Just or Merciful

[Moral Orel]

Ok. Here we go. Tell Moral Orel which of the two concepts that he's inserted into an epistemic and metaphysical framework not his own...are things God does.

God does neither of your concepts.

That's weird. Pretty much every responder has said that He does both, but you say He doesn't do either of these things. How does that work?

 

[zippy2006]

I am going to try to recapitulate the discussion in a way that refocuses it. Hopefully this long post will help avoid endlessly growing posts. Nevertheless, I will respond to the entirety of #215 and #218 in a “spoiler.”

First, let me restate your initial argument in a way that highlights our disagreement:

1. An act of justice ensures that someone gets what they deserve.
2. An act of mercy results in someone not getting what they deserve.
3. Therefore acts of mercy are unjust.​

Our disagreement revolves around the concept of desert in premises (1) and (2). The disagreement allows at least a possible distinction between the case of gifts and the case of forgiving a debt, and you have claimed that both are unjust.

The case of a gift is a bit simpler, so perhaps we can start with that. The common opinion is that taking from someone without their prior consent (stealing) is unjust, yet giving to someone without their prior consent (gifting) is not unjust. Or as I said in #214, “To be incredibly straightforward, stealing a dollar from a man is unjust and giving a dollar to a man is not, yet both imply an unbalanced exchange.” I went on to give the reason for this in the concept of private property. The axiom of private property says that if we own goods then we are able to use and dispose of them in ways that others are not.

Now when someone says that theft is unjust and gifting is not, they are not resorting to special pleading. Their working definition of justice in this case is not “unbalanced exchange,” but rather, “unlawful action regarding private property.” It is lawful for a man to give his own goods and it is lawful for a man to receive freely given goods from another, but it is unlawful for a man to take another’s goods without his consent. “Balanced exchange” is not the definition of justice, but of course it does enter into the nature of justice. Yet justice is not interested in balanced exchange tout court (and as I tried to illustrate with the pelts and the coins, there simply is no such thing as unbalanced exchange apart from intents, perspectives, contracts, etc.).

Justice is interested in balanced exchange only in relation to the law, whether that law be natural or civil. Thus when someone commits an unlawful act they have unbalanced the scales in a way that involves justice. When someone commits an act that is not unlawful, they have done nothing against justice. Indeed, it is probably the case that every single act we carry out results in various “imbalances.” Maybe we could even define rational acts in just that way: an attempt to alter the balance of reality in one’s own favor. Every interaction you have with another human being creates "imbalances." Every interaction alters the prior balance that obtained between the two of you. That doesn't mean that every interaction is either just or unjust. Justice only cares about those acts that impinge upon the law. Justice is only concerned with unlawful imbalances.

I agree, in a way. I think what people mean when they use the word "unjust" is to say "that isn't deserved" but they only use it in places where they don't like that the thing happened, and they don't use it in places where they do like the thing that happened. The common definition is always the same, but where it is used differs. I think it's a massive case of special pleading.

Sometimes people make unjust accusations of injustice, but they are not being inconsistent when they see someone giving a gift and do not find it to be unjust. For example, suppose I see someone giving a large donation to Planned Parenthood. Despite the fact that I don’t like it, I would never say that it is unjust qua gift or qua imbalanced exchange. If I said the act was unjust it would be because I believe it is unjust to aid evil actors, not because I believe it is unjust to give gifts.

I don't think you actually agree with that definition. You've already said that things like mercy are outside and "above" justice. Giving gifts is a good thing to do, and we ought to do good things, but you've said that gifts are neither just nor unjust, ergo not justice.

No, I am happy with the definition. Justice governs what is lawful. Just acts fulfill the law; unjust acts break the law. Yet justice is not comprehensive (and this is a very important truth for political philosophy). There are acts which don’t fulfill the law and don’t break the law. There are lots of them. Being merciful is one. Giving a gift is one. Gift-giving isn’t “governed by a set of rules,” in the relevant way. You can go your whole life never giving or receiving a gift and you will not thereby have acted justly or unjustly. By definition the law doesn’t care whether we give gifts.

This gets to the equivocation present in premise (2), and is perhaps related to the distinction you made in the second sentence of #204. If I gift you $100 it is undeserved, and if I give you an award for being the first man on the moon it is undeserved, but in two different ways. In the first case you don’t deserve to have it. In the second case you deserve to not-have it. Only the second case is against the law and therefore unjust. The (natural) law does not say that a man cannot receive a free gift of $100 from another, but it does say that a man who did not do something cannot receive a reward for doing it.

You are allowed to be unjust in that manner. It is good for a person to be unjust by donating money to charity. I do not agree that things cease to be unjust simply because they are good.

We could define justice as goodness insofar as it enters into law. If paint is basically color insofar as it can be applied to material objects, you cannot say that some paint is not-colored. Paint isn’t just color. Paint and color aren’t the same thing. Nevertheless, all paint is colored, just as all just acts are good. We could call justice a subset of goodness, but I would rather call it a species of goodness.

Spoiler: Posts 215 and 218

If you track all the goings on of a restaurant in real-time then yes, taking the food is when the harm occurs. They lost food, equipment suffered degradation, employee wages were spent, etc. It's just to bring back balance by paying, and it's unjust to allow that imbalance to continue to exist by not paying.

