- Jul 23, 2018
- 927
- 265
- 40
- Country
- United States
- Faith
- Non-Denom
- Marital Status
- Married
- Politics
- US-Constitution
“No other general in the war commanded more respect and admiration from his men than George McClellan”
-John Cannan The Antietam Campaign
It is my opinion that General George B McClellan was the most underrated army commander of the civil war. Not because I think he was a great general or military genius, but because he is portrayed as so awful a general. No one carries today the example of a in-complainant, timid northern general like Mcclellan has been given. I think unjustified. George B McClellan nicknamed “Young Napoleon” or “Little Mac” graduated second in his class of 59 at the U.S Military Academy in 1846. A class that included 20 future full rank generals. He would return to West Point as an instructor.
“Your only foes are the armed traitors and show mercy even to them when they are in your power, for many of them are misguided” and later “bear in mind that you are in the country of friends, not of enemies- that you are here to protect not to destroy.”
-George B McClellan May 26 1861 and June 25 1861
To the northern democrat mac did not view the south as the spawn of Satan but fellow Americans who in fact had produced most of the unions leaders up till that time. His understanding and tolerant views of the south and the desire to spare needless bloodshed is out of step with modern historians and the republicans of the day who wrote the history in attempt to justify the massacres that would come and the total warfare of 64 and 65.
West Virginia and Promotion
“Harley six weeks had elapsed... and in that time he had actually created an army and began the first campaign.”
-George b McClellan Commanding general U.S army May 26 1861
Mac did a great job organizing militia from three states into a fighting force and saw the first action of the war as a commander of union forces in what is know West Virginia at odds with his reputation as a slow moving timid general. During the rich mountain campaign he waged an aggressive attacking operation and dislodged, captured, and forced the retreat of confederate forces fortified in mountain terrain while taking minimal loses and capturing large supply bases and prisoners. This helped secure west Virginia for the union and prevented the destruction of the Baltimore and Ohio railroad. Lincoln was very impressed and this propelled him to commander of all union forces. Mac would take over for McDowell after his defeat in the battle of Bull Run.
Organization of the Army of the Potomac and Demotion by Lincoln
“In a very real sense, McClellan rescued the union in these early days from dependency and fear. Someone had to rebuild the army and show the country that there was great hope for the future”
-S.C Gwynne Rebel Yell The Violence, Passion and Redemption of Stonewall Jackson Simon and Schuster 2014
What the non military press and Lincoln, who was pressured for political reasons, wanted was quick action and a fast end to the war. Part of what fueled this was the north's inability to see how determined the south was even after the loss at Bull Run. They thought this would be an easy quick war. They underestimated the south resolve to fight and their ability to wage war. So while the press and Lincoln called on mac for fast action. The military man mac, understood that what the demoralized, undisciplined, citizen army needed was discipline, training and organization. He disciplined and trained the soldiers while reorganizing the army. He got rid of poor performing generals and instilled in the soldiers a spirit and pride while increasing their morale. He was loved and revered by his men. One area those even critical of him admit is that he was a first rate organizer of the army. Mac took a militia army and turned it into a professional army.
“Mcclellan started with little more than a collection of undisciplined, ill-officered, and un-instructed men, who were, as a rule, much demoralized by defeat and ready to run at the first shot. He ended with the finest army ever seen on the North American continent”
-James V Murfin Battlefields of the civil war
Had the north attacked soon after bull run or before they were ready like Lincoln and the press called for, likely the same result would have happened further dropping national morale. As General Sherman stated Napoleon took three years to build an army “Here its expected in ninety days and bull run is the consequence.” Macs offensive plan, as many in the north called for, was to mass a large army some said up to 200,000 to than march on Richmond and end the war. They wanted no mistakes after Bull Run. This was mac's general plan, this plan would take time and preparations. Mac also constructed large fortifications around D. C including 48 forts and 480 guns as the capital had been left almost completely unguarded or prepared for by McDowell. Given mac had to train, organize, recruit, supply and discipline a massive citizen army and transform it into a professional world class army the time he was able to do so is reasonable. Further Mac was commander of all armies and planned for a simultaneous synchronized attack across the confederacy witch would take further time to plan and put in motion. On August 4th 1861 in a letter to Lincoln he laid out his plan that included the main attack to be against Richmond but also simultaneously push into Missouri, capture the Mississippi, after Kentucky joined the union to push to eastern Tennessee into union friendly territory seizing railroad from Memphis to Nashville and begin capturing coastal cities such as new Orleans, Savannah, Mobile and move on to Montgomery and Pensacola. Mac wanted one massive assault to wipe out the south and not a prolonged war, this would take time.
