument?

It is relevant in the sense that we are responsible for the effects of our actions. In the violinist example the responsibility is not present because no volitional action was undertaken to effect the dependency scenario. In the vast majority of pregnancies it is just the opposite.

(Fair warning that I'm not going to be able to discuss this issue in any real depth. I was too deeply committed to the pro-choice movement in my secular days, and the irrational moral outrage over a position that ended up being morally reprehensible was damaging. I dislike both sides pretty intensely these days, but running with old arguments like the violinist one is not terribly pleasant.)

Fair enough. I don't think either of us want to.

 

[Silmarien]

Oh, so basically the question of viability?

Sort of. I mean, you can induce labor of a viable fetus--obviously sometimes this is medically necessary. Inducing labor is the equivalent of unhooking the violinist; late-term abortion is something very different.

It is relevant in the sense that we are responsible for the effects of our actions. In the violinist example the responsibility is not present because no volitional action was undertaken to effect the dependency scenario. In the vast majority of pregnancies it is just the opposite.

That is legally problematic for a variety of reasons. For one, the responsibility is shared between two people, but only one bears the burden after the fact. I'm very skeptical of the prospect of imposing a legal burden based on the notion of responsibility when only one of the responsible parties is effected. (I also think basing things around the notion of responsibility could lead to strange results--if a couple already has children and cannot afford another, does being responsible for their actions mean that they actually ought to abort an additional child that they might otherwise have wished to keep? That would be absurd, but you could make the argument.)

I think the bigger problem is that this reasoning carves out the rape exception. That is bad for legal reasons--it is not always easy for a woman to prove that she's been raped, and there would almost certainly be an increase in false reporting if such an exception were provided. It also flies in the face of the strongest pro-life argument out there: if the point is human dignity and the sanctity of life, then the mother's responsibility or lack thereof should be irrelevant. If it's not irrelevant, then the underlying concern is not really sanctity of life. So at best, the question of responsibility seems like a distraction from genuine issues, and at worst recasts pregnancy as a sort of just punishment that women ought to suffer. (The biggest problem that the pro-life movement has is that it tends to give precisely this impression.)

Frankly, I think you'd have a pretty serious moral duty towards the violinist too. Only a totalitarian state would force you to act upon that moral duty, but the duty still exists.

Fair enough. I don't think either of us want to.

Oh, my problem is that I've recently realized that my differences with the pro-choicers have become irreconcilable. I would still probably be lumped in with them, but we have radically different concepts of freedom, and I really can't put up with about 90% of what they say anymore. I could still defend it for the sake of argument, but that is too messed up and sophistic even for me.

 

[zippy2006]

That is legally problematic for a variety of reasons. For one, the responsibility is shared between two people, but only one bears the burden after the fact. I'm very skeptical of the prospect of imposing a legal burden based on the notion of responsibility when only one of the responsible parties is effected.

Both parties are affected in some ways (e.g. child support).

But the point remains that the violinist analogy fails to capture the reality of responsibility. One could agree to the violinist scenario yet deny its applicability on the basis of responsibility. This is important because the oversight isn't innocuous. Society has literally forgotten that sex and procreation are linked. Pregnancy is not an unavoidable and uncontrollable reality, as the violinist analogy implies.

I think the bigger problem is that this reasoning carves out the rape exception. That is bad for legal reasons--it is not always easy for a woman to prove that she's been raped, and there would almost certainly be an increase in false reporting if such an exception were provided. It also flies in the face of the strongest pro-life argument out there: if the point is human dignity and the sanctity of life, then the mother's responsibility or lack thereof should be irrelevant. If it's not irrelevant, then the underlying concern is not really sanctity of life. So at best, the question of responsibility seems like a distraction from genuine issues, and at worst recasts pregnancy as a sort of just punishment that women ought to suffer. (The biggest problem that the pro-life movement has is that it tends to give precisely this impression.)

Rape accounts for less than 1% of all pregnancies, and I don't see the point of ignoring the fact of responsibility. It is more of a counter argument than a primary argument, but it has its place. Neither do I see why affirming the fact that sex leads to procreation undermines the dignity of children. I can affirm sanctity of life and responsibility for one's choices at the same time.

Frankly, I think you'd have a pretty serious moral duty towards the violinist too. Only a totalitarian state would force you to act upon that moral duty, but the duty still exists.

Okay, that may be true!

Oh, my problem is that I've recently realized that my differences with the pro-choicers have become irreconcilable. I would still probably be lumped in with them, but we have radically different concepts of freedom, and I really can't put up with about 90% of what they say anymore. I could still defend it for the sake of argument, but that is too messed up and sophistic even for me.

Haha. I haven't really entered the fray in this area for a long time, but my disagreement with their concept of freedom runs deep and has impacts on all sorts of other areas of society as well.

 

[Silmarien]

Both parties are affected in some ways (e.g. child support).

Child support is not in any way analogous to pregnancy, though. If a man were legally compelled to nine months of indentured servitude to the woman while taking drugs that made him physically ill during that period, then it would begin to be analogous.

But the point remains that the violinist analogy fails to capture the reality of responsibility. One could agree to the violinist scenario yet deny its applicability on the basis of responsibility. This is important because the oversight isn't innocuous. Society has literally forgotten that sex and procreation are linked. Pregnancy is not an unavoidable and uncontrollable reality, as the violinist analogy implies.

It is a potentially unavoidable and uncontrollable reality, though. Abstinence isn't going to save you if you're in the wrong place at the wrong time, or if you have an abusive boyfriend who isn't inclined to wait any longer. This isn't a non-issue because it's relatively rare; any woman could be that unfortunate <1%.

So you really do need to grant that the violinist argument is potentially analogous. From there, you can either find a different reason to reject it (though I am unaware of any), or grant the rape exception as fully legitimate. Once you do that, though, you are on increasingly shaky footing.

(I'm sorry, I know you don't like the topic of sexual assault, but when it comes to the topic of abortion, it's not irrelevant. You really can't ignore it and end up with a consistent and rational pro-life position.)

Rape accounts for less than 1% of all pregnancies, and I don't see the point of ignoring the fact of responsibility. It is more of a counter argument than a primary argument, but it has its place. Neither do I see why affirming the fact that sex leads to procreation undermines the dignity of children. I can affirm sanctity of life and responsibility for one's choices at the same time.

No, the problem is that if responsibility is a genuine factor, then it follows that it's more acceptable to abort a fetus that is the product of rape than one that is not. This is what undermines the idea of human dignity--it should not be variant from one fetus to another. The circumstances of your conception should not matter.

I think the question of responsibility breaks down for other reasons as well, though. If a person had sex and contracted HIV, would you deny them medical treatment on the grounds that it was their own fault? What if someone decides to go hiking in the mountains and gets lost in a blizzard? We do normally prefer to rescue people from the consequences of their bad decisions, so the argument from responsibility isn't convincing.

Haha. I haven't really entered the fray in this area for a long time, but my disagreement with their concept of freedom runs deep and has impacts on all sorts of other areas of society as well.

Yeah, I can imagine, haha. The rhetoric is really dripping with subjectivism these days--my choice, whatever it is, is the correct one. I'm a lot more liberal than you are, but this is increasingly an issue for me too.

I don't know how you can legislate around it, though. My position used to be pretty radical and terrible, so I can say that genuine freedom is submission of a sort, and the perceived freedom to think that anything is good is really destruction, but I don't see how I can make that decision for anyone else. This is the major issue where two worldviews collide, and there are obviously very big questions about what the government in a pluralistic society should do when that occurs.