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George B McClellan the Most Underrated General of the Civil war
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<blockquote data-quote="Tolkien R.R.J" data-source="post: 73982657" data-attributes="member: 411644"><p><strong>Lee vs Mac</strong></p><p></p><p>Lincoln had micro manged a trap for Jackson in the valley and greatly reduced mac force near Richmond. Heavy rains swelled the Chickahominy river and created a split in the army of the Potomac and Lee saw his opportunity. Lee who many consider not only the premier general of the south but of the war, recalled Jackson from the valley to help in the offensive vs mac, nnow with a force near equal of mac's, would battle on the peninsula. Lee would strike the smaller portion of macs army and threaten is supply line under general Porter. Porter was suppose to be supported by McDowell from the north to meet up with his flank coming south from mananas. Had Macs plan been allowed, the attack would not have been possible, repulsed, or Richmond captured. However when Lincoln sent McDowell to the valley to trap Jackson, this left porter vulnerable and Lee pounced.</p><p></p><p>“<em>General McClellan wished and had advised that reinforcements should be sent him by water now that the James was open.... had the army been massed in one body instead of being divided by that stream... the capture of Richmond could be carried out because of the presidents dis tempered fancy Washington was not safe... McClellan was commanded to extend his right wing to the north of Richmond, in order to establish the communication between himself and general McDowell....should McDowell not come it exposed our right in a way no prudent officer would have done, and, as general McDowell did not come, the enemy did not fail to take advantage.”</em></p><p><em>-George Stillman Hillard Life and Campaigns of George B McClellan 1864</em></p><p></p><p>Lee attacked in multiple bloody battles that resulted in high loses on both sides. Mac would cause high causalities on Lee during the campaign inflicting more loses than he received. However Mac going off “expert” information know believed not only was he outnumbered but in danger of being cut off with no help from the north with Lincoln recalling so many of his troops, ordered a retreat off the peninsula. Mac telegraphed D.C stating “If I save this army now, I tell you plainly I owe no thanks to you or to any other persons in Washington...you have done your best to sacrifice this army.” The retreat off the peninsula was dangerous yet well conducted by McClellan and tactically by Porter to save his force from disaster. Mac would withdraw by night and defend a favorable position by day. It was a major strategic victory for the south yet tactical victory for the union. Lincoln called it a “half defeat.” Given the force size and causalities suffered, mac performed better than the future union commanders of the army of the Potomac.</p><p></p><p>-Peninsula campaign total troops involved</p><p>-Union 105,000 causalities 15,849</p><p>-Confederate [with Jackson] 88,500 causalities 20,133</p><p></p><p></p><p><strong>Antietam/Mac Takes Command</strong></p><p></p><p>“<em>I must have McClellan to reorganize this army and bring it out of chaos...there is no man in this army who can man these fortifications and lick these troops into shape half as well as he can”</em></p><p><em>-Abraham Lincoln</em></p><p></p><p>“<em>General McClellan has again assumed the supreme command of the army... his reception by the officers and soldiers was marked by the most unbounded enthusiasm... in every camp his arrival was greeted by hearty and prolonged cheering...already... a remarkable change in the solders. His presence seemed to act magically upon them. Despondency is replaced by confidence, and all are glad that McClellan will, hereafter direct them.” </em></p><p> <em>-Elis leaves from the Diary of an army Surgeon p 214 quoted in George Stillman Hillard Life and Campaigns of George B McClellan 1864</em></p><p></p><p>Lincoln selection of aggressive republican general John Pope's army of Virginia was defeated and he was embarrassed by Jackson and Lee at Second Mananas. Pope was than exiled to Minnesota to fight Indians. Lee turned his attention to an invasion of the north. Meanwhile mac had to reorganize the defeated demoralized army of popes and integrate it into his command and try and restore morale. Mac was given command of popes army and the army of the Potomac on September 2nd .