“I have ever regarded our true policy as being that of a fully preparing ourselves, and then seeking for the most decisive results. I do not wish to waste life in useless battles. But prefer to strike at the heart.”
-George B McClellan 1861
“When I was placed in command... I turned my attention to the whole field of operations regarding the army of the Potomac as only one, while the most important, of the masses under my command.”
-George B McClellan 1861
Just when mac felt his army was ready winter had started in and Mac was bed ridden for three weeks around Christmas. Lincoln and the non military press wanted action know despite the impassable roads [they would not demand grant move this early in 64]. This offensive action was attempted in the winter of 62 by Burnside, the results were Fredricksburg and the “mud march” ending in the removal of Burnside. Grant in 64 would start his spring offensive in April later than mac would his peninsula campaign. As Grant said because the roads in Virginia would not allow large movements of troops before than. Mac started at the normal time for spring offensives. No other union army was campaigning during this winter. Yet Because of Lincolns urgency and what he saw as a too cautious McClellan. He demoted mac to simply commander of the army of the Potomac. Lincoln also chose and forced corps commanders on the army of the Potomac. Mac wanted to wait to promote generals after seeing them in battle. This is not the last time Lincoln interfered with macs plans.
“It was inevitable that the first leaders should be sacrificed to the nations ignorance of war”
-William Swinton Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac
Peninsula Campaign Begins
"Let me tell you that if your government had supported General McClellan in the field as it should have done, your war would have been ended two years sooner than it was."
-- General Helmuth von Moltke, Chief of Staff of the Prussian Army and one of the leading military experts of the 19th Century
“Reduced my force by 1/3, after [bless and do not curse][bless and do not curse][bless and do not curse][bless and do not curse] task had been assigned, its operations planned... it frustrated all my plans... it left me incapable of continuing operations which had been begun. It made rapid and brilliant operations impossible.”
-George B McClellan
The peninsula campaign started with a well thought out plan designed by mac an amphibious movement utilizing the north navel superiority to transport and supply his army, the ultimate goal was Richmond. Mac thought he would have over 150,000 men for the campaign as he left for the peninsula. However once landed Lincoln would greatly reduce his army with the other troops spread around the valley, D.C, and mananas. Mac had wanted more men but Lincoln wanted him to hold men back to guard D.C. Lincoln forced mac to leave Blenkess division of 10,000 men in D.C along with the garrison already available. Lincoln now had a garrison of around 20,000 in D.C and up to 74,000 as far as NY that could be shipped/railed/marched to the D.C if attacked. Plus world class fortifications set up by McClellan. McClellan, McDowell, Winfeild Scott, and every corp commander believed this was more than enough men to guard D.C and supported McClellan plan to bring more men, but Lincoln would not allow for fear of D.C being attacked.
“The moment the army of the Potomac landed upon the peninsula an uneasy sense of insecurity took possession of the minds of the president, the cabinet, and the members of congress.”