I think this kind of analysis is incorrect. No one does a restaurant an injustice or a harm when they eat the restaurant’s food. The whole point of the restaurant is for people to eat food. The restaurant wants you to eat their food. The injustice and the harm occurs when someone eats the food without paying.

Again, justice has to do with the law, not with mere imbalance. When I sit down and eat my steak I am not committing a crime or breaking the law, and when I pay for my steak I am not making restitution for a crime. Restitution and remuneration are not the same thing. For various reasons there is often a temporal gap between receiving a good or service and paying for it. This doesn’t mean that receiving the good is an act of injustice and paying for the good is an act of just restitution.

If the victim is harmed by a lack of justice, then the scales are tipped further. Harm moves the scales. The victim isn't owed more because the judge was unjust, the victim continues to be owed the same amount.

They are tipped further, but justice is not a univocal concept. It is complex and involves many different aspects because law is predicated on many different axioms. If the judge renders you an unjust decision then you are now further owed any of several things, including an apology and an appeal. You may not receive recompense for your windshield, an apology, or an appeal, but that does not mean that further injustices were not added when the judge rendered an unjust decision.

Say we have Jim and Bob. If Jim steals $5 from Bob, the scales are tilted against Bob. If Jim gifts $5 to Bob the scales are tilted against Jim. You aren't a victim if you volunteer, but if there is imbalance in the scales you don't have justice.

The only imbalances justice is concerned with are imbalances which are the result of unlawful behavior.

If you believe that retributive justice is intrinsically good, then yeah. It's an injustice to not punish people that deserve punishment. If forgiveness tilts the scales, I don't see how it really could, but if it did, then it wouldn't be an injustice.

I realize the quote from Aquinas that I gave involved forgiving debts and thus retribution, but let’s hash the issue of a simple gift before we move to forgiving debts. This post is long enough as it is.

So here's a theological question I don't know the answer to. When God forgives, do you cease to be deserving of death?

According to Catholicism the forgiveness of a mortal sin frees one from the debt of spiritual death. The relation to bodily death is an entrenched question.

I don't think I'm "imposing" symmetricity on justice. I think it's inherent. I just think it's good to be unjust sometimes. Why do we need to redefine justice instead of just acknowledging that it isn't best to have perfectly balanced scales?

I would say that the fact that your arguments lead to conclusions so contrary to popular opinion indicates that you are the one who is redefining justice. Balance is an incomplete concept until we specify what is being balanced. On a physical scale we are balancing weight, and if the weight of one thing is thought to be unequal to the weight of another, then we will have to incorporate a rate or ratio. Justice does not balance things according to weight, it balances them according to law. Acts which have no relation to the law have no relation to justice.

A long time ago you and I had a discussion on retributive justice that went nowhere. But here when you say justice isn't "a procedural balancing for the sake of balancing" that's exactly what retributive justice is. Justice for the sake of justice. Delivering suffering in response to suffering is intrinsically good, no? I dunno, maybe you've changed your stance on retributive justice in that time, maybe my point from back then will be clearer now in light of exploring what it means to balance scales for the sake of balance.

Good questions, but let’s hold them until we finish gifts.

I dunno what word I'd like to use to describe "promoting good" but it ain't "justice". It's better to do more good than it is to blindly balance scales and you can't have justice without that balance.

Do you think that civil law ought to punish theft but not gift-giving?

 

[Pommer]

You know, maybe this dichotomy betwixt “justice” and “mercy” is what God, limiting His Own capricious power and authority, looks like to human beings on this side of the veil?

 

[Moral Orel]

@zippy2006 I've read your post a couple times thus far, I'll read it a few more before I respond. I'll give you a headstart in thinking about my next response though. Just a teaser. Please don't respond to this yet. I'm not trying to skip your posts, and I don't want this post to cause a response that requires a response and so on... But...

Can a law be unjust?

 

[2PhiloVoid]

That's weird. Pretty much every responder has said that He does both, but you say He doesn't do either of these things. How does that work?

I'm sure it is weird to anyone who wants to completely ignore all of the previous posts I've already made in this thread ...

 

[Moral Orel]

I'm sure it is weird to anyone who wants to completely ignore all of the previous posts I've already made in this thread ...

I think it's weird that God doesn't ensure that deserving people are punished or spare people from punishment they deserve. So how does that work?

 

[Moral Orel]

I am going to try to recapitulate the discussion in a way that refocuses it. Hopefully this long post will help avoid endlessly growing posts. Nevertheless, I will respond to the entirety of #215 and #218 in a “spoiler.”

First, let me restate your initial argument in a way that highlights our disagreement:

1. An act of justice ensures that someone gets what they deserve.
2. An act of mercy results in someone not getting what they deserve.
3. Therefore acts of mercy are unjust.

First of all, thank you for accurately paraphrasing my argument. You know how hard that sort of thing is to come by around here. And you're much better about that than most.

Our disagreement revolves around the concept of desert in premises (1) and (2). The disagreement allows at least a possible distinction between the case of gifts and the case of forgiving a debt, and you have claimed that both are unjust.

