Personal relationship with God

[Resha Caner]

I dont see how this addresses the reality that i mentioned.

If you don't want to participate, that's fine.

 

[FrumiousBandersnatch]

...Paraphrasing, you stated you want to have "others independently confirm the physical phenomenon". OK.
... My guess would be something like, "Frumious wants to select others who will independently confirm the physical phenomenon". If so, how would you select these other people?

I was thinking about independent experts in appropriate knowledge domain(s) depending on the kind of phenomenon. Of course, as suggested earlier, if an omniscient, omnipotent, God's intent was to convince me of its existence, it would be able to do so.

1) What is impossible? ... we'll assume current physics. If something requires changing the laws of physics, it's impossible for the purposes of this discussion. I'll speed up the answers by noting every example related to one of the following: Law of Noncontradiction, Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle, Godel's Incompleteness Theorem, and the speed of light (and even that one is somewhat debatable when you start talking about seeing beyond the event horizon).

You've answered your own question - by your criterion, something that requires changing the laws of physics is impossible.

But I disagree; if it's observed and verified beyond reasonable doubt, it's clearly not impossible; the laws of physics are descriptive, not prescriptive. They've changed before.

2) What identifies an intelligent cause?

If you don't see an intelligent agent acting, you'd be justified in identifying an intelligent agent if it's something that can't occur without intelligent agency. Outside that, the jury's out - intelligent agents can do stuff that also occurs naturally.

Isn't this more a question for those that claim a divine intelligent cause (along with 'how do you identify intelligent design') ? - burden of proof and all that?

 

[bhsmte]

If you don't want to participate, that's fine.

What about my post, made you think I didn't want to participate in the discussion?

 

[Resha Caner]

What about my post, made you think I didn't want to participate in the discussion?

You said my post didn't address what you mentioned. I thought it did, but OK, I didn't address what you mentioned. I want to stick to discussing the 2 questions in post #138. If you would like to answer those, great.

But I disagree; if it's observed and verified beyond reasonable doubt, it's clearly not impossible; the laws of physics are descriptive, not prescriptive. They've changed before.

I was trying to keep the first part short. But I'd be curious to know what physical laws have changed. Unless you just mean the earlier stages of the Big Bang. I meant changes in the laws of our current universe.

So, suppose someone claimed they had measured both the position and momentum of an electron in violation of the Uncertainty Principle. What would you think?

Isn't this more a question for those that claim a divine intelligent cause (along with 'how do you identify intelligent design') ? - burden of proof and all that?

I'm not trying to prove anything. I don't really care whether you believe me or not. You asked what evidence I had for God, and I assume you realized that means we're talking about an intelligent agent. "I'll know it when I see it," won't make for much of a discussion, so I want to know what you think identifies an intelligent agent.

Outside that, the jury's out - intelligent agents can do stuff that also occurs naturally.

If so, wouldn't that make assuming a natural cause erroneous for those cases?

If you don't see an intelligent agent acting, you'd be justified in identifying an intelligent agent if it's something that can't occur without intelligent agency.

Sorry, but that doesn't tell me anything. What are things that can't occur without intelligent agency?

 

[bhsmte]

You said my post didn't address what you mentioned. I thought it did, but OK. I didn't address what you mentioned. I want to stick to discussing the 2 questions in post #138. If you would like to answer those, great.



I was trying to keep the first part short. But I'd be curious to know what physical laws have changed. Unless you just mean the changes occurring during earlier stages of the Big Bang. I meant changes in the laws of our current universe.

So, suppose someone claimed they had measured both the position and momentum of an electron in violation of the Uncertainty Principle. What would you think?



I'm not trying to prove anything. I don't really care whether you believe me or not. You asked what evidence I had for God, and I assume you realized that means we're talking about an intelligent agent. "I'll know it when I see it," won't make for much of a discussion, so I want to know what you think identifies an intelligent agent.



If so, wouldn't that make assuming a natural cause erroneous for those cases?



Sorry, but that doesn't tell me anything. What are things that can't occur without intelligent agency?

I Think discussions flow better, when you take it one step at a time. I posted a comment to you and you responded with something that didn't appear to address what I had stated. For me to then need to answer questions from you, when you didn't address the content of my comments, seems like a waste of time.