-George Stillman Hillard Life and Campaigns of George B McClellan 1864
So Mac landed the army that was slow moving because it was so massive and carried heavy siege equipment. He faced the single largest army the south would have during the war of 88,000 [Grant faced 65,000 in 64 with a larger force under him]. Once his army landed he was notified that Stanton had closed all the recruiting depots in the union. His army would now have to do without any replacements or reinforcements during a major campaign. This was a huge shock to mac and the generals in the army. He than was told that McDowell's 40,000 men near mananas could not be used but must help defend any possible action towards D.C. Despite the fact confederates showed no sighs of attacking and burned the bridges south of manasas as they retreated to defend Richmond. McDowell told McClellan this decision [McDowell protested it] was “Intended a blow to you.” Than McClellan was told the garrison of 10,000 men at Fort Monroe would as well be withheld. Even critics of McClellan like general Heintzelman said it was a “Great outrage” to withhold his army from his command. General Wells said it was the radicals trying to get mac to resign. Harpers weekly stated “To exaggerate the mischief which has been done by division of councils and civilians interference with military movements”
“In General McClellan opinion, the way to defend Washington was to attack Richmond and the greater force thrown against the rebel capitol, the greater the security of our own”
-George Stillman Hillard Life and Campaigns of George B McClellan 1864
Mac was now forced to revise his plans because of the over cautions Lincoln. In the revised plan McDowell would advance on Richmond from the north with his 40,000 men and would better protect an attack by confederate general Joe Johnson if he were to go north to Washington due to Lincolns concern with protecting Washington. However as mac argued the attack on Richmond would force the confederate army to defend their capital rather than a desperate attack on D.C. This disagreement and argument delayed the attack further with Lincoln getting his way.
"Notwithstanding all that has been said and written upon this subject, I have no hesitation in expressing the opinion, that had not the President and his advisors stood in such ungrounded fear for the safety of Washington, and had not withheld McDowell's forces at a time when their absence was a most serious blow to the plans of General McClellan, the close of the year would have seen the Rebellion crushed, and the war ended."
-- Allan Pinkerton, chief of the Union Intelligence Service, 1861-1862
Yorktown
Mac now moved up the peninsula towards Richmond and was promised McDowell men if D.C was clear. His army first encountered confederate general John Magruder small confederate force at Yorktown. Magruder did a fantastic job deceiving mac into thinking his force was larger than it really was by moving the same troops around in multiple places, acting aggressive, small units moving constantly, using ammo freely, setting up dummy defensive positions etc this convinced mac the force was larger than it really was so mac set in for a siege also wanting his siege artillery to come up not wanting to assault with green troops sure to take heavy losses and lose morale. Mac eventually captured Yorktown and 80 heavy guns without losses but it gave confederate general Joe Johnson time to organize troops to defend Richmond.
Advance on Richmond
Mac than started to push towards Richmond with Johnson falling back. The union army captured both supply and cannons during this advance. Mac is criticized for slow movement with a smaller confederate force in front of him, yet he relied upon his friend and “expert” spy Alan Pinkerton of the Pinkerton detective agency. Pinkerton gave relabel info on many matters and was considered dependable. Yet the one area he failed was in enemy troop numbers. He gave confederate force numbers from various agents as 160,000 123,000 180,000 and even 200,000 in the Richmond area. General Hallack on August 6 gave estimates of 200,000 around Richmond when he wanted mac to join Pope. Because of this Mac actually believed he was outnumbered. This was common during the war generals thinking the force opposed him was larger than reality. Since this was the information he had and believed he was not being cautious but aggressive and daring to continue the campaign even if at a slow/ cautious pace. Some northern newspapers working independent gave even higher estimates than mac did. At the time the enemy numbers were not certain. Mac also waited for his heavy siege artillery to come up from the back as it was needed for an attack on Richmond's large forts.
But without doubt the advance was working. Richmond was preparing to evacuate. It forced the confederates to scuttle the ironclad Virginia witch caused a loss of morale throughout the confederacy. Johnson called general Euell from Jackson to help in Richmond. McDowell was advancing unopposed north of Richmond. Mac had achieved better success than McDowell, Burnside, Hooker or Meade advancing on Richmond.
“Not until 1864 that another union army, led by Grant, would get as close to Richmond as McClellan did in the spring of 1862.”
--John Cannon Great Campaigns The Peninsula Campaign David G Martin Combined Books PA 1992
The next time the federals would get this close was under their top general, Grant. Fighting agonist a very weakened southern army in 64 with a much larger federal army. But this time three things saved Richmond and stopped mac from capturing the confederate capital and being hailed as a hero. All three had to happen to stop mac, and two were very unlikely and could not be foreseen.
1] Jackson in the Valley
“The most significant contrast between the Virginia campaigns of Grant and McClellan is that Early's offensive did not accomplish its ultimate objective- to relive pressure on Lee's army at Petersburg Jacksonson's campaign in the Shenandoah valley did.“Unlike McClellan before him,Grant would not be forced to alter his designs on the James river one iota.