</p><p></p><p>“<em>The effect of the news was instantaneous. All of a sudden the federals forgot their defeat, weariness, and hunger and exploded into triumphant hurrahs, multitudes of caps were thrown in the air”</em></p><p><em>-John Cannan The Antietam Campaign</em></p><p></p><p>“<em>As the news passed down the columns, men jumped to their feet and sent out such a hurrah as the army had never heard before”</em></p><p><em>-Union solider upon hearing McClellan had taken command</em></p><p></p><p></p><p><strong>Slow to Meet Lee?</strong></p><p></p><p>A modern criticism of mac in the Antietam campaign is that he was slow to move the army out to meet Lee's invasion allowing Lee to enter Maryland. Lee entered Maryland around Sep 4-7. Mac had just taken control on the 2nd of a disorganized defeated army. McClellan “worked a minor miracle in the next few days as he restored the army's morale and organization, and equally significant, its pride and sense of purpose.” No other man in the army could have as fast restored morale and cohesion as mac did before the battle of Antietam. Mac had already reorganized his army and marched to meet Lee by September the 9th. Lee expected a longer time for mac to prepare and his fast reaction spoiled Lee's plan to capture Harrisburg Pennsylvania.</p><p></p><p>“<em>Pennsylvania was Robert E Lees target in September 1862 but may land and George McClellan got in the way”</em></p><p><em>-Dennis Frye Showdown on South Mountain Americas Civil war Magazine</em></p><p></p><p>Also Hallack had ordered Mac to be cautious of D.C and wait until Lee's intentions were fully known believing Lee was trying to draw mac out to than attack D.C. Mac was receiving consistent reports from his Calvary of an enemy strength between 60,000-120,000. Porter put Lees army at 100,00 and Sumner at 130,000 This was accepted by union high command believing Lee must have been reinforced before an invasion attempt.</p><p></p><p>Mac moved west forcing Lee to fall back to link with Jackson from Harper's Ferry. Mac helped lead the attack at the battle of turners gap, south mountain and Fox Turners Gap.<u> All victories</u>. At Turners Gap CSA losses were 2,300 USA loses 1,800 despite the fact that the attack was up a mountain and rough terrain and the confederates used multiple stone walls. The union still took the ground. On sep 16th Mac trapped Lee by a flank maneuver on Lee's left and captured the road to Hagerstown forcing an end to Lee's northern invasion. Lee had wanted to link with Jackson and than move north once more.</p><p></p><p>“<em>Lee saw his invasion crumbling. The most important matter now was not pennslvania, but preservation of the army”</em></p><p><em>-Dennis Frye Showdown on South Mountain Americas Civil war Magazine</em></p><p></p><p>“<em>I thought I knew McClellan, but this movement puzzles me”</em></p><p><em>-Stonewall Jackson</em></p><p></p><p></p><p><strong>The Battle</strong></p><p></p><p>The two armies met near Sharpsburg Maryland on Sep 17th The “cautious” mac would assault the confederate lines leading to the bloodiest day of the war. Mac plan was for an attack simultaneously on both the confederate left and right, to be followed up with a massive and reserves attack in the center. The attack met with small success, but failed to destroy Lee in part due to Burnside's late hour to come into the battle. Burnsides delayed attack on the confederate right “throw off the whole plan” and allowed lee to shift reinforcements along his line to meet the attack in the center and left. McClellan sent a half dozen couriers to Burnside to push him to attack and threatened to relive him of command. Yet still Lees army was near to breaking in all three sectors. Mac did not show tactical genius and made some mistakes but in the end it was a strategic victory for the north and a tactical draw. He rested on the 18th to resupply [artillery near out of ammo] and gave orders to attack daylight on on the 19th but the confederates had left. It sent Lee's army wounded back to Virginia and more importantly ended any hopes the confederacy had for European involvement in the war. </p><p></p><p>“<em>George McClellan saved the union”</em></p><p><em>-Dennis Frye Chief Historian at Harpers Ferry National Historical Park</em></p><p></p><p>Antietam</p><p></p><p>Union Forces 87,000 Causalities 12,401</p><p>Confederate Forces 47,000 Causalities 10,316</p><p></p><p><em>"A man who could take a demoralized army, as McClellan took the combined forces that had been defeated under Pope in front of Washington at the second Bull Run, restore its discipline by the magic of his name and his swift reconstruction of its shattered organizations, and then lead it to victory within fourteen days, after an almost unexampled celerity of movement against the enemy who had crushed it two weeks before--such a man is not to be spoken of or thought of as wanting in the force and vigor of a great general."