The Logical Problem of Evil: Mackie's World

[anonymous person]

The relevant attributes (there could be others) would be morally perfect, all-good, or of infinite goodness, such that every act of an omnibenevolent entity would be good, and every choice would favour the more morally desirable over the less morally desirable (defined below).

The moral desirability of an act is the extent to which an act is right or wrong, good or evil; where right or good is more morally desirable than wrong or evil.

For the argument, it doesn't matter, as long as it is used consistently.

That's mixing the contexts of use. An omnibenevolent entity is morally perfect by definition, which implies always choosing the most morally desirable action (as defined above). That is what I meant by being 'obliged' to make such choices. I'm sorry if you found my choice of words confusing.

Ok thanks. In light of this, I reject all premises except 4. I agree with 4 if by "leads to evil" you mean to say that:

4. God created a world wherein He knew beforehand that the free moral agents He created to inhabit that world would commit evil. The bible says that Jesus was the Lamb that was slain before the foundation of the world. This tells me that God knew before the world was even created, that He would have to send His Son to atone for the sins i.e. evil that free creatures would commit.

So we can agree that God created a world wherein He knew evil would occur.

I reject the rest of your premises and I will give you my reasons if you want.

 

[anonymous person]

So He literally has no choice in His actions - not only does He already know what He will do, but also He can only act for the greatest good and greatest love. Oh, the constraints of the divine...

Now you're getting it. God is constrained by His nature. Remember me telling you there were things God cannot do?

God cannot commit evil, He cannot lie, He cannot covet, He cannot make a free moral agent love Him etc. etc.

 

[anonymous person]

I'm using the common dictionary definition, 'unlimited power' (vocabularly.com even suggests, 'can do absolutely anything') . What definition do you prefer - what does 'Almighty' mean if not 'having unlimited power'?

Let's stick with a more technical understanding from a philosophy encyclopedia over at Stanford.

"According to some philosophers, omnipotence should be understood in terms of the power to perform certain tasks, for instance, to kill oneself, to make 2+2=4, or to make oneself non-omniscient. However, recent philosophical discussion, omnipotence has been analyzed in terms of the power to bring about certain possible states of affairs, understood as propositional entities which either obtain or fail to obtain (Rosenkrantz & Hoffman 1980; Flint & Freddoso 1983; and Wierenga 1989). Because we believe that it can yield an adequate analysis of omnipotence, we take this latter approach in what follows." http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/omnipotence/

Frumious, I tend to lean towards the view they lean to, the latter approach.

You misread my comment - I was saying that an omnibenevolent entity cannot do other than good, but since moral behaviour involves making a genuine choice of good over evil, such an entity cannot act morally because it doesn't have a genuine choice.

I didnt misunderstand you. I reiterate, the bible teaches that God is essentially good. For humans who are not essentially good, moral behaviour may indeed be predicated on being able to choose good over evil.

This would seem to make whatever God does good by definition, and if whatever God does is good, and good is whatever God does, 'good' becomes arbitrary and effectively redundant, what God does is just what God does; but it is also considered wrong for man to do some of the things that God does, which makes a double standard for good - what God does, and what is good for man. That's a mess...

I won't get too deep into this because I want to respect the thread. Suffice it to say, man is not God. God is not held to any standard to which He must live up to or meet. He is the Standard or paradigm or locus of moral values and duties.

It also renders the 'morally sufficient reason' excuse redundant; if whatever God does is good by definition, He doesn't need a morally sufficient reason for it (which at least removes the problem of how to make moral judgements if actions can have unknown 'morally sufficient reasons').

It's not an excuse. It is an appeal to something logically possible to demonstrate that one of the two implicit premises that the internal logical problem of evil depends on is invalid, thus by itself, it dissolves the argument.

 

[anonymous person]

In addition, it will be helpful to review the article on the logical problem of evil over at the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Mackie and McCloskey in the late fifties and early sixties did some work on the problem of evil and argued, like Frumious, Chany, and Todd (among others) that the following set of propositions form a logically inconsistent set:

(1) God is omnipotent (that is, all-powerful).

(2) God is omniscient (that is, all-knowing).

(3) God is perfectly good.

(4) Evil exists.