-Thomas j Rowland George B McClellan and Civil war History
Mac unlike Lincoln saw Jackson's valley campaign as a diversion by Lee to pull men away to help protect Richmond. Richmond was saved because of Jackson brilliance in the valley. Jackson outmaneuvering and outfought a force three times his own [17,000- 60,000] defeating them in multiple battles while also threatening D.C. Jackson knew Lincoln concern with protecting D.C so he knew aggressive maneuvers would pull men from the peninsula and help save Richmond. In all Jackson kept 71,000 additional men away from the Richmond attack with his victories and maneuvering. Lincoln was constantly scarred of what Jackson might do and this caused McDowell and other troops from helping Mac, the withholding of McDowell would prove decisive.
2] Lincoln Recalling Troops to Valley
“Jackson's campaign, and the insane terror it inspired in Washington, was the true cause of the failure on the peninsula.”
-George Stillman Hillard Life and Campaigns of George B McClellan 1864
Because of Jackson Lincoln recalled troops to support Washington and the valley, he also held back McDowell's 40,000 from the attack on Richmond. This “Changed the whole nature of the confrontation near Richmond” and “The confederacy was truly handed a amazing gift.” Mac would have rather left Jackson to clear out the valley and even attack D.C if he wished. Mac had built massive forts with a large garrison to protect the capital.
“Here is the true defense of Washington, it is here on the banks of the James”
-McClellan to Hallack August 4th quoted in George Stillman Hillard Life and Campaigns of George B McClellan 1864
With Pinkerton reporting large numbers of enemy to mac he paused his attack without McDowell who was suppose to attack Richmond from the north and pin the confederates from any attack. McDowell called his recall to the valley “a crushing blow to us” Even Lincoln told mac “If you think you are not strong enough to take Richmond just know, I do not ask you to try just know”
3] Lee Replaces Joe Johnson
The commanding confederate general Joe Johnson was injured and replaced by Robert E Lee. This would change the entire campaign. Mac had been slowly pushing back Johnson towards Richmond but Lee would take the inventive and attack mac.
-John Cannan The Antietam Campaign
It is my opinion that General George B McClellan was the most underrated army commander of the civil war. Not because I think he was a great general or military genius, but because he is portrayed as so awful a general. No one carries today the example of a in-complainant, timid northern general like Mcclellan has been given. I think unjustified. George B McClellan nicknamed “Young Napoleon” or “Little Mac” graduated second in his class of 59 at the U.S Military Academy in 1846. A class that included 20 future full rank generals. He would return to West Point as an instructor.
“Your only foes are the armed traitors and show mercy even to them when they are in your power, for many of them are misguided” and later “bear in mind that you are in the country of friends, not of enemies- that you are here to protect not to destroy.”
-George B McClellan May 26 1861 and June 25 1861
To the northern democrat mac did not view the south as the spawn of Satan but fellow Americans who in fact had produced most of the unions leaders up till that time. His understanding and tolerant views of the south and the desire to spare needless bloodshed is out of step with modern historians and the republicans of the day who wrote the history in attempt to justify the massacres that would come and the total warfare of 64 and 65.
West Virginia and Promotion
“Harley six weeks had elapsed... and in that time he had actually created an army and began the first campaign.”
-George b McClellan Commanding general U.S army May 26 1861
Mac did a great job organizing militia from three states into a fighting force and saw the first action of the war as a commander of union forces in what is know West Virginia at odds with his reputation as a slow moving timid general. During the rich mountain campaign he waged an aggressive attacking operation and dislodged, captured, and forced the retreat of confederate forces fortified in mountain terrain while taking minimal loses and capturing large supply bases and prisoners. This helped secure west Virginia for the union and prevented the destruction of the Baltimore and Ohio railroad. Lincoln was very impressed and this propelled him to commander of all union forces. Mac would take over for McDowell after his defeat in the battle of Bull Run.