</em></p><p><em>-- George T. Curtis, U.S. Commissioner, historian</em></p><p></p><p></p><p><strong>McClellan Allowed Lee to Escape?</strong></p><p></p><p>“<em>The federals found that the rebels still had a formidable bite”</em></p><p>-<em>-John Cannan The Antietam Campaign</em></p><p></p><p>“<em>Myths created by politicians that Lee should have been destroyed.”</em></p><p><em>-Dennis Frye Chief Historian at Harpers Ferry National Historical Park</em></p><p></p><p>Mac was heavily criticized by Lincoln for not destroying lee's army and not following him back into Virginia. However mac had sent Porter to harass the enemy retreat that had initial success capturing 40 confederate artillery pieces. However A.P Hill counter attacked pushing the union men back across the Potomac. Hill said it was “The most terrible slaughter...a lesson to the enemy, and taught to them to know it may sometimes be dangerous to press a retreating army.” Often retreating armies fought great rear guard actions to prevent the destruction of the army. Civil war battles rarely ended in the destruction of the army and I think points more to the expectations of the early war north had, rather than realistic goals. When the army was criticized after for not destroying Lee's army a solider in the army of the Potomac replied.</p><p></p><p>“<em>Think the rebbel army can be bagged? let them come and bagg them. Easy to talk about”</em></p><p><em>-Pennsylvanian solider after Antietam</em></p><p></p><p>Mac's army was also low on supply and had just fought two large scale engagements. Lee knew where mac would not be able to supply his army [size of a moving city] and planned his withdrawal accordingly. Mac was also working off his Calvary and Pinkerton's estimate of the confederate strength. Thinking the confederates still had equal force, he chose not to push the attack or risk a loss on Maryland soil that would endanger D.C and the outcome of the war. After Lee fell back to Virginia his plan was to continue the invasion once more. He sent Stuarts Calvary to create a bridgehead at Williamsport Maryland to renew the invasion. However mac had anticipated this move and sent Calvary along with the 6th corps to prevent such a move. As argued by Dennis Frye who has studied the Antietam campaign for 50 years, Mac out thought Lee in Maryland. Later in October mac moved into Virginia to the Warrenton area so fast he split and surprised Lee. Both Lee and Longstreet were concerned, however the order was given 2 days before by Lincoln, and mac was removed from command.</p><p></p><p></p><p><strong>Conclusions</strong></p><p></p><p>“<em>Strong grounds for believing he was the best commander the army of the Potomac ever had”</em></p><p><em>-Francis Pafrey Antietam, Fredircksburg</em></p><p></p><p>While I would not go as far as the above quote does, I would say mac was the most underrated general of the war. He does not get credit where he should and gets the blame where he should not. I do not see mac as cautious to a fault as claimed. It was often Lincoln, Stanton and Halleck being over cautious about protecting D.C. That interfered with macs plans. His intelligence let him down not his over cautious nature.</p><p></p><p>“<em>Look at his campaign in western Virginia in 1861- a part of his military career convenient ignored by his enemies. Here he had a separate command, a defined field of action and was not hampered and trammeled by interference from Washington, and do we see any signs of indecision and want of promptness here? On the contrary.”