To say that the four propositions are logically inconsistent with one another is to say that they cannot all be true at the same time. Any two or three may be true, but all four cannot be true at the same time.

So this is the argument. God, if as Christians claim, is omnipotent and omnibenevolent, and omniscient, then evil cannot exist. But evil does exist. Therefore, God cannot exist.

Now what does it mean for two or more things to be logically inconsistent with one another? The encyclopedia tells us:

(5) "A set of statements is logically inconsistent if and only if: (a) that set includes a direct contradiction of the form "p & not-p"; or (b) a direct contradiction can be deduced from that set." http://www.iep.utm.edu/evil-log/#H3

Therefore the very first responsibility that men like Frumious and Todd have, is to acknowledge that condition (a) is not met in the argument. None of the statements in (1) through (4) directly contradicts any other. This is what I have been saying all along. The encyclopedia backs me up on this because the bolded portion is taken word for word from the IEP here: http://www.iep.utm.edu/evil-log/#H3

Therefore, if they want to continue to argue logical inconsistency, then they must argue that condition (b) is met, i.e. that we can deduce a contradiction from that set. Notice that the IEP is saying the same thing I have been saying, using different words. I have stated ad nauseum that there is no explicit contradiction (the IEP uses the word direct instead of explicit) in the propositions in question and the IEP affirms this. So to meet condition (b) Frumious and Todd must have some argument(s) that show that a direct contradiction can be deduced from that set.

Notice what they can't do at this point. They can't just say that "it seems to me that they are directly contradictory, or that "by definition they are directly contradictory". It has already been established that they are not (see bolded portion). This is not even in question. So Frumious and Todd must have some arguments which they believe will show that a contradiction can be deduced from the propositions. Notice the word deduced here. I will not go into detail about what deduction entails. Suffice it to say, deduction is not merely stating one's position. It is showing how one proposition follows another by the laws of logic and giving reasons for thinking the proposition is true.

So what course do they have. They can admit that while there is no explicit contradiction, once we think about what these terms like omnibenevolent and omnipotent mean, we can deduce a contradiction from them. They reason thus:


(6)If God is omnipotent, he would be able to prevent all of the evil and suffering in the world.

(7)If God is omniscient, he would know about all of the evil and suffering in the world and would know how to eliminate or prevent it.

(8)If God is perfectly good, he would want to prevent all of the evil and suffering in the world.

But evil exists.

Therefore:

(9)If God knows about all of the evil and suffering in the world, knows how to eliminate or prevent it, is powerful enough to prevent it, and yet does not prevent it, he must not be perfectly good.

(10)If God knows about all of the evil and suffering, knows how to eliminate or prevent it, wants to prevent it, and yet does not do so, he must not be all- powerful.

(11)If God is powerful enough to prevent all of the evil and suffering, wants to do so, and yet does not, he must not know about all of the suffering or know how to eliminate or prevent it—that is, he must not be all-knowing.

So the line of reasoning is that

(12) If evil and suffering exist, then God is either not omnipotent, not omniscient, or not perfectly good.

(13) Evil and suffering exists and therefore God is either not omnipotent, not omniscient, or not perfectly good.

Notice how propositions (6) through (12) are given to show that proposition (13) can be deduced from (1) through (3).

This is what Frumious and Todd have been attempting to do. Here the line of reasoning is organized and presented as one proposition following another by the laws of logic.

Therefore, in light of the evil and suffering we find in our world—if God exists, he is either impotent, ignorant or wicked, the logical contradictory of (1) (2) and (3) and since the argument is raised against the Christian who affirms (1) (2) and (3), the Christian must now attempt to show that all four propositions can be logically compatible or consistent after all.

This raises the question of what it means for propositions to be logically consistent.

(15) A set of statements is logically consistent if and only if it is possible for all of them to be true at the same time. http://www.iep.utm.edu/evil-log/#H3

So I and any other defender of the Christian conception of God who desires to rebut the logical problem of evil argument, needs to show how the four propositions can be logically consistent. If this is done, then the argument has been defeated, dissolved, destroyed, done away with, rendered impotent or whatever you want to call it. IOW, it should be abandoned.