 

[Resha Caner]

I Think discussions flow better, when you take it one step at a time. I posted a comment to you and you responded with something that didn't appear to address what I had stated. For me to then need to answer questions from you, when you didn't address the content of my comments, seems like a waste of time.

OK.

 

[FrumiousBandersnatch]

... I'd be curious to know what physical laws have changed. Unless you just mean the earlier stages of the Big Bang.

I meant the physical laws we infer from observing the world, e.g. Einstinian relativity vs Newtonian mechanics, or quantum mechanics vs classical mechanics.

I meant changes in the laws of our current universe.

We assume the universe behaves according to some consistent underlying causality that results in what we see, and our observations are broadly consistent with that, if that's what you mean.

So, suppose someone claimed they had measured both the position and momentum of an electron in violation of the Uncertainty Principle. What would you think?

I'd think that either they'd made a mistake, or that they used 'weak measurement' techniques.

I'm not trying to prove anything.

It was a rhetorical question.

I don't really care whether you believe me or not. You asked what evidence I had for God, and I assume you realized that means we're talking about an intelligent agent. "I'll know it when I see it," won't make for much of a discussion, so I want to know what you think identifies an intelligent agent.

You said God was physical. I was curious to know what physical phenomena convinced you of that, partly because I'd like to know what physical phenomena you felt could not be anything but the presence of God. If you're unwilling or unable to articulate that, so be it, we can move on to something else.

If so, wouldn't that make assuming a natural cause erroneous for those cases?

Rather the other way around; in general, there's no reason to infer intelligent agency for what could be naturally caused. In practice, if there was doubt, one would apply abductive reasoning (inference to best explanation). You'd need to take account of the the particular context, and the prior probabilities; for example, all things being equal, the most parsimonious explanation is the natural one. However, if the phenomenon could be natural but seems unlikely and it could be interpreted as related to something an intelligent agent might have reason to do, then the balance of probabilities would shift toward intelligent agency.

Sorry, but that doesn't tell me anything. What are things that can't occur without intelligent agency?

For example, most of the stuff that people make, most of the stuff that people do (this is from my own perspective, which doesn't include intelligent agents that can do anything, for obvious reasons).

 

[Resha Caner]

I'd think that either they'd made a mistake, or that they used 'weak measurement' techniques.

Yes, the logical reaction is to suspect a mistake. But suppose something unique is found, and as scientists around the world repeat the experiment, they too obtain measurements that violate the Uncertainty Principle. So, we have independently verified results from many repetitions. Then what?

Rather the other way around; in general, there's no reason to infer intelligent agency for what could be naturally caused. In practice, if there was doubt, one would apply abductive reasoning (inference to best explanation).

But it could be an erroneous assumption, yes? Why is the natural explanation the "best" explanation?

For example, most of the stuff that people make, most of the stuff that people do (this is from my own perspective, which doesn't include intelligent agents that can do anything, for obvious reasons).

Still pretty vague. See, the thing is, I don't think it can be done. I don't think it's possible to find a means for identifying intelligent cause.

 

[FrumiousBandersnatch]

Yes, the logical reaction is to suspect a mistake. But suppose something unique is found, and as scientists around the world repeat the experiment, they too obtain measurements that violate the Uncertainty Principle. So, we have independently verified results from many repetitions. Then what?

Then we know our inferred rules are incomplete and require additions and/or revisions.

But it could be an erroneous assumption, yes?

Of course.

Why is the natural explanation the "best" explanation?

All else being equal, the simplest explanation (i.e. most parsimonious per Occam's Razor) is preferred. The natural explanation doesn't need an intelligent agent. But as I said, in practice, in this particular situation (nature vs intelligent agent), context and priors are likely to be important.

Still pretty vague. See, the thing is, I don't think it can be done. I don't think it's possible to find a means for identifying intelligent cause.

If you want examples, manufactured artifacts, such as cars, mobile phones, etc., do not appear without intelligent agency; but I've already agreed that intelligent agents can do things that nature can do too, so it's not always possible to make a distinction. Not only that, but the terms are not clearly defined for edge cases - where is the boundary between nature and intelligent agency, when all the intelligent agents we observe are products of nature? and what's an intelligent agent, exactly? for example, is a chimp's stripped termite stick a product of intelligent agency, or bird's nest, or a termite mound, or a thrush's anvil?

 

[Resha Caner]

Then we know our inferred rules are incomplete and require additions and/or revisions.