</em></p><p><em>-George Stillman Hillard Life and Campaigns of George B McClellan 1864</em></p><p></p><p>Lincoln and the papers wanted aggression and the results were Bull run, Burnside at Fredricksburg and Pope at Second mananas. No general of the early war was able to handle the tandem of Jackson and Lee. Extreme events withheld mac from a capture of Richmond in 62. A fair critical comparison between mac and Sherman/Grant up until mac dismissal, is if anything very favorable to mac. Later when Grant/Sherman gained victories, it was more because of the capabilities of the confederate armies to offer Resistance than their ability being grater than macs.</p><p></p><p>I believe the real reason for Lincolns disappointment with mac was in the high expectations from the north. The north thought one battle, one victory in Virginia would win the war for them. They underestimated the resolve of the southern people to fight the war. They also underestimated the ability of Lee and Jackson.</p><p></p><p>“<em>I fear we shall at last find out that the difficulty is in our cause rather than in particular generals”</em></p><p><em>-Abraham Lincoln to his friend Carl Schurz 1862</em></p><p></p><p>The reason maybe historians have rated and viewed mac in a negative light is he was opposed and disagreed with Lincoln. He committed the unpardonable sin of running against Lincoln in the 64 election on a peace platform to end the bloodshed. Lincoln committed many errors that robbed mac of success as Lincoln would even admit. After McClellan Lincoln would not anymore get directly involved with his generals. Lincolns military faults it seems have simply been passed on to mac by his fan club of historians.</p><p></p><p>“<em>The real reason for witch general McClellan was removed were political, and not military”</em></p><p><em>-George Stillman Hillard Life and Campaigns of George B McClellan 1864</em></p><p></p><p>“<em>The republicans could not allow McClellan to be a victory. They could not allow that to happen. They needed to do everything they could to smear McClellan”</em></p><p><em><strong>-</strong>-Dennis Frye Chief Historian at Harpers Ferry National Historical Park</em></p><p></p><p>“<em>McClellan's relationship with Lincoln is central to any understanding of why historians judge him as a flawed personality...Lincoln has attained a stature that sets him apart from other mortals”</em></p><p><em><strong>-</strong>Thomas J Rowland George B Mcclellan and Civil war History in the Shadow of grant and Sherman Kent State University Press</em></p><p></p><p>“<em>However patriotic the abolitionist radicals in the north may have been, the very last thing they wanted was for little Mac to win in the battle for Richmond....the abolitionist would lose their influence”</em></p><p><em>-S.C Gwynne Rebel Yell The Violence, Passion and Redemption of Stonewall Jackson Simon and Schuster 2014</em></p><p></p><p>“<em>Their is a political element connected with this war witch must not be overlooked”</em></p><p><em>-Congressional committee on the conduct of war dec 26 1861 quoted in George Stillman Hillard Life and Campaigns of George B McClellan 1864</em></p><p></p><p>“<em>At this moment a considerable portion of his countrymen have their minds barred against all arguments and considerations in defense of general McClellan, by political prejudice. To deny him all military capacity is part of the creed of a great political party. Most supporters of the present administration hold it to be a point of duty to disparage and decry him.”</em></p><p><em>-George Stillman Hillard Life and Campaigns of George B McClellan 1864</em></p><p></p><p></p><p><strong>Major Battles and Causalities of Union Generals vs Lee</strong></p><p></p><p>Union commander/ Battle Union Losses Lee loses Union causality per confederate causality</p><p></p><p>Pope- Second Manasas 13,879 Lee 8,353 1.65 per</p><p>Hooker- Chancellorsville 17,100 Lee 12,151 1.43 per</p><p>Burnside- Fredricksburg 13,353 Lee 4,576 2.95 per</p><p>Grant- Wilderness 18,400 Lee 11,400 1.61 per</p><p>Grant- Spotsylvania 18,000 Lee 12,000 1.5 per</p><p>Grant- Cold Harbor 12,737 Lee 4,594 2.8 per</p><p>Grant- Total 49,100 Lee 27,900 1.75 per</p><p></p><p>Meade- Gettysburg 23,049 Lee 28,063 .82</p><p>Meade- Total [Above] 72,049 Lee 55,963 1.29</p><p></p><p>McClellan- Peninsula 15,849 Lee 20,133 .78 per</p><p>McClellan - Antietam 12,401 Lee 10,316 1.2 per</p><p>McClellan - Total 28,250 Lee 30,449 .92 per</p><p></p><p>McClellan was the only union general to give out more causalities than taken when faced with lee. His average over two battles is only bested once by a union commander, that was by Meade [who performed worse overall] at Gettysburg. He fought against Lee with, if anything, less of a manpower advantage than Grant would have later on. He also faced the Army of Northern Virginia while it had Jackson, was well supplied, and the south had high national morale, unlike what Grant faced. How many other union commanders can claim over two battles with Lee to have won a tactical victory on the first, and a strategic victory and tactical draw on the second while inflicting heavy losses? It is no wonder <em>Lee said mac was the best he faced</em>. Famed confederate John Mosby the “gray ghost of the confederacy” said that McClellan was the best union commander “by all odds.”</p></blockquote><p></p>
