Free Will

[Shane Roach]

We can't if those terms entail mutually exclusive qualities.

I just gave a huge example of how terms that seem to have mutually exclusive properties nevertheless exist. At the very least, address that example?

Well, we have limited epistemic access even to our own mental processes. What may appear to be the case may not actually be the case at a deeper level of abstraction, as exemplified by the earlier example of visual oddities made by Todd and myself.

I am not sure if you mean the cat thing or what, but the bottom line is I answered both of those as well, and have seen no further explanation of what exactly it is you mean. Specifically, I am convinced that you are actually using the reliability of observations as a club against their reliability by focusing on the fact that mistakes have been made while ignoring the fact that it is through observation that those mistakes are rectified. There just seems to be absolutely no sense in using an example of when closer observation has revealed more detailed information to then turn around and argue that observations are not reliable. It is the logical frame of reference, the accepted axioms, that were wrong, not the processes of observation itself.

Is that not the case?

If I separate out will from peception for your benefit, do you even concede that our consciousness exists? Why should we be aware at all? And why not summarize the ideas from your sources. Saying that there is some expert out there that agrees with you is just an appeal to authority, and not even so much as bothering to present his arguments makes it a rather blind appeal to authority.

I personally do put a lot of stock in well informed authorities' opinions, but I simply can't go and read every book that every single person I talk to has read. I think especially if a person is going to take up their computer and post publically about their ideas and make assertions about the truth or falsehood about other people's ideas, that the very least common courtesy would dictate that they go ahead then and present the ideas, rather than just saying that they are out there somewhere and anyone who does not know them like the back of their hand just needs to go read more.

It seems more a case of definition and presupposition. As Dennett argues, there does not need to be anything "immaterial" (or at least something that contradicts naturalism) to account for the processes that make up consciousness.

Well, and if you include the immaterial as part of the natural world, it works too, but that is just shuffling the problem back and forth between perception and questions of the nature of reality without ever really addressing either.

It is unfair to dismiss the anti-free will position with a "sweeping generalizations" handwave. I could say much the same about the way you have been conflating perceptions and mental processes.

I am not dismissing the position. I have posted a few times now, though I can understand how you could have missed those posts, that there seems to be a sort of combination of free will and yet predestiny both in the Bible and in the way I see the world around me working. I am dismissing the arguments I have seen so far because they simply bypass the subject rather than addressing it.

 

[Marz Blak]

No one has made asolid argument against free will here. If you don't believe in free will, don't even give Christians a bad name by calling yourself one.

So Calvinists who adhere to predestination, election, etc., aren't Christians?

Sillyness...

Indeed.

 

[Marz Blak]

ShaneRoach, I see that TeddyKGB has started a Dennett thread in this forum. I can be found here: (http://www.christianforums.com/t2251792-the-extent-of-cartesian-dualism.html)

 

[TeddyKGB]

I just gave a huge example of how terms that seem to have mutually exclusive properties nevertheless exist. At the very least, address that example?

Which mutually exclusive properties are you talking about? Choice and predestination? As yet, it has not been settled to my satisfaction that "choice" is a comprehensible concept.

I am not sure if you mean the cat thing or what, but the bottom line is I answered both of those as well, and have seen no further explanation of what exactly it is you mean.

It may not have been this thread (is there another active thread on free will?), but ToddNotTodd provided as an example of the differences between perception and experience the fact that the lens focuses images upside down on the retina, yet we "see" right side up.

To that, I added the blind spot, which is filtered out by clever use of binocular vision.

Specifically, I am convinced that you are actually using the reliability of observations as a club against their reliability by focusing on the fact that mistakes have been made while ignoring the fact that it is through observation that those mistakes are rectified.

But not from a first-person perspective. I do not have epistemic access to the brain processes that "fill-in" my blind spots. I can do creative experiments to exploit them, but I am not conscious of their activity ordinarily.

There just seems to be absolutely no sense in using an example of when closer observation has revealed more detailed information to then turn around and argue that observations are not reliable. It is the logical frame of reference, the accepted axioms, that were wrong, not the processes of observation itself.

I do not know to what "the accepted axioms" refers.