Again, a reasonable conclusion.

All else being equal, the simplest explanation (i.e. most parsimonious per Occam's Razor) is preferred. The natural explanation doesn't need an intelligent agent.

As noted earlier in the thread, Occam's Razor is not universal. The simplest explanation (which has not been defined) is not always correct, and I would assume correct is better than simple. Regardless, neither has it been explained why a natural explanation is simpler.

But as I said, in practice, in this particular situation (nature vs intelligent agent), context and priors are likely to be important.

Yes, but if such things were known, we wouldn't have to assume natural vs. intelligent.

If you want examples, manufactured artifacts, such as cars, mobile phones, etc., do not appear without intelligent agency; but I've already agreed that intelligent agents can do things that nature can do too, so it's not always possible to make a distinction. Not only that, but the terms are not clearly defined for edge cases - where is the boundary between nature and intelligent agency, when all the intelligent agents we observe are products of nature? and what's an intelligent agent, exactly? for example, is a chimp's stripped termite stick a product of intelligent agency, or bird's nest, or a termite mound, or a thrush's anvil?

Indeed. As I said, I'm not sure we're capable of defining the difference. I suspect the reason you say cars are made by intelligent agents is because you've seen intelligent agents make cars. There is nothing inherent in the car that identifies its source as an intelligent agent. As such, were you to come across a thing which you had not seen made, you would be unable to distinguish.

- - -

So, pulling it all together, you say God should know how to convince you. Yet if you yourself can't identify what would be convincing, how will you know it when you see it? It seems to me you can't be convinced by anything:

1. God could convince you by doing something impossible ... but no. If the impossible only happened once, you would conclude it was a mistake. If the impossible were frequent, well ... then it's not really impossible. You would reclassify it as possible.

2. All things that are possible can be divided into those that have natural and intelligent causes. But the only things you put into the category for an intelligent cause are those things you have seen intelligent agents do, and you're not even sure where to draw the line. Regardless, whatever one intelligent agent can do, multiple intelligent agents can do: many people can build cars, not just one person; many birds can build nests, not just one bird; etc. So if some new intelligent agent appeared and did something, you would assume what that agent did can be explained, and thereby that other intelligent agents could do it. Or at least you would attempt to explain it.

3. Anything you haven't seen intelligent agents do, yet is possible, has a "natural" explanation, and that is the "best" explanation.

4. Though religious practice may induce unique experiences, you won't engage those religious communities to understand those practices on their terms. You want independent confirmation from "experts" outside that community whom you select, which means they must agree with you on the preceding points.

 

[FrumiousBandersnatch]

As noted earlier in the thread, Occam's Razor is not universal. The simplest explanation (which has not been defined) is not always correct, and I would assume correct is better than simple. Regardless, neither has it been explained why a natural explanation is simpler.

All other things being equal, the natural explanation is simple because it doesn't invoke an additional intelligent agent. But as I said, the natural vs intelligent agent distinction is not one where all is likely to be equal; context is particularly important.

Yes, but if such things were known, we wouldn't have to assume natural vs. intelligent.

Can you explain? It seems to me that if the phenomenon is ambiguous (could be natural or intelligently caused), but the context suggests an intelligent cause, then we'd be justified in assuming an intelligent cause, and vice-versa. I'd be inclined to express it in terms of rough probability. If the context & priors aren't known, the natural explanation would be preferred, although with clear caveats. For example, you are given a broken twig that could have been broken naturally or by some intelligent agent. Without context or priors, you can't say it was intelligent agency, so a natural explanation is the provisional default. If you have some context, such being found under a tree felled by lightning, you can be fairly confident it was broken naturally. Alternatively, if you are told it was part of a rabbit trap, you can be pretty sure it was broken by some intelligent agency.

Indeed. As I said, I'm not sure we're capable of defining the difference. I suspect the reason you say cars are made by intelligent agents is because you've seen intelligent agents make cars. There is nothing inherent in the car that identifies its source as an intelligent agent. As such, were you to come across a thing which you had not seen made, you would be unable to distinguish.

It depends where you want to start. You have to assume some knowledge of the world or nothing would make any sense and you wouldn't be making any distinctions. I assume basic everyday knowledge of the natural world - which, even if you knew nothing of other intelligent agents or their works, would lead you to seriously doubt that those objects could be naturally produced.