[QUOTE="Tolkien R.R.J, post: 73982657, member: 411644"] [B]Lee vs Mac[/B] Lincoln had micro manged a trap for Jackson in the valley and greatly reduced mac force near Richmond. Heavy rains swelled the Chickahominy river and created a split in the army of the Potomac and Lee saw his opportunity. Lee who many consider not only the premier general of the south but of the war, recalled Jackson from the valley to help in the offensive vs mac, nnow with a force near equal of mac's, would battle on the peninsula. Lee would strike the smaller portion of macs army and threaten is supply line under general Porter. Porter was suppose to be supported by McDowell from the north to meet up with his flank coming south from mananas. Had Macs plan been allowed, the attack would not have been possible, repulsed, or Richmond captured. However when Lincoln sent McDowell to the valley to trap Jackson, this left porter vulnerable and Lee pounced. “[I]General McClellan wished and had advised that reinforcements should be sent him by water now that the James was open.... had the army been massed in one body instead of being divided by that stream... the capture of Richmond could be carried out because of the presidents dis tempered fancy Washington was not safe... McClellan was commanded to extend his right wing to the north of Richmond, in order to establish the communication between himself and general McDowell....should McDowell not come it exposed our right in a way no prudent officer would have done, and, as general McDowell did not come, the enemy did not fail to take advantage.” -George Stillman Hillard Life and Campaigns of George B McClellan 1864[/I] Lee attacked in multiple bloody battles that resulted in high loses on both sides. Mac would cause high causalities on Lee during the campaign inflicting more loses than he received. However Mac going off “expert” information know believed not only was he outnumbered but in danger of being cut off with no help from the north with Lincoln recalling so many of his troops, ordered a retreat off the peninsula. Mac telegraphed D.C stating “If I save this army now, I tell you plainly I owe no thanks to you or to any other persons in Washington...you have done your best to sacrifice this army.” The retreat off the peninsula was dangerous yet well conducted by McClellan and tactically by Porter to save his force from disaster. Mac would withdraw by night and defend a favorable position by day. It was a major strategic victory for the south yet tactical victory for the union. Lincoln called it a “half defeat.” Given the force size and causalities suffered, mac performed better than the future union commanders of the army of the Potomac. -Peninsula campaign total troops involved -Union 105,000 causalities 15,849 -Confederate [with Jackson] 88,500 causalities 20,133 [B]Antietam/Mac Takes Command[/B] “[I]I must have McClellan to reorganize this army and bring it out of chaos...there is no man in this army who can man these fortifications and lick these troops into shape half as well as he can” -Abraham Lincoln[/I] “[I]General McClellan has again assumed the supreme command of the army... his reception by the officers and soldiers was marked by the most unbounded enthusiasm... in every camp his arrival was greeted by hearty and prolonged cheering...already... a remarkable change in the solders. His presence seemed to act magically upon them. Despondency is replaced by confidence, and all are glad that McClellan will, hereafter direct them.” -Elis leaves from the Diary of an army Surgeon p 214 quoted in George Stillman Hillard Life and Campaigns of George B McClellan 1864[/I] Lincoln selection of aggressive republican general John Pope's army of Virginia was defeated and he was embarrassed by Jackson and Lee at Second Mananas. Pope