There could be a heaven or a hell you don't know what you don't know.

[Freodin]

I suggest that what makes "me me" is the ensemble of experiences I have - not the particulars of the platform I am instantiated on.

That might be why you discard my objections as "irrelevant philosophical questions".

Well, all of that is "philosophical questions"... we do not have the means to show one way or the other.

But I'd still say that my objections, especially in the "copy" situations, make it quite clear that, were you copied, each copy of "you" would only identify their individual "platform" as "you"... and identify the copy as "not you".

I still do not see how any of this is relevant to what I think people really mean when they talk about "life after death" - the continuation of experience that feels like it is being experienced by the same being.

Because people do not mean it this way. People do not see copies of themselves as "the same being".

 

[expos4ever]

But I'd still say that my objections, especially in the "copy" situations, make it quite clear that, were you copied, each copy of "you" would only identify their individual "platform" as "you"... and identify the copy as "not you".

Again, so what? How is not, frankly, obvious that this entire "copy" business has no bearing whatsoever on the particular question of whether there will be the particular Fred who is copied will continue to experience himself as Fred. The fact that there may be another being that will think the same thoughts is, I suggest, clearly, immaterial.

 

[expos4ever]

Because people do not mean it this way. People do not see copies of themselves as "the same being".

I am surprised we are still talking about this. Obviously the original Fred will see the copy as a different person. No one is suggesting otherwise. The relevant point is that the original Fred experiences his life as if he has survived his own "death". If, at this very moment, someone makes an exact copy of me - including my brain and all the "data" in it - the fact of the existence of that copy clearly has no bearing on the experiences I (the original) continue to have.

Yes, there is another version of me. And yes that version of me will think its "the real me" unless told otherwise. And yes that version of me will have experiences. But so what? This does not in any way affect the experience of living that I - the original "me" - continue to have.

 

[expos4ever]

This copy would not know. You would not know either, being dead.

But this copy would not be you.

Obviously it would not be me in a certain sense. But in the sense that matters for this thread, it certainly would be me. Yes, it is true that "from the outside", the original me is gone. But we do not experience life "from the outside" Our lives, as we actually experience them, are fully made of up of the inner world of thoughts and emotions we experience. Hence I agree that the copy would not know its a copy. So what? The copy would still "be" me in the sense that matters - it would "be me" in exactly the same sense that the "me" who awakes tomorrow morning will continue to be me even if, as I slept, some magical being took each atom of my body away and replaced each such atom with an identical one.

 

[expos4ever]

But there was this instance where Riker was "split" in a transporter accident. Suddenly, there are two Rikers. And while both of them believe to be the "real" Riker, they both are distinct persons. They are not a single consciousness within two bodies... they are seperate conscious entities.

I have never suggested these are not distinct persons. But - and this is really important - this Riker fellow (I have no idea who this is, I have no TV and have never watched Star Trek except for the original version in the 1960s) will, as a subject of experience, live on. In fact, two versions of him will live on. And yes, I am obviously aware that each of these two versions is a separate subject of experience. So, yes, the Star Trek universe now contains two people, each of which thinks he is the "real" Riker.

So what?

 

[Freodin]

I am surprised we are still talking about this. Obviously the original Fred will see the copy as a different person. No one is suggesting otherwise. The relevant point is that the original Fred experiences his life as if he has survived his own "death". If, at this very moment, someone makes an exact copy of me - including my brain and all the "data" in it - the fact of the existence of that copy clearly has no bearing on the experiences I (the original) continue to have.

Yes, there is another version of me. And yes that version of me will think its "the real me" unless told otherwise. And yes that version of me will have experiences. But so what? This does not in any way affect the experience of living that I - the original "me" - continue to have.

Sorry, I absolutely fail to see why you cannot understand the problem here.

The relevant point is that the original Fred experiences his life as if he has survived his own "death".

This "relevant point" is indeed the linchpin of the whole idea... and it is false.
The problem is exactly that: the original Fred WILL NOT experience his life as if he has survied his own death. The original Fred will still be dead, and won't experience anything at all. Someone else, who thinks he is Fred, will experience things.

This does not in any way affect the experience of living that I - the original "me" - continue to have.

Yes! See, you say it for yourself: what this "new version" of you, this copy, will experience has no affect on any experience the original "you" makes". And this original "you" won't experience anything at all, because it is dead.

 

[DogmaHunter]

Imagine this scenario.

Fred is a living human person who is about to die. Probes are inserted into Fred's brain and the "information state" of that brain is saved to a storage device. An indestructible new body, with an indestructible brain is then created. The information state of Fred's brain is then transferred to the indestructible body.