But this tack is heading into deep semantic and epistemological waters...

So, pulling it all together, you say God should know how to convince you. Yet if you yourself can't identify what would be convincing, how will you know it when you see it? It seems to me you can't be convinced by anything:

I've already described the criteria that would give me pause to seriously consider it. But if God was omniscient and omnipotent, it would -by definition - know.

1. God could convince you by doing something impossible ... but no. If the impossible only happened once, you would conclude it was a mistake. If the impossible were frequent, well ... then it's not really impossible. You would reclassify it as possible.

No. I've already described the criteria that would give me pause to seriously consider it.

2. All things that are possible can be divided into those that have natural and intelligent causes. But the only things you put into the category for an intelligent cause are those things you have seen intelligent agents do, and you're not even sure where to draw the line. Regardless, whatever one intelligent agent can do, multiple intelligent agents can do: many people can build cars, not just one person; many birds can build nests, not just one bird; etc. So if some new intelligent agent appeared and did something, you would assume what that agent did can be explained, and thereby that other intelligent agents could do it. Or at least you would attempt to explain it.

No; where did you get this from?

3. Anything you haven't seen intelligent agents do, yet is possible, has a "natural" explanation, and that is the "best" explanation.

No; I haven't said that.

4. Though religious practice may induce unique experiences, you won't engage those religious communities to understand those practices on their terms. You want independent confirmation from "experts" outside that community whom you select, which means they must agree with you on the preceding points.

I spent 15 years engaging with a religious community to no effect; and no to your second claim about what I want.

You seem to have read a bunch of stuff that I haven't said and didn't mean into what I have said. I've tried to be careful to say only what I meant, so that's a bit unfortunate.

Still, at least I've learned a little. I hope you have too.

 

[Resha Caner]

Can you explain? It seems to me that if the phenomenon is ambiguous (could be natural or intelligently caused), but the context suggests an intelligent cause, then we'd be justified in assuming an intelligent cause, and vice-versa.

It would take an example to explain. Where I grew up fence posts were just trees with the limbs cut off. When they were no good you dumped them in the same grove they came from. Storms would sometimes knock down trees - a mix of "natural" and "intelligent agency". If you had enough experience to interpret the context (nails & saw cuts), it was hardly an assumption. You knew they were old posts. If you lacked experience, you would be deceived (wood wrapped in barb wire from a storm), and think you had context when you didn't; you would mistake downed trees for fence posts. Sometimes there was no context at all. Rotted wood is rotted wood, and you've no idea whether it's natural or a fence post. Saying it's natural is a bad assumption. Saying it's intelligent agency is a bad assumption. The best answer is: I don't know.

I've already described the criteria that would give me pause to seriously consider it.

If it's clear to you, OK. It's not as if I really need to know what those criteria are. But I don't recall anything. All I recall are reasons for dismissing everything. Do you at least understand the issue with "impossible"? You won't accept a singular event, and repeated events are evidence it's not impossible. If it's possible, you think it best to assume a natural cause - except for context, which I still don't get what you mean.

But if God was omniscient and omnipotent, it would -by definition - know.

God doesn't "know" the logically impossible.

Still, at least I've learned a little. I hope you have too.

Unless you decide to reply, I'll take this as an indication you wish to end now. Thanks for talking with me.

 

[FrumiousBandersnatch]

... Sometimes there was no context at all. Rotted wood is rotted wood, and you've no idea whether it's natural or a fence post. Saying it's natural is a bad assumption. Saying it's intelligent agency is a bad assumption. The best answer is: I don't know.

"I don't know" is where you start. The criteria of abduction, of which simplicity or parsimony is one, are intended to distinguish between two or more hypotheses, to decide which is the better and should be the focus of attention for testing, not to decide on the correct explanation. The (possibly/probably) correct explanation is unknown until the hypothesis has been tested in as many ways as possible. The results of testing the hypothesis tells you whether it is invalid or not.

As I said previously, in the case of natural vs intelligent agency, the criteria are vague and overlap; so "I don't know" is likely to remain the situation except where you can establish beyond reasonable doubt that the phenomenon could not have a different cause; e.g. a mountain range is beyond the capability of known intelligent agents to cause and other such phenomena can be naturally caused - so you'd be justified in attributing natural causation. A car could not be naturally caused - there are no natural processes that could produce or assemble all those materials; similar objects are known to be produced by intelligent agents, so you'd be justified in attributing intelligent agency.