was than exiled to Minnesota to fight Indians. Lee turned his attention to an invasion of the north. Meanwhile mac had to reorganize the defeated demoralized army of popes and integrate it into his command and try and restore morale. Mac was given command of popes army and the army of the Potomac on September 2nd . “[I]The effect of the news was instantaneous. All of a sudden the federals forgot their defeat, weariness, and hunger and exploded into triumphant hurrahs, multitudes of caps were thrown in the air” -John Cannan The Antietam Campaign[/I] “[I]As the news passed down the columns, men jumped to their feet and sent out such a hurrah as the army had never heard before” -Union solider upon hearing McClellan had taken command[/I] [B]Slow to Meet Lee?[/B] A modern criticism of mac in the Antietam campaign is that he was slow to move the army out to meet Lee's invasion allowing Lee to enter Maryland. Lee entered Maryland around Sep 4-7. Mac had just taken control on the 2nd of a disorganized defeated army. McClellan “worked a minor miracle in the next few days as he restored the army's morale and organization, and equally significant, its pride and sense of purpose.” No other man in the army could have as fast restored morale and cohesion as mac did before the battle of Antietam. Mac had already reorganized his army and marched to meet Lee by September the 9th. Lee expected a longer time for mac to prepare and his fast reaction spoiled Lee's plan to capture Harrisburg Pennsylvania. “[I]Pennsylvania was Robert E Lees target in September 1862 but may land and George McClellan got in the way” -Dennis Frye Showdown on South Mountain Americas Civil war Magazine[/I] Also Hallack had ordered Mac to be cautious of D.C and wait until Lee's intentions were fully known believing Lee was trying to draw mac out to than attack D.C. Mac was receiving consistent reports from his Calvary of an enemy strength between 60,000-120,000. Porter put Lees army at 100,00 and Sumner at 130,000 This was accepted by union high command believing Lee must have been reinforced before an invasion attempt. Mac moved west forcing Lee to fall back to link with Jackson from Harper's Ferry. Mac helped lead the attack at the battle of turners gap, south mountain and Fox Turners Gap.[U] All victories[/U]. At Turners Gap CSA losses were 2,300 USA loses 1,800 despite the fact that the attack was up a mountain and rough terrain and the confederates used multiple stone walls. The union still took the ground. On sep 16th Mac trapped Lee by a flank maneuver on Lee's left and captured the road to Hagerstown forcing an end to Lee's northern invasion. Lee had wanted to link with Jackson and than move north once more. “[I]Lee saw his invasion crumbling. The most important matter now was not pennslvania, but preservation of the army” -Dennis Frye Showdown on South Mountain Americas Civil war Magazine[/I] “[I]I thought I knew McClellan, but this movement puzzles me” -Stonewall Jackson[/I] [B]The Battle[/B] The two armies met near Sharpsburg Maryland on Sep 17th The “cautious” mac would assault the confederate lines leading to the bloodiest day of the war. Mac plan was for an attack simultaneously on both the confederate left and right, to be followed up with a massive and reserves attack in the center. The attack met with small success, but failed to destroy Lee in part due to Burnside's late hour to come into the battle. Burnsides delayed attack on the confederate right “throw off the whole plan” and allowed lee to shift reinforcements along his line to meet the attack in the center and left. McClellan sent a half dozen couriers to Burnside to push him to attack and threatened to relive him of command. Yet still Lees army was near to breaking in all three sectors. Mac did not show tactical genius and made some mistakes but in the end it was a strategic victory for the north and a tactical draw. He rested on the 18th to resupply [artillery near out of ammo] and gave orders to attack daylight on on the 19th but the confederates had left. It sent Lee's army wounded back to Virginia and more importantly ended any hopes the confederacy had for European involvement in the war. “[I]George McClellan saved the union” -Dennis Frye Chief Historian at Harpers Ferry National Historical Park[/I] Antietam Union Forces 87,000 Causalities 12,401 Confederate Forces 47,000 Causalities 10,316 [I]"A man who could take a demoralized army, as McClellan took the combined forces that had been defeated under Pope in front of Washington at the second Bull Run, restore its discipline by the magic of his name and his swift reconstruction of its shattered organizations, and then lead it to victory within fourteen days, after an almost unexampled celerity of movement against the enemy who had crushed it two weeks before--such a man is not to be spoken of or thought of as wanting in the force and vigor of a great general." -- George T. Curtis, U.S. Commissioner, historian[/I] [B]McClellan Allowed Lee to Escape?