That is essentially the model I have in mind. How is this not "life after death" for Fred? Is this scenario implausible?

If such technology would be available, we might require new definitions for "life" and "death".

I'ld say the biological entity known as Fred would be dead at that point.
While Fred's consiouscness would be copied into another, non-biological, body.
At this point, Fred is no longer human and no longer really "alive".
Fred now is a robot or, at best, a cyborg. A machine.

EDIT: other posters make a really good point that I even hadn't considered... what if there were 1000 "robot" Fred's, all of which are uploaded with Fred's "information state"? Now who's Fred?
What if Fred actually survives and lives? Now we have biological Fred + 1000 "robot" Fred's. Will the real Fred please stand up?

Consider another scenario: Fred is used to build a new RoboCop.
His entire biological body was replaced by a mechanical one. But his real biological brain is put in it. No copies are being made of his "brain state" to be uploaded to whatever other computer brain. Nope. His actual biological brain is transplanted into the mechanical body.

Is RoboCop now actually Fred, and not just some copy?

I say: yes.

Is RoboCop Fred alive or dead?

I say: alive.

What say you?

 

[expos4ever]

At this point, Fred is no longer human and no longer really "alive".
Fred now is a robot or, at best, a cyborg. A machine.

Yes indeed. But in the sense that is really relevant, the "Fred as experiencer" lives on.

EDIT: other posters make a really good point that I even hadn't considered... what if there were 1000 "robot" Fred's, all of which are uploaded with Fred's "information state"? Now who's Fred?

Again, this is not the point! While it is an interesting question, the point is that "Fred as a subject of experience" lives on, even if there are 1000 copies. I simply do not seem to be able to get you guys to see what I consider self-evident: if there is an exact copy of me walking around, that has precisely zero impact on my subjective experience:

- it does not change the flavor of orange juice as I experience it.
- it does not change the feeling of being in love as I experience it.
- it does not change the joy of mastering a new craft as I experience it.

and so on.

What if Fred actually survives and lives? Now we have biological Fred + 1000 "robot" Fred's. Will the real Fred please stand up?

Again, not the point for reasons just stated.

Consider another scenario: Fred is used to build a new RoboCop.
His entire biological body was replaced by a mechanical one. But his real biological brain is put in it. No copies are being made of his "brain state" to be uploaded to whatever other computer brain. Nope. His actual biological brain is transplanted into the mechanical body.

Is RoboCop now actually Fred, and not just some copy?

I say: yes.

Is RoboCop Fred alive or dead?

I say: alive.

What say you?

I am not sure your question is internally coherent. More specifically, I do not see how we can transfer Fred's actual biological brain into a mechanical body without also transferring the "information" state of his brain. I am no neurologist but isn't the information state of Fred's brain reflected in the actual physical structure of his brain? I do not imagine how it could be otherwise.

 

[Chany]

Is the machine copying the brain states or somehow transfering them?

 

[expos4ever]

Sorry, I absolutely fail to see why you cannot understand the problem here.

I believe we have reached an impasse, no hard feelings.

 

[expos4ever]

An important distinction needs to be drawn: If we have these multiple copies of "Fred", there is indeed an exceedingly difficult problem for the rest of the world - which one, if any, do we deem to be the real Fred.

I have never denied this problem exists.
I have never denied it is difficult.

I have simply pointed out that it is not relevant to the question that really matters: will the universe continue to contain at least one "subject who experiences" that sees itself as Fred? You see, when people think about eternal life, they do not even think about, will I still be the "real me" if I am given a new (e.g. resurrection) body? No. Instead they ask this: will I - understood specifically and solely as a subject who experiences - continue to exist? And the possibility that there may be 2 or 10 or a 1000 "subjects who experience and see themselves as me" does not change the answer to that question.

Why should I care one iota that there may be copies of me that are as convinced as I am that they are me?

I raise the possibility that this copy business, while definitely interesting, is a diversion intended to draw attention away from the compelling case that we can certainly imagine how the "essential human being" - that is, the "agent who experiences" - can survive the death of the body.

 

[expos4ever]

Is the machine copying the brain states or somehow transfering them?

I do not see why this distinction matters but, from my perspective, it does not make a difference.

 

[Freodin]

Instead they ask this: will I - understood specifically and solely as a subject who experiences - continue to exist?

And this is the point that you do not seem to understand. All the examples, all the "irrelevant philosophical questions" that we presented in this regard show very clearly that the answer to this question is: NO.

 

[Chany]

I do not see why this distinction matters but, from my perspective, it does not make a difference.