... All I recall are reasons for dismissing everything.

Not from me.

Do you at least understand the issue with "impossible"? You won't accept a singular event, and repeated events are evidence it's not impossible. If it's possible, you think it best to assume a natural cause - except for context, which I still don't get what you mean.

When I say 'impossible', I mean something that could not occur through natural causes and is beyond ordinary intelligent agency because it contradicts established physical laws - for example, an aquarium where time is reversed (the fish live & swim backwards in time), or the entire house and its contents are transmuted into single-crystal diamond, or the doorways lead to rooms other than those whose shared wall they're in (so, for example, when you walk through the door between lounge and kitchen, you enter the bedroom). I'm sure an omniscient, omnipotent God could come up with more impressive examples.

 

[Resha Caner]

I'm sure an omniscient, omnipotent God could come up with more impressive examples.

Whatever your example, it doesn't matter. You would assume a hallucination, a hoax, or a mistake. If all of those possibilities are eliminated, you would then conclude it is a natural phenomena requiring an adjustment to current physics.

"I don't know" is where you start. The criteria of abduction, of which simplicity or parsimony is one, are intended to distinguish between two or more hypotheses, to decide which is the better and should be the focus of attention for testing, not to decide on the correct explanation. The (possibly/probably) correct explanation is unknown until the hypothesis has been tested in as many ways as possible. The results of testing the hypothesis tells you whether it is invalid or not.

If you disagree with my above statement, an example would really help. Can you give me an example of scientific testing to determine if a previously unknown phenomena was caused by intelligent agency? Where the hypothesis was, "This has a natural cause," and the hypothesis was falsified?

 

[FrumiousBandersnatch]

Whatever your example, it doesn't matter. You would assume a hallucination, a hoax, or a mistake. If all of those possibilities are eliminated, you would then conclude it is a natural phenomena requiring an adjustment to current physics.

If you know what I will think in all situations, there's little point asking me; but I've already described what I really think. If you want to make a straw man argument, I'm not interested.

It's true that I would consider a deity that demonstrably acted physically in the world to be a new kind of natural phenomenon, because observable physical activity would make it so. That's simply a matter of ontological labelling or categorization; obviously it doesn't change the phenomenon itself. I don't see why you'd object to that. Clearly, no 'adjustment' to current physics could accommodate an omnipotent deity.

If you disagree with my above statement, an example would really help. Can you give me an example of scientific testing to determine if a previously unknown phenomena was caused by intelligent agency? Where the hypothesis was, "This has a natural cause," and the hypothesis was falsified?

I've already given you examples of what I think could not be natural phenomena. If scientific examination confirms that this is likely to be the case, it would be reasonable to assume intelligent agency. Remember that it's in the context of an apparent message from a deity, and the combined probabilities of both are multiplicative (assuming one could even estimate them).

If you really want me to be specific about why I think the phenomena I suggested previously could not occur naturally, I will; but I had assumed you'd see why I thought so (or perhaps you have ideas of ways they could occur naturally?).

 

[Resha Caner]

If you know what I will think in all situations, there's little point asking me; but I've already described what I really think. If you want to make a straw man argument, I'm not interested.

I tried to base that statement on what you have said about various situations. I'm open to correction.

Clearly, no 'adjustment' to current physics could accommodate an omnipotent deity.

Again, I have to wonder if you're assuming a god that I'm not talking about. What example are you thinking of where physics doesn't "accommodate" God?

If you really want me to be specific about why I think the phenomena I suggested previously could not occur naturally, I will; but I had assumed you'd see why I thought so (or perhaps you have ideas of ways they could occur naturally?).

It would help if you were really specific. That will probably require definitions of "natural", etc.

Also, if you can, I still want an example of testing the hypothesis "This has a natural cause" that was falsified.

Part of the reason I'm skeptical is that if it were possible to prove intelligent agency, the ID discussion would be all over it. Either proponents would be using such schemes to prove creation was caused by intelligent agency or opponents would be using it to prove it isn't. But neither has happened. The best attempt was Dembski (The Design Inference) and he was unsuccessful.

 

[FireDragon76]

God is omnipresent, how is sitting at a coffee table relevant to a personal relationship then?