[/B] “[I]The federals found that the rebels still had a formidable bite”[/I] -[I]-John Cannan The Antietam Campaign[/I] “[I]Myths created by politicians that Lee should have been destroyed.” -Dennis Frye Chief Historian at Harpers Ferry National Historical Park[/I] Mac was heavily criticized by Lincoln for not destroying lee's army and not following him back into Virginia. However mac had sent Porter to harass the enemy retreat that had initial success capturing 40 confederate artillery pieces. However A.P Hill counter attacked pushing the union men back across the Potomac. Hill said it was “The most terrible slaughter...a lesson to the enemy, and taught to them to know it may sometimes be dangerous to press a retreating army.” Often retreating armies fought great rear guard actions to prevent the destruction of the army. Civil war battles rarely ended in the destruction of the army and I think points more to the expectations of the early war north had, rather than realistic goals. When the army was criticized after for not destroying Lee's army a solider in the army of the Potomac replied. “[I]Think the rebbel army can be bagged? let them come and bagg them. Easy to talk about” -Pennsylvanian solider after Antietam[/I] Mac's army was also low on supply and had just fought two large scale engagements. Lee knew where mac would not be able to supply his army [size of a moving city] and planned his withdrawal accordingly. Mac was also working off his Calvary and Pinkerton's estimate of the confederate strength. Thinking the confederates still had equal force, he chose not to push the attack or risk a loss on Maryland soil that would endanger D.C and the outcome of the war. After Lee fell back to Virginia his plan was to continue the invasion once more. He sent Stuarts Calvary to create a bridgehead at Williamsport Maryland to renew the invasion. However mac had anticipated this move and sent Calvary along with the 6th corps to prevent such a move. As argued by Dennis Frye who has studied the Antietam campaign for 50 years, Mac out thought Lee in Maryland. Later in October mac moved into Virginia to the Warrenton area so fast he split and surprised Lee. Both Lee and Longstreet were concerned, however the order was given 2 days before by Lincoln, and mac was removed from command. [B]Conclusions[/B] “[I]Strong grounds for believing he was the best commander the army of the Potomac ever had” -Francis Pafrey Antietam, Fredircksburg[/I] While I would not go as far as the above quote does, I would say mac was the most underrated general of the war. He does not get credit where he should and gets the blame where he should not. I do not see mac as cautious to a fault as claimed. It was often Lincoln, Stanton and Halleck being over cautious about protecting D.C. That interfered with macs plans. His intelligence let him down not his over cautious nature. “[I]Look at his campaign in western Virginia in 1861- a part of his military career convenient ignored by his enemies. Here he had a separate command, a defined field of action and was not hampered and trammeled by interference from Washington, and do we see any signs of indecision and want of promptness here? On the contrary.” -George Stillman Hillard Life and Campaigns of George B McClellan 1864[/I] Lincoln and the papers wanted aggression and the results were Bull run, Burnside at Fredricksburg and Pope at Second mananas. No general of the early war was able to handle the tandem of Jackson and Lee. Extreme events withheld mac from a capture of Richmond in 62. A fair critical comparison between mac and Sherman/Grant up until mac dismissal, is if anything very favorable to mac. Later when Grant/Sherman gained victories, it was more because of the capabilities of the confederate armies to offer Resistance than their ability being grater than macs. I believe the real