The following explication on what entails logical consistency will demonstrate how enormously ambitious the logical problem of evil is and what an enormous burden its proponent must bear. The IEP states:

Notice that (15) does not say that consistent statements must actually be true at the same time. They may all be false or some may be true and others false. Consistency only requires that it be possible for all of the statements to be true (even if that possibility is never actualized). (15) also doesn't say anything about plausibility. It does not require the joint of a consistent set of statements to be plausible. It may be exceedingly unlikely or improbable that a certain set of statements should all be true at the same time. But improbability is not the same thing as impossibility. As long as there is nothing contradictory about their conjunction, it will be possible (even if unlikely) for them all to be true at the same time.

The IEP is clear.

This brief discussion allows us to see that the atheological claim that statements (1) through (4) are logically inconsistent is a rather strong one. The atheologian is maintaining that statements (1) through (4) couldn't possibly all be true at the same time. In other words,

(16) It is not possible for God and evil to co-exist.

If the Christian can come up with a proposition that is merely logically possible to conjoin to the one's in question that entails nothing contradictory about their conjunction, the Christian will have succeeded in demonstrating that there is no logical inconsistency after all.

Take proposition:

(17) It is possible that God has morally sufficient reasons for allowing evil.

The IEP states:

If it is possible that God has a morally sufficient reason for allowing evil and suffering to occur, then the logical problem of evil fails to prove the non-existence of God. http://www.iep.utm.edu/evil-log/#H3

And it certainly is logically possible. It need not be true that God has morally sufficient reasons, it need not be plausible. But if it is merely logically possible, then the argument fails.

 

[FrumiousBandersnatch]

Now you're getting it. God is constrained by His nature. Remember me telling you there were things God cannot do?

God cannot commit evil, He cannot lie, He cannot covet, He cannot make a free moral agent love Him etc. etc.

So considerably restricted in action - clearly not 'all powerful' or 'omnipotent', because one can easily conceive a less constrained entity with all the same powers, yet additionally capable of evil, lies, covetousness, etc. (much like the God of the OT and pre-Christian Gods in general!).

 

[anonymous person]

So considerably restricted in action - clearly not 'all powerful' or 'omnipotent', because one can easily conceive a less constrained entity with all the same powers, yet additionally capable of evil, lies, covetousness, etc. (much like the God of the OT and pre-Christian Gods in general!).

Did you review the article I provided on why omnipotence is to be viewed as the ability to bring about logically possible states of affairs?

Moreover, if you do think that God can do logical impossibilities, then the problem of evil immediately evaporates, for then God can bring it about that both evil exists and He exists, even though that is logically impossible! Even if evil proves that it is logically impossible that God exists, God can bring it about that He does not exist and that He exists, so no problem!

Read more: http://www.reasonablefaith.org/god-evil-and-the-rules-of-logic#ixzz4IWhWDqx7

So it seems to me that if you think the logical problem of evil is a good argument, (which I have shown it isn't) then you would be committed to a view of omnipotence that DID NOT allow for God to do anything, for anything entails the logically impossible.

 

[quatona]

Did you review the article I provided on why omnipotence is to be viewed as the ability to bring about logically possible states of affairs?

Moreover, if you do think that God can do logical impossibilities, then the problem of evil immediately evaporates, for then God can bring it about that both evil exists and He exists, even though that is logically impossible! Even if evil proves that it is logically impossible that God exists, God can bring it about that He does not exist and that He exists, so no problem!

Read more: http://www.reasonablefaith.org/god-evil-and-the-rules-of-logic#ixzz4IWhWDqx7

So it seems to me that if you think the logical problem of evil is a good argument, (which I have shown it isn't) then you would be committed to a view of omnipotence that DID NOT allow for God to do anything, for anything entails the logically impossible.

It seems to me that the argument rests on the assumption that the person speaking and his target audience share a similar view of benevolence.
There is nothing impossible or illogical about creating a world without "evil". So, for purposes of the argument, an omnipotent God could have done that.
If you (and that surely isn´t a surprise since you have even employed genocide apologetics before) feel that creating a world with "evil" is more benevolent than creating a world without "evil", I guess there just isn´t sufficient common ground for an argument, to begin with.