Organization of the Army of the Potomac and Demotion by Lincoln
“In a very real sense, McClellan rescued the union in these early days from dependency and fear. Someone had to rebuild the army and show the country that there was great hope for the future”
-S.C Gwynne Rebel Yell The Violence, Passion and Redemption of Stonewall Jackson Simon and Schuster 2014
What the non military press and Lincoln, who was pressured for political reasons, wanted was quick action and a fast end to the war. Part of what fueled this was the north's inability to see how determined the south was even after the loss at Bull Run. They thought this would be an easy quick war. They underestimated the south resolve to fight and their ability to wage war. So while the press and Lincoln called on mac for fast action. The military man mac, understood that what the demoralized, undisciplined, citizen army needed was discipline, training and organization. He disciplined and trained the soldiers while reorganizing the army. He got rid of poor performing generals and instilled in the soldiers a spirit and pride while increasing their morale. He was loved and revered by his men. One area those even critical of him admit is that he was a first rate organizer of the army. Mac took a militia army and turned it into a professional army.
“Mcclellan started with little more than a collection of undisciplined, ill-officered, and un-instructed men, who were, as a rule, much demoralized by defeat and ready to run at the first shot. He ended with the finest army ever seen on the North American continent”
-James V Murfin Battlefields of the civil war
Had the north attacked soon after bull run or before they were ready like Lincoln and the press called for, likely the same result would have happened further dropping national morale. As General Sherman stated Napoleon took three years to build an army “Here its expected in ninety days and bull run is the consequence.” Macs offensive plan, as many in the north called for, was to mass a large army some said up to 200,000 to than march on Richmond and end the war. They wanted no mistakes after Bull Run. This was mac's general plan, this plan would take time and preparations. Mac also constructed large fortifications around D. C including 48 forts and 480 guns as the capital had been left almost completely unguarded or prepared for by McDowell. Given mac had to train, organize, recruit, supply and discipline a massive citizen army and transform it into a professional world class army the time he was able to do so is reasonable. Further Mac was commander of all armies and planned for a simultaneous synchronized attack across the confederacy witch would take further time to plan and put in motion. On August 4th 1861 in a letter to Lincoln he laid out his plan that included the main attack to be against Richmond but also simultaneously push into Missouri, capture the Mississippi, after Kentucky joined the union to push to eastern Tennessee into union friendly territory seizing railroad from Memphis to Nashville and begin capturing coastal cities such as new Orleans, Savannah, Mobile and move on to Montgomery and Pensacola. Mac wanted one massive assault to wipe out the south and not a prolonged war, this would take time.
“I have ever regarded our true policy as being that of a fully preparing ourselves, and then seeking for the most decisive results. I do not wish to waste life in useless battles. But prefer to strike at the heart.”
-George B McClellan 1861
“When I was placed in command... I turned my attention to the whole field of operations regarding the army of the Potomac as only one, while the most important, of the masses under my command.”
-George B McClellan 1861
Just when mac felt his army was ready winter had started in and Mac was bed ridden for three weeks around Christmas. Lincoln and the non military press wanted action know despite the impassable roads [they would not demand grant move this early in 64]. This offensive action was attempted in the winter of 62 by Burnside, the results were Fredricksburg and the “mud march” ending in the removal of Burnside. Grant in 64 would start his spring offensive in April later than mac would his peninsula campaign. As Grant said because the roads in Virginia would not allow large movements of troops before than. Mac started at the normal time for spring offensives. No other union army was campaigning during this winter. Yet Because of Lincolns urgency and what he saw as a too cautious McClellan. He demoted mac to simply commander of the army of the Potomac. Lincoln also chose and forced corps commanders on the army of the Potomac. Mac wanted to wait to promote generals after seeing them in battle. This is not the last time Lincoln interfered with macs plans.
“It was inevitable that the first leaders should be sacrificed to the nations ignorance of war”
-William Swinton Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac
Peninsula Campaign Begins
"Let me tell you that if your government had supported General McClellan in the field as it should have done, your war would have been ended two years sooner than it was."
-- General Helmuth von Moltke, Chief of Staff of the Prussian Army and one of the leading military experts of the 19th Century
“Reduced my force by 1/3, after [bless and do not curse][bless and do not curse][bless and do not curse][bless and do not curse] task had been assigned, its operations planned... it frustrated all my plans... it left me incapable of continuing operations which had been begun. It made rapid and brilliant operations impossible.”