The case of a gift is a bit simpler, so perhaps we can start with that. The common opinion is that taking from someone without their prior consent (stealing) is unjust, yet giving to someone without their prior consent (gifting) is not unjust. Or as I said in #214, “To be incredibly straightforward, stealing a dollar from a man is unjust and giving a dollar to a man is not, yet both imply an unbalanced exchange.” I went on to give the reason for this in the concept of private property. The axiom of private property says that if we own goods then we are able to use and dispose of them in ways that others are not.

Now when someone says that theft is unjust and gifting is not, they are not resorting to special pleading. Their working definition of justice in this case is not “unbalanced exchange,” but rather, “unlawful action regarding private property.” It is lawful for a man to give his own goods and it is lawful for a man to receive freely given goods from another, but it is unlawful for a man to take another’s goods without his consent. “Balanced exchange” is not the definition of justice, but of course it does enter into the nature of justice. Yet justice is not interested in balanced exchange tout court (and as I tried to illustrate with the pelts and the coins, there simply is no such thing as unbalanced exchange apart from intents, perspectives, contracts, etc.).

Justice is interested in balanced exchange only in relation to the law, whether that law be natural or civil. Thus when someone commits an unlawful act they have unbalanced the scales in a way that involves justice. When someone commits an act that is not unlawful, they have done nothing against justice.

So now we get into my teaser question. Can a law be unjust? If justice is only concerned with unlawful acts, then it seems the law informs us of what is just, and justice doesn't inform us of what should be a law.

But most importantly, if you're defining justice as being decided by what is lawful, and not the other way around, I think you've redefined desert right out of the definition of justice. "Unlawful action regarding private property" as you say doesn't involve an imbalance. And earlier, "The set of rules that ought to guide the actions and exchanges that take place between humans" doesn't mention balance either. So justice isn't about what is deserved, or fairness, or balance anymore and these things aren't intrinsically good.

Consider the following statement, "A person should only receive X if they deserve X". If folks getting what they deserve is intrinsically good, then it's true. But because you're saying that it's only sometimes true depending on what X is, then what is good is determined by the nature of X and not by what is deserved.

Indeed, it is probably the case that every single act we carry out results in various “imbalances.” Maybe we could even define rational acts in just that way: an attempt to alter the balance of reality in one’s own favor. Every interaction you have with another human being creates "imbalances." Every interaction alters the prior balance that obtained between the two of you. That doesn't mean that every interaction is either just or unjust. Justice only cares about those acts that impinge upon the law. Justice is only concerned with unlawful imbalances.

It's funny, sometimes you make argumentum absurdums and I'm all like, "Yeah, totally!". Every action does lead to an imbalance.

Sometimes people make unjust accusations of injustice, but they are not being inconsistent when they see someone giving a gift and do not find it to be unjust. For example, suppose I see someone giving a large donation to Planned Parenthood. Despite the fact that I don’t like it, I would never say that it is unjust qua gift or qua imbalanced exchange. If I said the act was unjust it would be because I believe it is unjust to aid evil actors, not because I believe it is unjust to give gifts.

And again, you would call that act unjust because it is aiding evil doing, not because of what is deserved.

No, I am happy with the definition. Justice governs what is lawful. Just acts fulfill the law; unjust acts break the law. Yet justice is not comprehensive (and this is a very important truth for political philosophy). There are acts which don’t fulfill the law and don’t break the law. There are lots of them. Being merciful is one. Giving a gift is one. Gift-giving isn’t “governed by a set of rules,” in the relevant way. You can go your whole life never giving or receiving a gift and you will not thereby have acted justly or unjustly. By definition the law doesn’t care whether we give gifts.

This gets to the equivocation present in premise (2), and is perhaps related to the distinction you made in the second sentence of #204. If I gift you $100 it is undeserved, and if I give you an award for being the first man on the moon it is undeserved, but in two different ways. In the first case you don’t deserve to have it. In the second case you deserve to not-have it. Only the second case is against the law and therefore unjust. The (natural) law does not say that a man cannot receive a free gift of $100 from another, but it does say that a man who did not do something cannot receive a reward for doing it.

But giving gifts is a good thing to do; they're a thing you ought to do. Does the (natural) law not say, frinstance, that you should give some money to a starving beggar. That would "fulfill" the law making it just. The law isn't only a bunch of "don't" to you, is it?

But this also goes back to "A person should only receive X if they deserve X". If this is only sometimes true depending on X, then the nature of X determines whether it's good or not, not what is deserved.

We could define justice as goodness insofar as it enters into law. If paint is basically color insofar as it can be applied to material objects, you cannot say that some paint is not-colored. Paint isn’t just color. Paint and color aren’t the same thing. Nevertheless, all paint is colored, just as all just acts are good. We could call justice a subset of goodness, but I would rather call it a species of goodness.

Sorry, you lost me. All just acts are good, not all good acts are just? But you've defined "just" as "lawful" now, so aren't all good acts lawful and therefore all good acts are just? Look at this again: "the set of rules that ought to guide the actions and exchanges that take place between humans". How is this not the complete set of what acts are good?