I think you misunderstand what Christians mean by "personal relationship". Luhrman's book When God Talks Back might help you understand an evangelical/charismatic type "personal relationship with God" from a sociological perspective. But in other kinds of Christianity, this phrase is not so relevant. Most Christians do have spiritual experiences of some kind, they just don't talk about them in that language.

If you seriously want to know, I do recommend the book I just mentioned. Of course this might be homework but real inquiry requires some effort.

 

[devolved]

I think you misunderstand what Christians mean by "personal relationship". Luhrman's book When God Talks Back might help you understand an evangelical/charismatic type "personal relationship with God" from a sociological perspective. But in other kinds of Christianity, this phrase is not so relevant. Most Christians do have spiritual experiences of some kind, they just don't talk about them in that language.

If you seriously want to know, I do recommend the book I just mentioned. Of course this might be homework but real inquiry requires some effort.

I appreciate your attempt to in the very least approach this academically.

Hence, I gave it a try and read the sample 20++ pages of the book available through kindle. I think it may be noble for the author to approach the subject via anthropological methodology, but the book seems like a series of anecdotes that describe subjective experience of people training themselves of interpreting events in their lives and thoughts that they have as "signs" and "voice" of "God".

I have a very similar anecdote to tell that she describes for her first interview with Arnold.

Around the year 2004 I began noticing 11:11 patterns everywhere in my life. I'd wake up and notice 11:11 on the clock. I'd drive and see the 111111 miles on my car. In fact, I was driving Pontiac Gran Prix and one morning I was walking up to the car and found the IX fell off, I picked it up and it formed XI (11 in roman numerals). I'd notice 11:11 on the receipts, and all other weird cincronicity that I drove me insane.

So, one morning I randomly flipped through the Bible in the bathroom (of all places), and bam, I landed on Hebrews 11. If you studies theology, I don't need to explain what it reads.

And I must admit that it felt exceptionally weird. Was it God communicating to me, or was it my brain merely selectively noticing distinct patterns and then correlating certain causality? In 2004 I was convinced that it was God communicating to me and there are no better explanations. That I needed faith, and that's what God did through this sequential preparation of #11 to having me read Hebrews 11 and seeing that I needed faith and nothing else.

It's an incredible story, right? From a perspective of confirmation bias of a believing mind... it is! Believing mind will always seek biased validation, hence any story that fits the belief paradigm will fall into confirmation bias.

But, if you approach the story with a healthy skepticism, there are better question as to why would I link the number 11 to hebrews? I was searching for answer, and any answer would do better than none, but is any answer REALLY better than none absent of more certain correlation? I don't think so.

Would the above be a viable dynamics of any relationship? How can we separate such "relationship" from any child's relationship with imaginary friends? Again, my 4 year old has a relationship with his imaginary dog that does all sorts of stuff with him, and if something goes awry he blames it on his dog friend. Is that dog real and can talk? Well, that's what he'd say.

It seems to me that the difference between my child's friend, and the God is that God is a bigger "doG" and is spelled in reverse. I could be very much wrong, but how can I personally tell the difference? That's the question.

 

[FireDragon76]

It's ironic you mention children and imaginary friends. Jesus said unless we become as little children, we will not inherit the Kingdom of God. This was no doubt a source of scandal for some of his listeners, but it reveals an answer to the questions you are asking. If you want to find the truth, cynicism is a blind guide, nor will reason allow you to storm heaven. Your "healthy skepticism" is actually spiritual poison. God was speaking to you, you are just doubting it. The experience you describe is consistent with how the Christian God often works providentially to bring people to faith in him. I have had many of those sorts of experiences myself.

Faith is indeed the substance of things hoped for. That's far different from grasping intellectually. Faith isn't an intellectual assent to propositions, it is an inclination or intentional state of the will towards that which is hoped or desired, God. This is why St. Paul groups faith, hope, and love together, because they all go together.

On the training subject that Luhrman deals with... this sort of discipline would be precisely the thing one would expect as necessarily in a fallen world, a world where there is an apparent metaphysical gulf between humanity and God, and God often appears hidden. But I would also point out that Christians believe God those who have faith his Spirit, which bridges this gulf directly. The problem is we still have a human will which is capable of resisting God's desires, and which is inclined towards its own ends. Therefore, there is an element of struggle in the Christian life, if we desire to have an intimate relationship with God.