-George B McClellan
The peninsula campaign started with a well thought out plan designed by mac an amphibious movement utilizing the north navel superiority to transport and supply his army, the ultimate goal was Richmond. Mac thought he would have over 150,000 men for the campaign as he left for the peninsula. However once landed Lincoln would greatly reduce his army with the other troops spread around the valley, D.C, and mananas. Mac had wanted more men but Lincoln wanted him to hold men back to guard D.C. Lincoln forced mac to leave Blenkess division of 10,000 men in D.C along with the garrison already available. Lincoln now had a garrison of around 20,000 in D.C and up to 74,000 as far as NY that could be shipped/railed/marched to the D.C if attacked. Plus world class fortifications set up by McClellan. McClellan, McDowell, Winfeild Scott, and every corp commander believed this was more than enough men to guard D.C and supported McClellan plan to bring more men, but Lincoln would not allow for fear of D.C being attacked.
“The moment the army of the Potomac landed upon the peninsula an uneasy sense of insecurity took possession of the minds of the president, the cabinet, and the members of congress.”
-George Stillman Hillard Life and Campaigns of George B McClellan 1864
So Mac landed the army that was slow moving because it was so massive and carried heavy siege equipment. He faced the single largest army the south would have during the war of 88,000 [Grant faced 65,000 in 64 with a larger force under him]. Once his army landed he was notified that Stanton had closed all the recruiting depots in the union. His army would now have to do without any replacements or reinforcements during a major campaign. This was a huge shock to mac and the generals in the army. He than was told that McDowell's 40,000 men near mananas could not be used but must help defend any possible action towards D.C. Despite the fact confederates showed no sighs of attacking and burned the bridges south of manasas as they retreated to defend Richmond. McDowell told McClellan this decision [McDowell protested it] was “Intended a blow to you.” Than McClellan was told the garrison of 10,000 men at Fort Monroe would as well be withheld. Even critics of McClellan like general Heintzelman said it was a “Great outrage” to withhold his army from his command. General Wells said it was the radicals trying to get mac to resign. Harpers weekly stated “To exaggerate the mischief which has been done by division of councils and civilians interference with military movements”
“In General McClellan opinion, the way to defend Washington was to attack Richmond and the greater force thrown against the rebel capitol, the greater the security of our own”
-George Stillman Hillard Life and Campaigns of George B McClellan 1864
Mac was now forced to revise his plans because of the over cautions Lincoln. In the revised plan McDowell would advance on Richmond from the north with his 40,000 men and would better protect an attack by confederate general Joe Johnson if he were to go north to Washington due to Lincolns concern with protecting Washington. However as mac argued the attack on Richmond would force the confederate army to defend their capital rather than a desperate attack on D.C. This disagreement and argument delayed the attack further with Lincoln getting his way.
"Notwithstanding all that has been said and written upon this subject, I have no hesitation in expressing the opinion, that had not the President and his advisors stood in such ungrounded fear for the safety of Washington, and had not withheld McDowell's forces at a time when their absence was a most serious blow to the plans of General McClellan, the close of the year would have seen the Rebellion crushed, and the war ended."
-- Allan Pinkerton, chief of the Union Intelligence Service, 1861-1862
Yorktown
Mac now moved up the peninsula towards Richmond and was promised McDowell men if D.C was clear. His army first encountered confederate general John Magruder small confederate force at Yorktown. Magruder did a fantastic job deceiving mac into thinking his force was larger than it really was by moving the same troops around in multiple places, acting aggressive, small units moving constantly, using ammo freely, setting up dummy defensive positions etc this convinced mac the force was larger than it really was so mac set in for a siege also wanting his siege artillery to come up not wanting to assault with green troops sure to take heavy losses and lose morale. Mac eventually captured Yorktown and 80 heavy guns without losses but it gave confederate general Joe Johnson time to organize troops to defend Richmond.