I think this kind of analysis is incorrect. No one does a restaurant an injustice or a harm when they eat the restaurant’s food. The whole point of the restaurant is for people to eat food. The restaurant wants you to eat their food. The injustice and the harm occurs when someone eats the food without paying.

Again, justice has to do with the law, not with mere imbalance. When I sit down and eat my steak I am not committing a crime or breaking the law, and when I pay for my steak I am not making restitution for a crime. Restitution and remuneration are not the same thing. For various reasons there is often a temporal gap between receiving a good or service and paying for it. This doesn’t mean that receiving the good is an act of injustice and paying for the good is an act of just restitution.

Sure the restaurant is harmed. It cost them something, that's harm. They don't just want you to eat there, they are willing to sacrifice their capital and time in exchange for your money. Sacrifice is harm. Sometimes harm is for a good end. Sometimes I want to be harmed even if I don't enjoy that harm. I want to be harmed by the pin-prick of receiving the Covid vaccine, for example.

They are tipped further, but justice is not a univocal concept. It is complex and involves many different aspects because law is predicated on many different axioms. If the judge renders you an unjust decision then you are now further owed any of several things, including an apology and an appeal. You may not receive recompense for your windshield, an apology, or an appeal, but that does not mean that further injustices were not added when the judge rendered an unjust decision.

Okay, ya got me. I was only thinking of what the bloke who broke my windshield owes me, but yes, the interactions with the court can bring their own imbalances such that the court and/or judge now owes me something else.

The only imbalances justice is concerned with are imbalances which are the result of unlawful behavior.

Yeah, you really want to drive that one home. I think it's just putting a label on the special pleading and defining "justice" out of it's inherent usage of balance.

I realize the quote from Aquinas that I gave involved forgiving debts and thus retribution, but let’s hash the issue of a simple gift before we move to forgiving debts. This post is long enough as it is.

But you said that they're the same thing. Forgiving a debt is giving a gift. The only reason we're talking about gifts is because I brought up forgiveness, and you said that forgiveness is just a gift, and we wouldn't say a gift is unjust.

According to Catholicism the forgiveness of a mortal sin frees one from the debt of spiritual death. The relation to bodily death is an entrenched question.

So when you good Christian folk die you deserve to go to Heaven? God lays out the rules for what He expects you to do in order for Him to forgive your sins, you do them, so He forgives you, and now you deserve to go to Heaven. Funny, in my other thread "Are you doing enough?" everyone told me that you can't "earn salvation" but I think what you've just described is you agreeing to work for payment. I'll give you credit for being one of the only people to not try and completely dodge the responsibility I implied in that thread, though. Some folks literally insisted I didn't have to do anything. So I said, "Okay. I'm doing nothing now, and I'll keep doing nothing so that I go to Heaven."

I would say that the fact that your arguments lead to conclusions so contrary to popular opinion indicates that you are the one who is redefining justice. Balance is an incomplete concept until we specify what is being balanced. On a physical scale we are balancing weight, and if the weight of one thing is thought to be unequal to the weight of another, then we will have to incorporate a rate or ratio. Justice does not balance things according to weight, it balances them according to law. Acts which have no relation to the law have no relation to justice.

Actually, I think that even though there are a few things that everyone else agrees is fine and not unjust, there's enough disagreement on what we should deem to be "just" that we have to define it so broadly. I'm pointing out that the necessarily broad definition creates a problem of it's own.

But aside from that, justice balances things according to weight. We don't give the death penalty for shoplifting. Too severe a punishment is unjust even when some punishment is deserved. The weight of your action should be weighed against the weight of the punishment, even if it's only considered when it's law.

Good questions, but let’s hold them until we finish gifts.

Okie-dokie.

Do you think that civil law ought to punish theft but not gift-giving?

Of course. Because I don't think civil law should be driven by a concept of justice. Sometimes giving people what they deserve produces something good, and that's a good law. Sometimes giving people what they deserve does not produce something good, and that's a bad law.

 

[2PhiloVoid]

I think it's weird that God doesn't ensure that deserving people are punished or spare people from punishment they deserve. So how does that work?

... I think you've mistaken me for someone who believes that systematic theology is really a thing, Orel.

If I had all the answers, it'd be because I wouldn't need to read anything other than the Bible. But I do need to read much more than the Bible in order to attempt to understand the Bible, so... I don't have all of the answers.

Toodles !!!

 

[Moral Orel]

... I think you've mistaken me for someone who believes that systematic theology is really a thing, Orel.

If I had all the answers, it'd be because I wouldn't need to read anything other than the Bible. But I do need to read much more than the Bible in order to attempt to understand the Bible, so... I don't have all of the answers.

Toodles !!!

So you know that he doesn't ensure people get what they deserve, and you know that he doesn't spare people from what they deserve... You just don't know how that works. How do you know God does neither of those things?

Also, do you really have to write so much just to say "I don't know"?

 

[Paulomycin]

Edit: Accidental response to an old post.

 

[zippy2006]

First of all, thank you for accurately paraphrasing my argument. You know how hard that sort of thing is to come by around here. And you're much better about that than most.

Sure.

Let's start at the end:

Do you think that civil law ought to punish theft but not gift-giving?

