Discussion thread for High Priests, Sadducees...

[muffler dragon]

This is the continuation thread so as to NOT derail Chazak's Pauline thread.

[muffler dragon]

My point is this: IF the office of High Priest was not established in accordance with the parameters established by G-d; then is it possible that the authority of the office was diminished?

Simchat Torah:

In some quick glances around the 'net, I found the following. Please excuse the potential spurious nature of the source:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kohen_Gadol



Political aspects
Ecclus. (Sirach) l. is another evidence of the great reverence in which the high priest was held. The assumption of the princely authority by the Maccabean high priests (the Hasmoneans) was merely the final link in this development, which, beginning with the death of Zerubbabel, was to combine the two ideals, the politico-Messianic and the religio-Levitical, in one office. But after the brief heyday of national independence had come to an inglorious close, the high-priesthood changed again in character, insofar as it ceased to be a hereditary and a life office. High priests were appointed and removed with great frequency (see above). This may account for the otherwise strange use of the title in the plural (ἀρχιερεῖς) in the New Testament and in Josephus ("Vita," § 38; "B. J." ii. 12, § 6; iv. 3, §§ 7, 9; iv. 4, § 3). The deposed high priests seem to have retained the title, and to have continued to exercise certain functions; the ministration on the Day of Atonement, however, may have been reserved for the actual incumbent. This, however, is not clear; Hor. iii. 1-4 mentions as distinctive the exclusive sacrifice of a bull by the high priest on the Day of Atonement and the tenth of the ephah (that is, the twelve "ḥallot"; comp. Meg. i. 9; Macc. ii. 6). But even in the latest periods the office was restricted to a few families of great distinction (probably the bene kohanim gedolim; Ket. xiii. 1-2; Oh. xvii. 5; comp. Josephus, "B. J." vi. 2, § 2; see Schürer, "Gesch." 3d ed., ii. 222).

[muffler dragon]

Another link of interest:

http://www.koltorah.org/ravj/14-11%20The%20Conflict%20between%20Rav%20Shimon%20ben%20Shetach%20and%20Yanai%20HaMelech%201.htm

The following are quotes of interest:

The Mishna – Checks and Balances in a Torah Government
The Mishna (Sanhedrin 18a) states that Beit Din may judge and impose its authority upon the Kohen Gadol. This seems to be an example of the desirability of having checks and balances built into a Torah government. Indeed, one might understand the Ramban's (commentary to Bereshit 49:10) severe criticism of the Hasmoneans (who were Kohanim) for their assuming the role of Melech (king), in this light. When the Kohen Gadol also serves as king, the separation between powers is diminished and the necessary checks and balances between the various leaders of Am Yisrael are impaired (see Derashot Haran 11, where the Ran discusses the checks and balances between the King and Beit Din and Rav Aharon Lichtenstein's Leaves of Faith Part Two where he devotes an entire chapter to discussing the interaction of religion and state in Medinat Yisrael). My Talmid Josh Pollack explains that a Melech will potentially be receptive to Mussar (rebuke) from a Navi because it is understood that this is the role of the spiritual figure in relation to a lay leader. However, a Kohen Gadol will be far less likely to be receptive to rebuke as he himself is a spiritual figure. The Kohen Gadol will likely view a Navi as a competitor and be less receptive to his message than a Melech who is not a spiritual leader.
Josh adds that the desired separation between the powers of a Kohen Gadol and the Melech might be similar to the Torah's division of roles and power between men and women. He added that it might also teach that the powers of the Shul Rabbi and president be separated, another example of the importance of separating between the sacred and secular (Havdalah Bein Kodesh Lichol). We should briefly note that Havdala is a very fundamental Torah value as we find that in each of the seven days of creation, Hashem makes some sort of separation. It is one of Hashem's primary methodologies that He used in Creation (Rashi to Breishit 2:2 might be understood in light of this insight into the methodology of Creation).
Moreover, my students noted that once a Kohen Gadol assumes political leadership and power he would be an entirely ineffective Kohen Gadol. The effectiveness of a Navi in Tanach emerges from the fact that he was politically powerless and thus objective in his teachings. If a Navi assumes political power, he loses his credibility (except for Moshe Rabbeinu and a very few other exceptions). The same might apply to a Rav. My students added that women in Tanach in many cases exert profound influence (such as Chanah who envisioned the rise of a Melech, see Shmuel 1:2:10). Women exerted such influence precisely because they had no political power (Paroh's daughter is another example, as is Bat Sheva's influence over Shlomo Hamelech as described in Sanhedrin 70b).
It seems that the Torah fundamentally agrees with John Locke's celebrated assertion that "absolute power corrupts absolutely." This attitude is somewhat reflected by the Halacha (Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah 156:3) that states that Tzedaka is not collected by less than two individuals and is not distributed by less than three people. In fact, the Shulchan Aruch states, "No communal authority regarding monetary issues is imposed with less than two individuals."
Similarly, the Mishna (Avot 4:10) strongly advises (see Tosafot Sanhedrin 5a s. v. Kigone Ana) against judging alone as only Hashem is capable of judging alone. Thus, a hallmark of a Beit Din proceeding is the presence of three Dayanim (rabbinic judges) to decide a case (although one judge may adjudicate a dispute in case of need, see Shulchan Aruch Choshen Mishpat 3:2). In fact, the Gemara (Yevamot 121a) lauds the practice of Rabbis consulting each other before issuing rulings (especially ones of great importance) citing the Pasuk in Mishlei (11:14), "Salvation is found when one seeks much counsel."
However, the Mishna states that Beit Din does not judge a king. This appears very difficult in light of the many instances in the Tanach where a Navi (prophet) rebukes a king, such as the severe criticism directed to Shaul HaMelech by Shmuel Hanavi and Natan Hanavi's strong rebuke of David Hamelech. Accordingly, the Gemara (Sanhedrin 19a) limits this ruling of the Mishna to "Jewish kings" or non-Davidic kings, but does not apply to the "kings of the house of David. " The Rambam (Hilchot Sanhedrin 2:5) explains that we do not judge non-Davidic kings who do not submit to Torah authority "lest trouble result." The Rambam in Hilchot Melachim 3:7 adds that the non-Davidic kings are arrogant, and seeking to impose Torah authority upon them will cause "trouble and losses" to the cause of Torah.
My Talmid Alex Itzkowitz notes that the term "kings of the house of David" does not refer specifically to the family of David HaMelech. Rather, it is a genre of kings who submit to Torah authority (the Gemara presents David as the paradigm for kingly behavior). His proof is that Shmuel Hanavi criticized Shaul HaMelech in Shmuel I Chapter 15 and the latter accepted the criticism (see, though, Shmuel I 16:2; although this may have been after Shaul Hamelech became mentally ill). Thus Shaul Hamelech would appear to be included in Malchei Beit David for this purpose (for further exploration of the distinction between Davidic and non-Davidic kings, see the Kesef Mishneh and Lechem Mishneh to Hilchot Melachim 3:7).