If I separate out will from peception for your benefit, do you even concede that our consciousness exists? Why should we be aware at all? And why not summarize the ideas from your sources. Saying that there is some expert out there that agrees with you is just an appeal to authority, and not even so much as bothering to present his arguments makes it a rather blind appeal to authority.

Obviously, we can use the word "consciousness" to mean something about our phenomenological world. I may not agree with you that it has to be an immaterial something-or-other, but I don't have to abandon the word thereby.

I personally do put a lot of stock in well informed authorities' opinions, but I simply can't go and read every book that every single person I talk to has read. I think especially if a person is going to take up their computer and post publically about their ideas and make assertions about the truth or falsehood about other people's ideas, that the very least common courtesy would dictate that they go ahead then and present the ideas, rather than just saying that they are out there somewhere and anyone who does not know them like the back of their hand just needs to go read more.

I'll see what I can do when I finish (I have about 1/4 left). In the meantime, I will try to answer specific objections; I do not think I will be able to properly respond to generalized claims of something "immaterial," however.

Well, and if you include the immaterial as part of the natural world, it works too, but that is just shuffling the problem back and forth between perception and questions of the nature of reality without ever really addressing either.

I just ignore it until such time as there is something substantial to report. While "immaterial" is still limited in concept to "something not made of matter," it is, IMO, absurd to appeal to.

I am not dismissing the position. I have posted a few times now, though I can understand how you could have missed those posts, that there seems to be a sort of combination of free will and yet predestiny both in the Bible and in the way I see the world around me working. I am dismissing the arguments I have seen so far because they simply bypass the subject rather than addressing it.

Well, my main problem is that your "subject" tends to use terms that are poorly-defined. I have noted some important ones above.

 

[TeddyKGB]

ShaneRoach, I see that TeddyKGB has started a Dennett thread in this forum. I can be found here: (http://www.christianforums.com/t2251792-the-extent-of-cartesian-dualism.html)

Dang. I go off on flights of fancy like that one minute and completely forget the next.

 

[Shane Roach]

Well, my main problem is that your "subject" tends to use terms that are poorly-defined. I have noted some important ones above.

No, it is not. You have purposefully danced around it all this post. You don't like the word immaterial, and you dodge the question of consciousness.

It's not even a little bit hard to see. This is why I think it is more a matter of perception than of logic. You have an opinion on the subject that is largely subjective, and anything that gets in the way you ignore. I simply say there is not enough information for definitive answers yet, but my working theory is that there is indeed free will because of the consistent daily evidence of it in my perceptions.

I don't see even a lick of evidence that there are all these problems with commonly understood words like "consciousness" or "immaterial". Even if we are speaking specifically merely of thoughts, there is no matter that you can point to and say, "there is my thought." I can look at your brain cells and perhaps if I were really good I might be able to identify which ones are doing what when you see a boat, but I will not be looking through your eyes and seeing the boat, or even seeing an exterior picture of the boat you are seeing.

You can't just pluck your perceptions out of your brain and hand them to me. They are immaterial things. That's all I am saying. It is a significant problem for me to accept an explanation of the world that tries to deny or skirt that.

 

[ToddNotTodd]

It's not even a little bit hard to see. This is why I think it is more a matter of perception than of logic. You have an opinion on the subject that is largely subjective, and anything that gets in the way you ignore. I simply say there is not enough information for definitive answers yet, but my working theory is that there is indeed free will because of the consistent daily evidence of it in my perceptions.

And I have constant daily evidence of the non-existence of free will in my perceptions. One of our opinions has to be wrong. What method would you choose to decide between the two opinions? We've given examples of how our perceptions decieve us. Do you really want to rely on perceptions if there's a method of deciding that is more reliable?

 

[Shane Roach]

And I have constant daily evidence of the non-existence of free will in my perceptions. One of our opinions has to be wrong. What method would you choose to decide between the two opinions? We've given examples of how our perceptions decieve us. Do you really want to rely on perceptions if there's a method of deciding that is more reliable?

I've addressed this objection. The way you know your perceptions were wrong before is that you looked more closely, and had new perceptions which led to new understanding.