Of course. Because I don't think civil law should be driven by a concept of justice. Sometimes giving people what they deserve produces something good, and that's a good law. Sometimes giving people what they deserve does not produce something good, and that's a bad law.

My semantic question about your definition of Justice 2.0 is still at play at a certain level. Do you have any way to justify your claim that civil law ought to punish theft rather than gift-giving? Do you have a rational basis for that claim? If so, what is it? Is there something to your judgment beyond whim? (Employing evaluations of "good" and "bad" without any further explanation certainly would be an instance of special pleading, so presumably you need to do more than that)

So now we get into my teaser question. Can a law be unjust? If justice is only concerned with unlawful acts, then it seems the law informs us of what is just, and justice doesn't inform us of what should be a law.

Haha - apparently my attempt to shorten the length of posts is going to fail miserably. I should have intervened after you gave the teaser. I expected you to criticize the notion of natural law. Now I expect you to do that in the next post.

First, as an aside for the sake of fun, let me quote a passage I read today. I stumbled upon Augustine's famous dictum in Kevin Flannery's Cooperation with Evil: Thomistic Tools of Analysis:

De libero arbitrio is a dialogue between two literary characters, one called Augustine, the other Evodius. As he discusses killing in self-defense with Evodius, the position of Augustine shifts occasionally; but one thesis remains firm in his mind. It is expressed in the following:

So, is not the law just which gives to a traveller the power to kill a highwayman lest he be killed by him—or [which gives] to any man or woman [the power] to kill, if possible, a violently onrushing rapist before being raped? For a soldier is even ordered by law to kill an enemy and, if he declines to effect this bloodshed [caede], a penalty is levied by the emperor. Are we to be so bold as to say that these laws are unjust—or, indeed, null and void?[19]​

[Footnote 19] [...] The very next sentence reads: “For it seems to me that a law which will not have been just is no law at all” [“Nam mihi lex esse non videtur, quae iusta non fuerit”]. This remark is one of Augustine’s most famous—or, among legal positivists, infamous. [...]​

So now we get into my teaser question. Can a law be unjust? If justice is only concerned with unlawful acts, then it seems the law informs us of what is just, and justice doesn't inform us of what should be a law.

Of course civil law can be unjust. There are two places where I alluded to the fact that I was not intending "law" only in the sense of civil law (or human law):

• "Justice is interested in balanced exchange only in relation to the law, whether that law be natural or civil."
  
• "The (natural) law does not say that a man cannot receive a free gift of $100 from another, but it does say that a man who did not do something cannot receive a reward for doing it."

...Scant but existent.

Something which is against civil law--or more precisely, legitimate civil law--would be unjust. But that which is against natural law would also be unjust, even if civil law does not legislate against it. As a starting point we might just say that the natural law is morality as known by human reason. The natural law is precisely what we refer to when we argue that a civil law is unjust (or just, for that matter).

To take a familiar example, the nature of private property is known by natural law. It is wrong for someone to steal my coat no matter what country we are in, or even if we are in no country at all.

To try to avoid a deep rabbit hole we might just say that injustice transgresses the natural law insofar as it transgresses a law known to human reason, though not fully known by all. My general point is that we don't take offense at every act which creates an imbalance, but only at certain kinds of acts which create an imbalance, and that far from being arbitrary, there is something deeply reasonable about why we take offense at some things and not others.

But most importantly, if you're defining justice as being decided by what is lawful, and not the other way around, I think you've redefined desert right out of the definition of justice. "Unlawful action regarding private property" as you say doesn't involve an imbalance. And earlier, "The set of rules that ought to guide the actions and exchanges that take place between humans" doesn't mention balance either. So justice isn't about what is deserved, or fairness, or balance anymore and these things aren't intrinsically good.

So: what is the relation of justice, law, desert, fairness, and balance?

A very common definition of justice is, "the perpetual and constant will to render to each one his right" (or his due) [ST II.II.58.1]. Thomas is talking about justice as a virtue. We might simply say that justice is "to render to each one his right/due."

We have been primarily focused on injustices and the justices that rectify them. So an injustice would transgress a right or what someone is due (or what someone deserves). The injustice would of course be unfair and would create an imbalance in the form of a debt to the person you acted unjustly towards. Justice requires that you rectify the injustice by paying the debt and restoring balance or harmony.

Thomas says that law is a special kind of right, though he is talking there about human law rather than natural law (you may find his articles on Right interesting). My point regarding "law" is that not every imbalance is the object of justice. So we might say that law is the collection of "rights" or the collection of things that humans are due. Assuming that civil law is just it will tend to cover the more important rights/dues, whereas non-civil natural law would cover smaller rights/dues (technically natural law also includes things unrelated to justice, but I digress... again... ).

In simple terms, not all human actions fall into the realm of justice because the "law" (civil or natural) contains some rights/dues but not others. For example, the right to private property establishes that asymmetrical relation between the human acts of theft and the human acts of gift-giving. The imbalances that justice cares about are imbalances that impinge on rights/dues, and these are collected by law.

Let me consider this quote out of order:

But aside from that, justice balances things according to weight. We don't give the death penalty for shoplifting. Too severe a punishment is unjust even when some punishment is deserved. The weight of your action should be weighed against the weight of the punishment, even if it's only considered when it's law.