The Conflict between Rav Shimon ben Shetach and Yanai Hemelech
The Gemara presents a story to illustrate why we do not judge Jewish kings who do not submit to Torah authority. The Gemara relates an incident where a slave of Yanai Hamelech killed someone. Rav Shimon ben Shetach said to the other Rabbis, "Let us put our eyes to him [Yanai] and judge him". It is important to note that Rav Shimon ben Shetach was Yanai's brother-in-law (he married Yanai's sister) and that the two had a tense relationship (see Berachot 48a and the Margaliot Hayam commentary to Sanhedrin 19a). Rashi (s.v. Tenu Eineichem; as noted by the Margaliot Hayam ad. loc.) indicates that Rav Shimon ben Shetach, who was the Av Beit Din (Chief Justice), ordered the other Dayanim (rabbinic judges) to judge Yanai, as Rav Shimon ben Shetach was disqualified to judge the case because of his relationship to Yanai.
The Rabbis proceeded to summon Yanai to appear in Beit Din, writing to him, "Your slave has killed someone." Yanai, in turn, sent his slave to Beit Din for judgment. The Rabbis replied to Yanai that he must also come, as the Torah (Shemot 21:29) requires that the owner of the slave appear in Beit Din when his slave is judged. Yanai came to Beit Din and he sat instead of standing respectfully before the Beit Din. Standing while the Beit Din remains seated expresses acceptance of the Beit Din's authority. Tosafot (Sanhedrin 19a s.v. Yanai, the second Tosafot with this heading on that page) rule that the litigants must rise during the witnesses' testimony, as well as during Beit Din's pronouncement of its ruling (Gemar Din; Shavu'ot 30b).
Tosafot equate the need to rise during the Gemar Din and during the witnesses' testimony, as these are critical moments in a trial and a time when recognition of the Beit Din's authority is of utmost importance. Rising during the Gemar Din expresses one's commitment to abide by the Beit Din's decision. Rising during the witnesses' testimony, in turn, expresses one's commitment to present witnesses who will testify in a completely honest manner. Accordingly, since Yanai already implicitly signaled his lack of respect towards the Beit Din, Rav Shimon ben Shetach felt it necessary at the outset of the trial to demand that Yanai express his acceptance of the Beit Din's authority.
We should note that Yanai's behavior is reminiscent of a rebellious student who cannot blatantly disregard his teachers but will "push the envelope" and irritate his teachers and do whatever he can "get away with" as a subtle way of resisting authority. It appears that Yanai could not "get away" with blatantly disregarding the Sanhedrin. Instead he resisted the Beit Din's authority in more subtle ways.
Rav Shimon ben Shetach then ordered Yanai to stand, as the Halacha (see Devarim 19:17 and Shavuot 30a) requires. Rav Shimon ben Shetach explained that standing is not done to respect the Dayanim, but rather is an expression of respect to the Creator who is present during Beit Din proceedings (see Devarim ad. loc. and Tehillim 82:1). Yanai replied that he would rise only when Rav Shimon ben Shetach's colleagues would request that he do so (recall our suggestion that Rav Shimon ben Shetach was not formally serving as a Dayan in this case because of his relationship to Yanai).
The Rabbis were petrified of Yanai because he killed Rabbis who did not act submissively to him (see Kiddushin 66a and Berachot 48a; interestingly, Berachot 48a indicates that Yanai was nonetheless observant of Jewish ritual law). Rav Shimon ben Shetach looked to the Dayanim on his right and his left to see if they would support his demand that Yanai express his submission to Torah authority (this was the essence of this conflict, whether Yanai would submit to Torah authority as David Hamelech submitted to Natan the prophet). The Dayanim hung their heads low due to their fear of Yanai (see Pitchei Teshuva Choshen Mishpat 12:1 and Rav J. David Bleich's Contemporary Halachic Problems 2:134-138 for a discussion of whether the Torah command not to fear any man, Devarim 1:17, requires Dayanim to risk their life).

[simchat_torah]

I absolutely believe that corruption at the highest levels ought to be rejected, especially when it involved the temple cult. However, the discussion particularly pertained to whether Paul was rejecting his Pharisee heritage by obeying the High Priest at the time (who was a Saduccee). The answer is no. He was not, he was merely doing what all Pharisees at the time were doing... following through with faith that the High Priestly order would be restored.

I disagree with their stance, and think the High Priest should have been overthrown at the time. But Paul certainly wasn't out of the norm for the P'rushim.

my 2 cents.

[Steve Petersen]

E.P. Sanders in his book Judaism: Practice and Belief 63 BCE-66CE makes the point that the scant references to a Sanhedrin in Josephus, and the Mishnah say nothing about the party affiliation or tenure of members of the Sanhedrin. The NT mentions parties in Acts 23:6 but not the numbers. It is assumed that there was a near balance, but that is not explicit in the texts.

One gets the impression that the Sanhedrin was always in session, but Sanders finds little evidence in historical sources that this was so. When they are in session it is nearly always at the behest of someone in authority, usually the High Priest.

Many of our best narratives describe eventes during the time of 'direct' Roman rule of Judaea, and they all agree: the high priest, with the support and assistance of the chief priests and some of the powerful lay people, handled local government. The system was informal, and the degree of consultation with others varied. There was probably an official council, but the high priest did not necessarily consult it as a body and in informaly way before taking action...On the other hand, there are two references in Josephus to the Synedrion, and the authors of Matthew, Mark, Luke and Acts also refer to the Synedrion. The evidence does not permit a firm decision about the formal existence of a supreme court with a fixed and known membership. We can be certain, however, that, even if there was supposed to be such a court, rulers could nevertheless empanel a group of their supporters for a trial. p. 487, 488

This supports the idea that it was the High Priest who was the highest Jewish authority.

[ChazakEmunah]

This is the continuation thread so as to NOT derail Chazak's Pauline thread.
And for that, I thank you!!

I'd rep you for it, but I've repped you too much already...