reason for Lincolns disappointment with mac was in the high expectations from the north. The north thought one battle, one victory in Virginia would win the war for them. They underestimated the resolve of the southern people to fight the war. They also underestimated the ability of Lee and Jackson. “[I]I fear we shall at last find out that the difficulty is in our cause rather than in particular generals” -Abraham Lincoln to his friend Carl Schurz 1862[/I] The reason maybe historians have rated and viewed mac in a negative light is he was opposed and disagreed with Lincoln. He committed the unpardonable sin of running against Lincoln in the 64 election on a peace platform to end the bloodshed. Lincoln committed many errors that robbed mac of success as Lincoln would even admit. After McClellan Lincoln would not anymore get directly involved with his generals. Lincolns military faults it seems have simply been passed on to mac by his fan club of historians. “[I]The real reason for witch general McClellan was removed were political, and not military” -George Stillman Hillard Life and Campaigns of George B McClellan 1864[/I] “[I]The republicans could not allow McClellan to be a victory. They could not allow that to happen. They needed to do everything they could to smear McClellan” [B]-[/B]-Dennis Frye Chief Historian at Harpers Ferry National Historical Park[/I] “[I]McClellan's relationship with Lincoln is central to any understanding of why historians judge him as a flawed personality...Lincoln has attained a stature that sets him apart from other mortals” [B]-[/B]Thomas J Rowland George B Mcclellan and Civil war History in the Shadow of grant and Sherman Kent State University Press[/I] “[I]However patriotic the abolitionist radicals in the north may have been, the very last thing they wanted was for little Mac to win in the battle for Richmond....the abolitionist would lose their influence” -S.C Gwynne Rebel Yell The Violence, Passion and Redemption of Stonewall Jackson Simon and Schuster 2014[/I] “[I]Their is a political element connected with this war witch must not be overlooked” -Congressional committee on the conduct of war dec 26 1861 quoted in George Stillman Hillard Life and Campaigns of George B McClellan 1864[/I] “[I]At this moment a considerable portion of his countrymen have their minds barred against all arguments and considerations in defense of general McClellan, by political prejudice. To deny him all military capacity is part of the creed of a great political party. Most supporters of the present administration hold it to be a point of duty to disparage and decry him.” -George Stillman Hillard Life and Campaigns of George B McClellan 1864[/I] [B]Major Battles and Causalities of Union Generals vs Lee[/B] Union commander/ Battle Union Losses Lee loses Union causality per confederate causality Pope- Second Manasas 13,879 Lee 8,353 1.65 per Hooker- Chancellorsville 17,100 Lee 12,151 1.43 per Burnside- Fredricksburg 13,353 Lee 4,576 2.95 per Grant- Wilderness 18,400 Lee 11,400 1.61 per Grant- Spotsylvania 18,000 Lee 12,000 1.5 per Grant- Cold Harbor 12,737 Lee 4,594 2.8 per Grant- Total 49,100 Lee 27,900 1.75 per Meade- Gettysburg 23,049 Lee 28,063 .82 Meade- Total [Above] 72,049 Lee 55,963 1.29 McClellan- Peninsula 15,849 Lee 20,133 .78 per McClellan - Antietam 12,401 Lee 10,316 1.2 per McClellan - Total 28,250 Lee 30,449 .92 per McClellan was the only union general to give out more causalities than taken when faced with lee. His average over two battles is only bested once by a union commander, that was by Meade [who performed worse overall] at Gettysburg. He fought against Lee with, if anything, less of a manpower advantage than Grant would have later on. He also faced the Army of Northern Virginia while it had Jackson, was well supplied, and the south had high national morale, unlike what Grant faced. How many other union commanders can claim over two battles with Lee to have won a tactical victory on the first, and a strategic victory and tactical draw on the second while inflicting heavy losses? It is no wonder [I]Lee said mac was the best he faced[/I]. Famed confederate John Mosby the “gray ghost of the confederacy” said that McClellan was the best union commander “by all odds.” [/QUOTE]
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George B McClellan the Most Underrated General of the Civil war
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