But you are using "weight" metaphorically, just as you are using "balance" metaphorically. How much weight does the idea of theft have? How much does the idea of murder have? Technically none, because ideas are immaterial entities.

You have been claiming that folks resort to special pleading with regard to justice because they don't care about all imbalances. But the notion that there even is some objective definition of "imbalance" or "all imbalances" is itself a form of "special pleading." All concepts of balance, no matter how metaphorical, require a system of weight and measurement. We might say that green and yellow are imbalanced, or light and darkness are imbalanced, or horses and ponies are imbalanced, or that Anakin Skywalker is unbalanced... These are highly equivocal uses, and they require an account of what is being balanced.

It's funny, sometimes you make argumentum absurdums and I'm all like, "Yeah, totally!". Every action does lead to an imbalance.

But the terminus of the reductio is the negation of civil law. If civil law is based on justice and justice is based on balance and balance is either arbitrary or impossible to measure, then civil law is an impossibility. That is why I "started at the end" above. We both agree that imbalance is ubiquitous.

Consider the following statement, "A person should only receive X if they deserve X". If folks getting what they deserve is intrinsically good, then it's true.

I think you're tripping on those "only if's" again. First, I don't agree with that first conditional, and secondly, your second conditional is logically false. Instead of parsing it let's just edit your first conditional by removing the word "only." In that case what you say would probably fly.

But because you're saying that it's only sometimes true depending on what X is, then what is good is determined by the nature of X and not by what is deserved.

I don't think so. In my last post I was saying that the law defines what is due or what is deserved. That is, the law defines what X's are deserved.


...So I realize we're already back in the weeds. We'll probably just have to try to make due as we always do. I'll try to cut out some unimportant stuff and shorten it where I can.

I have been pondering ways to make argument more effective and productive for those without formal training (but I have not tried very hard, I assure you). One very simple thing I've decided on is the importance of stating the conclusions each person is aiming at, both intermediate and final conclusions. So I'll do that with some short argumentation attached:

First, giving gifts is not unjust because it does not create an imbalance or inequality that is relevant to justice. That is, there is no law, right, or due that prohibits giving or receiving gifts. To put it simply: there is nothing wrong with giving gifts.

Second, if the concept of justice is based on arbitrary balancing then civil law would be either arbitrary or impossible, and it is neither. Therefore the concept of justice is not based on arbitrary balancing.

...those two conclusions are my only aim at this stage, apart from answering your objections.

And again, you would call that act unjust because it is aiding evil doing, not because of what is deserved.

Evildoers deserve to be not-aided.

But giving gifts is a good thing to do; they're a thing you ought to do.

Supposing that it is good to do some thing, it does not follow that there is a person who deserves to have that thing done to them. It doesn't follow that anyone has a right to the good act. There is no obligation to give gifts.

Does the (natural) law not say, frinstance, that you should give some money to a starving beggar. That would "fulfill" the law making it just.

Perhaps, but the moral authorities who argue that you have an obligation to share some food with a starving man would not see it as a gift. They would say that the man has a right to your food and you are obliged to give it. We are no longer in gift territory.

The law isn't only a bunch of "don't" to you, is it?

No, but you've skirted my point. My claim was that it is not unjust to give a gift because although the recipient does not deserve the gift, he does not deserve to not-have the gift. No right or due is being violated in the case of gift giving. Even if a starving beggar has a right to food, that does not mean that people have a general right to gifts.

But this also goes back to "A person should only receive X if they deserve X". If this is only sometimes true depending on X, then the nature of X determines whether it's good or not, not what is deserved.

The reason it's not true is because we can receive things we don't deserve, even though we should receive all things that we are due. See my distinction between the two senses of "deserve" in my last post.

I don't really understand the point you are trying to make here. If you want to maintain this tack, then please include in your clarification the precise kind of "deserving" you are referring to. I gave the two options above.

Sorry, you lost me. All just acts are good, not all good acts are just?

Right.

But you've defined "just" as "lawful" now, so aren't all good acts lawful and therefore all good acts are just?

No, if "just" is defined as "lawful" then they can be substituted in propositions. So all lawful acts are good and not all good acts are lawful. The transitive syllogism you are fishing for is as follows: if all just acts are good, and all lawful acts are just, then all lawful acts are good.

Look at this again: "the set of rules that ought to guide the actions and exchanges that take place between humans". How is this not the complete set of what acts are good?

Two reasons spring to mind immediately. First, not all acts take place between humans. Second, by "the actions" I did not mean "all actions." For example, beneficent acts are good but they are not guided by a set of rules or laws. In the same way, civil law guides human actions and interactions without guiding each and every one.

Sure the restaurant is harmed. It cost them something, that's harm. They don't just want you to eat there, they are willing to sacrifice their capital and time in exchange for your money. Sacrifice is harm. Sometimes harm is for a good end. Sometimes I want to be harmed even if I don't enjoy that harm. I want to be harmed by the pin-prick of receiving the Covid vaccine, for example.

I think you're talking goofy. Not all cost is harm. I buy a watch at a cost but I am not harmed in the transaction. As a general rule consensual transactions benefit us, they do not harm us.