 

[bhsmte]

It seems to me that the argument rests on the assumption that the person speaking and his target audience share a similar view of benevolence.
There is nothing impossible or illogical about creating a world without "evil". So, for purposes of the argument, an omnipotent God could have done that.
If you (and that surely isn´t a surprise since you have even employed genocide apologetics before) feel that creating a world with "evil" is more benevolent than creating a world without "evil", I guess there just isn´t sufficient common ground for an argument, to begin with.

With some Christians, it really comes down to scrambling to rationalize all of the bad.

We often see folks, quickly give God credit when something good happens and yet, when something bad happens, they will claim; who could possibly know the will of God? They seem to know the will of God when good things happen, but seem to lose this skill, with the bad.

 

[anonymous person]

It seems to me that the argument rests on the assumption that the person speaking and his target audience share a similar view of benevolence.

If rests on whatever assumptions the arguer presents to show that an explicit contradiction can be deduced from the particular set of propositions:

1. God is omnipotent
2. God is omnibenevolent
3. Evil exists

Those assumptions are:

1. If God is omnipotent, He can create any world He prefers.

2. If God is omnibenevolent, He prefers a world without evil.

Both of these assumptions must be necessarily true and they're not. Thus the argument is doubly invalid.

Thus, the target audience can if they so desire, happily agree that omnibenevolence would entail that God prefers a world without evil, and still refute the argument by pointing out that such an assumption is not necessarily true so long as it is merely logically possible that God has a morally sufficient reason for allowing evil.

This should indicate to you the point the IEP and Stanford Encyclopedia of philosophy drives home i.e. that such an argument attempts to prove too much.

There is nothing impossible or illogical about creating a world without "evil". So, for purposes of the argument, an omnipotent God could have done that.

You're exactly right. He could have created a world like ours in every respect but without free moral agents i.e a world with just animals for example. There would be no evil in such a world. He could have done that.

If you (and that surely isn´t a surprise since you have even employed genocide apologetics before) feel that creating a world with "evil" is more benevolent than creating a world without "evil", I guess there just isn´t sufficient common ground for an argument, to begin with.

But you see, while I subscribe to a theodicy which attempts to reconcile evil and the existence of God, it is simply irrelevant to refuting the logical problem of evil. That's why atheist philosophers themselves will generally favor a less ambitious formulation of the problem of evil than the one espoused here.

 

[anonymous person]

With some Christians, it really comes down to scrambling to rationalize all of the bad.

We often see folks, quickly give God credit when something good happens and yet, when something bad happens, they will claim; who could possibly know the will of God? They seem to know the will of God when good things happen, but seem to lose this skill, with the bad.

Maybe so. None of this however addresses my response to the logical problem of evil which shows the argument is doubly invalid.

 

[quatona]

You're exactly right.

Cool.

But you see, while I subscribe to a theodicy which attempts to reconcile evil and the existence of God,

Yes, that´s indeed no problem. For example, there´s nothing illogical about an evil God.

 

[anonymous person]

Cool.



Yes, that´s indeed no problem. For example, there´s nothing illogical about an evil God.

This would depend on what concept of God we are talking about.

If God for example is omnibenevolent then it would be incorrect to say there is not illogical about an evil God, for you would be saying there is nothing illogical about an evil God that is not evil, which is clearly logically incoherent and contradictory taking the form of not p and p at the same time.

 

[quatona]

This would depend on what concept of God we are talking about.

Exactly what I said in my previous post.

If God for example is omnibenevolent then it would be incorrect to say there is not illogical about an evil God, for you would be saying there is nothing illogical about an evil God that is not evil, which is clearly logically incoherent and contradictory taking the form of not p and p at the same time.

Bingo, you´ve got it.

Now, of course there´s still plenty of room for you to customize your definitions of "benevolence" and "evil" until they don´t lead to contradictions in your God concept. So there´s not much point in using two value logic as long as one of the keyterms is a matter of subjective value systems. This is indeed where the argument from evil failed to anticipate the moral/ethical flexibility and relativism of believers.
Seeing this process of redefinition in action is boring at best and annoying at worst.

 

[FrumiousBandersnatch]

Did you review the article I provided on why omnipotence is to be viewed as the ability to bring about logically possible states of affairs?

Sure - and I agree with it.