 

[TeddyKGB]

No, it is not. You have purposefully danced around it all this post. You don't like the word immaterial,

I think I am justified. Defining the key element of your dualism as "something that is not made of matter" is less-than-informative.

and you dodge the question of consciousness.

I am not sure I know what "the question" is. I can think of several questions to ask about consciousness.

It's not even a little bit hard to see. This is why I think it is more a matter of perception than of logic. You have an opinion on the subject that is largely subjective, and anything that gets in the way you ignore. I simply say there is not enough information for definitive answers yet, but my working theory is that there is indeed free will because of the consistent daily evidence of it in my perceptions.

This is some serious pot-kettle activity. How do you figure I am the one relying on subjectivity when your "working theory" is based solely on what you - a subject - perceives?

I don't see even a lick of evidence that there are all these problems with commonly understood words like "consciousness" or "immaterial".

Well then, I don't suppose we can debate further. Consciousness, perhaps, encompasses a set of relatively uncontroversial properties, but "immaterial," inasmuch as it is such a significant part of dualistic models, is simply insufficiently informative when defined as "something not made of matter."

Even if we are speaking specifically merely of thoughts, there is no matter that you can point to and say, "there is my thought." I can look at your brain cells and perhaps if I were really good I might be able to identify which ones are doing what when you see a boat, but I will not be looking through your eyes and seeing the boat, or even seeing an exterior picture of the boat you are seeing.

You can't just pluck your perceptions out of your brain and hand them to me. They are immaterial things. That's all I am saying. It is a significant problem for me to accept an explanation of the world that tries to deny or skirt that.

I'll get back to you when I finish with Dennett's take on qualia.

 

[ToddNotTodd]

I've addressed this objection. The way you know your perceptions were wrong before is that you looked more closely, and had new perceptions which led to new understanding.

That doesn't address anything.

I didn't come to the conclusion that there was no free will based on my perceptions. I see that my perceptions match my understanding, which is based on logic. Unless there's something wrong with the logical arguments against free will, then it doesn't matter what my perceptions are anyway. Perception can NOT trump logic, since we have shown that perceptions are not always accurate. If it is true that A=B and B=C, then A=C. If I percieve A to be different from C, then logic tells me my perception is wrong.

 

[Shane Roach]

I think I am justified. Defining the key element of your dualism as "something that is not made of matter" is less-than-informative.

Well, I don't know if I even am talking about a dualism here. I don't say that the fact that we are conscious necessarily proves anything about the existence of the supernatural, if that's what you mean. But, the simply fact that ideas, emotions, thoughts and will if it exists, or the illusion of will if it does not, are all not made of matter, and it's a fact I am not willing to simply ignore at this point.

I am not sure I know what "the question" is. I can think of several questions to ask about consciousness.

This is some serious pot-kettle activity. How do you figure I am the one relying on subjectivity when your "working theory" is based solely on what you - a subject - perceives?

I agree that my opinion is based on the subjective. I had thought you were arguing that yours was not.

I'll get back to you when I finish with Dennett's take on qualia.

I read some stuff on that on the web and lost the web page. Would like to hear it though.

 

[TeddyKGB]

Well, I don't know if I even am talking about a dualism here. I don't say that the fact that we are conscious necessarily proves anything about the existence of the supernatural, if that's what you mean. But, the simply fact that ideas, emotions, thoughts and will if it exists, or the illusion of will if it does not, are all not made of matter, and it's a fact I am not willing to simply ignore at this point.

This is one of the things Dennett talks about as a philosophical stumbling block - treating thoughts as self-contained things a priori - which makes understanding a process-centric model that much more difficult.

 

[Shane Roach]

This is one of the things Dennett talks about as a philosophical stumbling block - treating thoughts as self-contained things a priori - which makes understanding a process-centric model that much more difficult.

Yeah I have read that before. I can't relate. I mean, I am not trying to say at least for now even that they are separate from the brain, but it just seems too clear to me that when I think something, or the thought occurs however you wish to frame it, that the thought itself is not the series of neurons having sodium potasium reactions. It is basically taking the invisible thing and making it part of the universe, which is fine but... not all that much less invisible or immaterial to me, whether or not you say it is one and the same with the process.