Okay, ya got me. I was only thinking of what the bloke who broke my windshield owes me, but yes, the interactions with the court can bring their own imbalances such that the court and/or judge now owes me something else.

Okay.

But you said that they're the same thing. Forgiving a debt is giving a gift. The only reason we're talking about gifts is because I brought up forgiveness, and you said that forgiveness is just a gift, and we wouldn't say a gift is unjust.

They aren't the same, but the analysis is the same in many ways. The difference between a gift and forgiveness is the presence of a debt. A gift is the simpler case. It would be much easier to claim that justice has been neglected with regard to forgiveness than with regard to a gift. We're going to stick with the simpler concept before moving to the more complex, especially since I am arguing with a guy who just claimed that all cost implies harm.

So when you good Christian folk die you deserve to go to Heaven?

No, I merely said that a debt was forgiven, not that something else was deserved.

I'll give you credit for being one of the only people to not try and completely dodge the responsibility I implied in that thread, though. Some folks literally insisted I didn't have to do anything. So I said, "Okay. I'm doing nothing now, and I'll keep doing nothing so that I go to Heaven."

Haha - yes, that is a tricky question for Protestants. I did see some of those exchanges.

Actually, I think that even though there are a few things that everyone else agrees is fine and not unjust, there's enough disagreement on what we should deem to be "just" that we have to define it so broadly. I'm pointing out that the necessarily broad definition creates a problem of it's own.

I don't think we define justice broadly as a result of disagreement. I think the concept of justice is slippery because it's inherently difficult to pin down. Socrates has a heyday with justice in Plato's dialogues. It is easily one of the most elusive concepts that exists. Humans are so variegated and complex that trying to get a grasp on proper conduct turns out to be quite difficult.

That said, some questions regarding justice are perfectly obvious. Everyone knows that things like stealing, murder, and adultery are unjust.

Of course. Because I don't think civil law should be driven by a concept of justice. Sometimes giving people what they deserve produces something good, and that's a good law. Sometimes giving people what they deserve does not produce something good, and that's a bad law.

What should it be driven by?

 

[Moral Orel]

I'm just going to throw some stuff out there that I don't think is integral so that my real response is more focused.

No, I merely said that a debt was forgiven, not that something else was deserved.

True. Then I have to alter it to "Christians don't deserve Hell". Better yet, to use some of your phrasing, "Christians deserve to not go to Hell". How's that?

I think you're talking goofy. Not all cost is harm. I buy a watch at a cost but I am not harmed in the transaction. As a general rule consensual transactions benefit us, they do not harm us.

I don't think it's goofy at all. I don't think most people would even see it as goofy, especially not business folk. There's a cost benefit ratio in every decision, and we would all prefer to do without the cost if we can. That's why cost is harm, we don't like cost. As a general rule, consensual transactions have a net benefit to us, I'll agree to that.


And one question just for clarity:

See my distinction between the two senses of "deserve" in my last post.

You mean the difference between "Bill does not deserve this" and "Bill deserves to not have this", right?

 

[Paulomycin]

Haha - yes, that is a tricky question for Protestants. I did see some of those exchanges.

Sorry, which one? I just want to check myself here. I'm not trying to get into a denominational debate or anything. I'm looking to side with Thomism whenever I can.

 

[zippy2006]

True. Then I have to alter it to "Christians don't deserve Hell". Better yet, to use some of your phrasing, "Christians deserve to not go to Hell". How's that?

You could say that Christians who have been forgiven do not deserve Hell. On Catholicism we are forgiven of our sins at baptism but we are still capable of committing mortal sins after that.

I don't think it's goofy at all. I don't think most people would even see it as goofy, especially not business folk. There's a cost benefit ratio in every decision, and we would all prefer to do without the cost if we can. That's why cost is harm, we don't like cost. As a general rule, consensual transactions have a net benefit to us, I'll agree to that.

I see what you are saying, but I don't find it helpful to conflate cost and harm. If you really want to go that route I would make a distinction between different kinds of harm.

And one question just for clarity:

You mean the difference between "Bill does not deserve this" and "Bill deserves to not have this", right?

Right.

 

[zippy2006]

Sorry, which one? I just want to check myself here. I'm not trying to get into a denominational debate or anything. I'm looking to side with Thomism whenever I can.

He made a thread about the relation of effort to salvation: Are You Doing Enough?

My point was just that Catholics are often more comfortable with the notion of effort in relation to salvation than Protestants are (as shown in things like the concept of condign merit).

 

[Moral Orel]

Haha - apparently my attempt to shorten the length of posts is going to fail miserably.

Yeah, especially if you ask me questions like this:

My semantic question about your definition of Justice 2.0 is still at play at a certain level. Do you have any way to justify your claim that civil law ought to punish theft rather than gift-giving? Do you have a rational basis for that claim? If so, what is it? Is there something to your judgment beyond whim? (Employing evaluations of "good" and "bad" without any further explanation certainly would be an instance of special pleading, so presumably you need to do more than that)

And this:

What should it be driven by?