So it seems to me that if you think the logical problem of evil is a good argument, (which I have shown it isn't) then you would be committed to a view of omnipotence that DID NOT allow for God to do anything, for anything entails the logically impossible.

It was enough to illustrate that a defense against the logical problem of evil for the popular conception of a tri-omni deity requires a careful redefinition of the popular conception of the tri-omni attributes, considerable subtle logic, and the assumption of requirements that sit awkwardly together, such as God being essentially good, yet needing the possibility of a morally sufficient reason for action, and that come with their own baggage (the arbitrariness of good & the disjunction of moral action between God and man; and the problem of moral judgement, respectively). It also requires that we consider this world the best possible world, which obviously needs an enormous leap of faith - by definition, per Leibniz, 'all is for the best in this best of all possible worlds'...

It might be worth considering whether much of this convoluted fine-tuning could be dispensed with by assuming a deity that was not omnibenevolent, or even no deity at all... parsimony anyone?

 

[quatona]

Surely you will quote Isaiah to me.

Indeed.

 

[zippy2006]

That's mixing the contexts of use. An omnibenevolent entity is morally perfect by definition, which implies always choosing the most morally desirable action (as defined above). That is what I meant by being 'obliged' to make such choices. I'm sorry if you found my choice of words confusing.

Freedom + goodness does not constrain God or man. Morality is not some Kantian subset of life. Every act that comes from intellect and will is a moral act. A good act is just one that has no defects, and there are a plethora of such acts to choose from at any given time. A good agent is just someone who has no habitual defects and chooses good, non-defective acts easily and freely.

This would seem to make whatever God does good by definition, and if whatever God does is good, and good is whatever God does, 'good' becomes arbitrary and effectively redundant, what God does is just what God does; but it is also considered wrong for man to do some of the things that God does, which makes a double standard for good - what God does, and what is good for man. That's a mess... It also renders the 'morally sufficient reason' excuse redundant; if whatever God does is good by definition, He doesn't need a morally sufficient reason for it (which at least removes the problem of how to make moral judgements if actions can have unknown 'morally sufficient reasons').

God has no defects and his acts have no defects. This is so true that he is Goodness itself, the very source of everything that is good.

 

[anonymous person]

Exactly what I said in my previous post.


Bingo, you´ve got it.

Now, of course there´s still plenty of room for you to customize your definitions of "benevolence" and "evil" until they don´t lead to contradictions in your God concept. So there´s not much point in using two value logic as long as one of the keyterms is a matter of subjective value systems. This is indeed where the argument from evil failed to anticipate the moral/ethical flexibility and relativism of believers.
Seeing this process of redefinition in action is boring at best and annoying at worst.

Since I have done none of the above in demonstrating the that propositions in question are not logically inconsistent, I will charitably attribute your charge as a misunderstanding of my refutation.

Please see my post containing an explication of all this submitted at 10:35pm est.

 

[quatona]

Since I have done none of the above in demonstrating the that propositions in question are not logically inconsistent,

Could you reword that in English?

Look, it´s actually quite simple:
Your Holy Book explicitly states that God creates evil.

 

[anonymous person]

Could you reword that in English?

Look, it´s actually quite simple:
Your Holy Book explicitly states that God creates evil.

Isaiah was originally written in Hebrew. Do you agree?

 

[anonymous person]

Sure - and I agree with it.

It was enough to illustrate that a defense against the logical problem of evil for the popular conception of a tri-omni deity requires a careful redefinition of the popular conception of the tri-omni attributes, considerable subtle logic, and the assumption of requirements that sit awkwardly together, such as God being essentially good, yet needing the possibility of a morally sufficient reason for action, and that come with their own baggage (the arbitrariness of good & the disjunction of moral action between God and man; and the problem of moral judgement, respectively). It also requires that we consider this world the best possible world, which obviously needs an enormous leap of faith - by definition, per Leibniz, 'all is for the best in this best of all possible worlds'...

It might be worth considering whether much of this convoluted fine-tuning could be dispensed with by assuming a deity that was not omnibenevolent, or even no deity at all... parsimony anyone?

The two assumptions in your argument which must be necessarily true aren't. The argument is thus doubly invalid.

Pretty parsimonious to me.