Advance on Richmond
Mac than started to push towards Richmond with Johnson falling back. The union army captured both supply and cannons during this advance. Mac is criticized for slow movement with a smaller confederate force in front of him, yet he relied upon his friend and “expert” spy Alan Pinkerton of the Pinkerton detective agency. Pinkerton gave relabel info on many matters and was considered dependable. Yet the one area he failed was in enemy troop numbers. He gave confederate force numbers from various agents as 160,000 123,000 180,000 and even 200,000 in the Richmond area. General Hallack on August 6 gave estimates of 200,000 around Richmond when he wanted mac to join Pope. Because of this Mac actually believed he was outnumbered. This was common during the war generals thinking the force opposed him was larger than reality. Since this was the information he had and believed he was not being cautious but aggressive and daring to continue the campaign even if at a slow/ cautious pace. Some northern newspapers working independent gave even higher estimates than mac did. At the time the enemy numbers were not certain. Mac also waited for his heavy siege artillery to come up from the back as it was needed for an attack on Richmond's large forts.
But without doubt the advance was working. Richmond was preparing to evacuate. It forced the confederates to scuttle the ironclad Virginia witch caused a loss of morale throughout the confederacy. Johnson called general Euell from Jackson to help in Richmond. McDowell was advancing unopposed north of Richmond. Mac had achieved better success than McDowell, Burnside, Hooker or Meade advancing on Richmond.
“Not until 1864 that another union army, led by Grant, would get as close to Richmond as McClellan did in the spring of 1862.”
--John Cannon Great Campaigns The Peninsula Campaign David G Martin Combined Books PA 1992
The next time the federals would get this close was under their top general, Grant. Fighting agonist a very weakened southern army in 64 with a much larger federal army. But this time three things saved Richmond and stopped mac from capturing the confederate capital and being hailed as a hero. All three had to happen to stop mac, and two were very unlikely and could not be foreseen.
1] Jackson in the Valley
“The most significant contrast between the Virginia campaigns of Grant and McClellan is that Early's offensive did not accomplish its ultimate objective- to relive pressure on Lee's army at Petersburg Jacksonson's campaign in the Shenandoah valley did.“Unlike McClellan before him,Grant would not be forced to alter his designs on the James river one iota.
-Thomas j Rowland George B McClellan and Civil war History
Mac unlike Lincoln saw Jackson's valley campaign as a diversion by Lee to pull men away to help protect Richmond. Richmond was saved because of Jackson brilliance in the valley. Jackson outmaneuvering and outfought a force three times his own [17,000- 60,000] defeating them in multiple battles while also threatening D.C. Jackson knew Lincoln concern with protecting D.C so he knew aggressive maneuvers would pull men from the peninsula and help save Richmond. In all Jackson kept 71,000 additional men away from the Richmond attack with his victories and maneuvering. Lincoln was constantly scarred of what Jackson might do and this caused McDowell and other troops from helping Mac, the withholding of McDowell would prove decisive.
2] Lincoln Recalling Troops to Valley
“Jackson's campaign, and the insane terror it inspired in Washington, was the true cause of the failure on the peninsula.”
-George Stillman Hillard Life and Campaigns of George B McClellan 1864
Because of Jackson Lincoln recalled troops to support Washington and the valley, he also held back McDowell's 40,000 from the attack on Richmond. This “Changed the whole nature of the confrontation near Richmond” and “The confederacy was truly handed a amazing gift.” Mac would have rather left Jackson to clear out the valley and even attack D.C if he wished. Mac had built massive forts with a large garrison to protect the capital.
“Here is the true defense of Washington, it is here on the banks of the James”
-McClellan to Hallack August 4th quoted in George Stillman Hillard Life and Campaigns of George B McClellan 1864
With Pinkerton reporting large numbers of enemy to mac he paused his attack without McDowell who was suppose to attack Richmond from the north and pin the confederates from any attack. McDowell called his recall to the valley “a crushing blow to us” Even Lincoln told mac “If you think you are not strong enough to take Richmond just know, I do not ask you to try just know”
3] Lee Replaces Joe Johnson
The commanding confederate general Joe Johnson was injured and replaced by Robert E Lee. This would change the entire campaign. Mac had been slowly pushing back Johnson towards Richmond but Lee would take the inventive and attack mac.