If it copies the same way a computer copies (makes a duplicate copy of the file), then the person will still die, as the actual qualia of biological Fred will cease to exist at death. The fact that a computer puts probes into Fred's brain and made a mechanical copy of Fred is irrelevant to Fred's survival. The machine would actually have to transfer the consciousness from Fred into the new body in order to maintain Fred's life. I'm not sure if this is even theoretically possible, and, as any such real machine would produce unfalsifiable results.

 

[expos4ever]

If it copies the same way a computer copies (makes a duplicate copy of the file), then the person will still die, as the actual qualia of biological Fred will cease to exist at death. The fact that a computer puts probes into Fred's brain and made a mechanical copy of Fred is irrelevant to Fred's survival. The machine would actually have to transfer the consciousness from Fred into the new body in order to maintain Fred's life. I'm not sure if this is even theoretically possible, and, as any such real machine would produce unfalsifiable results.

Not sure I understand you, but I am relieved you use the term qualia since it is precisely qualia that I think is the relevant consideration here (even though I have not used this particular term).

I agree that if it copies "the way a computer copies", Fred still dies. But I do not see that as relevant - Fred as an experiencer of qualia continues on, instantiated in the new body. Do you not agree? It's like a deep sleep. When I sleep, I lose all my qualia, just as, presumably, we do when we die (under the standard "no afterlife" model of the world). But I get them back when I awake. Just as "Fred the qualia experiencer" gets his qualia back in the new body.

I am inclined to believe that if the "brain state" of Fred is replicated, the consciousness - the seat of qualia - comes along as a "free lunch".

And, of course, none of this is falsifiable. However, falsifiability is certain not necessary for something to be "real".

In case you know about this, I am sympathetic to the views of David Chalmers on the matter of consciousness.

 

[expos4ever]

I think one key problem is that people reject the very idea that there is an "experiencing self" that persists regardless of changes to the physical environment in which it is hosted (note that I do not believe in the concept of a consciousness-bearing soul that can exist apart from the body and if you think I have to believe in such a beast in order to coherently believe in what I am otherwise saying, let me know and we can go through that). I take the persistent existence of a such a persistent "experiencing self" as manifestly self-evident.

As I sleep, presumably some cells die to be replaced by new ones. In fact, I believe the experts will tell us that we go through a complete "change of atoms" every few weeks. Does my sense of self - the "thing" that experiences the tastes, smells, emotions, and thoughts that "I" experience - survive this renovation process?

Of course it does.

So the fact that my body changes - even to the extent of being entirely replaced with new atoms - does not alter the fact that there is clearly an "experiencing me" that sails seamlessly through all such rework to my changing physical being.

Does anyone deny this?

 

[Chany]

Not sure I understand you, but I am relieved you use the term qualia since it is precisely qualia that I think is the relevant consideration here (even though I have not used this particular term).

I agree that if it copies "the way a computer copies", Fred still dies. But I do not see that as relevant - Fred as an experiencer of qualia continues on, instantiated in the new body. Do you not agree? It's like a deep sleep. When I sleep, I lose all my qualia, just as, presumably, we do when we die (under the standard "no afterlife" model of the world). But I get them back when I awake. Just as "Fred the qualia experiencer" gets his qualia back in the new body.

I am inclined to believe that if the "brain state" of Fred is replicated, the consciousness - the seat of qualia - comes along as a "free lunch".

And, of course, none of this is falsifiable. However, falsifiability is certain not necessary for something to be "real".

In case you know about this, I am sympathetic to the views of David Chalmers on the matter of consciousness.

I am saying that the biological Fred and his qualia is not indentical to the copy cybernetic Fred and his qualia. Just because the content of the two qualia are indentical does not mean they are the same person. I disagree that consciousness transfers over to the replicate.

 

[Chany]

I am saying that the biological Fred and his qualia is not indentical to the copy cybernetic Fred and his qualia. Just because the content of the two qualia are indentical does not mean they are the same person. I disagree that consciousness transfers over to the replicate.

Please note that I accidently hit post reply on my phone. Need to finish my thoughts.

 

[expos4ever]

I am saying that the biological Fred and his qualia is not indentical to the copy cybernetic Fred and his qualia. Just because the content of the two qualia are indentical does not mean they are the same person.

All I have ever claimed is the qualia are identical.

I disagree that consciousness transfers over to the replicate.

Why not? For my part, I accept the argument that consciousness is a necessary accompaniment to sophisticated structure and function. Based on that premise, the consciousness would indeed transfer.

 

[expos4ever]

Please note that I accidently hit post reply on my phone. Need to finish my thoughts.

Too late.....

I will wait to see what else you have to say....