I'm usually happy to tell you what I like and what sorts of things lead to what I like and why, but is that really pertinent? Maybe you just want to put me more on the defensive, or maybe you just want to point out that I don't have anything better. I'm open about being a subjectivist, so that sort of thing isn't really going to phase me. I mean, if you want to avoid rabbit trails to keep our posts from turning into novels, are you sure you want to ask me how I feel folks ought to act and how we ought to get them to act that way? I guarantee our responses are going to double in length if we follow this route.

 

[Paulomycin]

Yeah, especially if you ask me questions like this:

And this:


I'm usually happy to tell you what I like and what sorts of things lead to what I like and why, but is that really pertinent? Maybe you just want to put me more on the defensive, or maybe you just want to point out that I don't have anything better. I'm open about being a subjectivist, so that sort of thing isn't really going to phase me. I mean, if you want to avoid rabbit trails to keep our posts from turning into novels, are you sure you want to ask me how I feel folks ought to act and how we ought to get them to act that way? I guarantee our responses are going to double in length if we follow this route.

And yet you were doing exactly that with me not too long ago, where the threads became pretty massive. Attempting to control Zippy's writing style won't get you out of the fix you're in. And your non-answers are a dead giveaway.

 

[zippy2006]

I'm usually happy to tell you what I like and what sorts of things lead to what I like and why, but is that really pertinent? Maybe you just want to put me more on the defensive, or maybe you just want to point out that I don't have anything better. I'm open about being a subjectivist, so that sort of thing isn't really going to phase me. I mean, if you want to avoid rabbit trails to keep our posts from turning into novels, are you sure you want to ask me how I feel folks ought to act and how we ought to get them to act that way? I guarantee our responses are going to double in length if we follow this route.

Oh heavens, you think you can give top-to-bottom critiques of the entire concept of justice, but no one is allowed to ask you what the alternative basis of a fair society would be? That's odd to say the least, especially when you claim that society should prohibit theft but not gift-giving.

Moral Orel: It's silly that people think theft is unjust but gift-giving is not.
Zippy: Do you think civil law should prohibit theft but not gift-giving?
Moral Orel: Of course, but not because of justice.
Zippy: Then why?
Moral Orel: That question is off-topic.
Zippy: ???
​

If you are engaged in strawmen and semantic games then avoiding that question ensures that you will not be caught out. That's what I've claimed all along. The strawman is that justice is merely balancing. The semantic game is that we can erect rationally ordered law without recourse to justice.

In a logical sense I have given a reductio: if you reject justice then you must also reject civil law. It is absurd to reject civil law, therefore it is absurd to reject justice. My hope is that once you begin to consider the problem of civil law you will begin to understand what the word "justice" actually means.

 

[Moral Orel]

Oh heavens, you think you can give top-to-bottom critiques of the entire concept of justice, but no one is allowed to ask you what the alternative basis of a fair society would be? That's odd to say the least, especially when you claim that society should prohibit theft but not gift-giving.

Moral Orel: It's silly that people think theft is unjust but gift-giving is not.
Zippy: Do you think civil law should prohibit theft but not gift-giving?
Moral Orel: Of course, but not because of justice.
Zippy: Then why?
Moral Orel: That question is off-topic.
Zippy: ???

If you are engaged in strawmen and semantic games then avoiding that question ensures that you will not be caught out. That's what I've claimed all along. The strawman is that justice is merely balancing. The semantic game is that we can erect rationally ordered law without recourse to justice.

In a logical sense I have given a reductio: if you reject justice then you must also reject civil law. It is absurd to reject civil law, therefore it is absurd to reject justice. My hope is that once you begin to consider the problem of civil law you will begin to understand what the word "justice" actually means.

Gee whiz! Relax, bro! I asked if you wanted to double our post lengths. I didn't say I wouldn't. You already not so chill anymore? You seem pretty touchy to be turning a question into a refusal. And then to call my position a strawman...

 

[zippy2006]

Gee whiz! Relax, bro! I asked if you wanted to double our post lengths. I didn't say I wouldn't. You already not so chill anymore? You seem pretty touchy to be turning a question into a refusal. And then to call my position a strawman...

No, I am very happy to stand behind #258, which was in accord with the tone of #256.

Again, I think it is altogether strange to claim that my question is unreasonable. You've intimated that I am asking an impertinent question "just to put you on the defensive," or because my position is bad, but "[you] don't have anything better."

In #258 I explained exactly why I am asking it. Maybe you don't like the word "strawman," but it is apt. I have pointed out multiple times that mere balance is a misrepresentation of the definition of justice, and that imbalances are ubiquitous and impossible to delineate. That is, justice as mere balance is a mischaracterization that falls over in the lightest breeze. It is therefore a strawman.

#256 shows forth that attitude where someone spends all their time criticizing a solution to a problem without offering any constructive suggestions themselves, and then goes on to find a request for the slightest constructive suggestion "impertinent." It is a common attitude in American politics, especially among progressives. It makes one wonder whether they actually desire to achieve philosophical insight and solve problems, or instead simply want to criticize. I am not merely trying to put you on the defensive; I am trying to get you to think about the deeper issues at stake. Usually people who are all criticisms and no solutions don't have a very good understanding of the problem at hand.

As far as I am concerned, once you begin to see the real problem of things like civil law and begin to understand the real definition of justice, 90% of these long posts and criticisms will evaporate.