Reformational Philosophy

[jgaive]

It anyone interested in Reformational Philosophy. The father of Reformational Philosophy was Abraham Kuyper in the 19th/20th Century.

There are at least three strands:

Reformed Epistemology: Alvin Plantinga et al

Westminster Seminary tradition following Cornelius Van Til

The Amsterdam School: Herman Dooyeweerd and Dirk Vollenhoven

There are also the follower of Gordon Clark - I'm not sure to what extent they would see themselve as intellectual heirs of Kuyper or opposed to him. They would be closet to Alvin Plantinga with their evidentialist approach.

[ClementofRome]

Gordon J. Spykman's "Reformational Theology: A New Paradigm for Doing Dogmatics" is a great piece of work that begins with a philosophical basis for reformational thinking.

[jgaive]

Gordon J. Spykman's "Reformational Theology: A New Paradigm for Doing Dogmatics" is a great piece of work that begins with a philosophical basis for reformational thinking. Yes it is a very useful peice of theological writing from a Reformational standpoint

[jbarcher]

Out of curiosity, who are the contemporary Reformed philosophers? All I know of is Plantinga, because he's the top dog in some circles. There seem to be a few Plantingas, too; Ted, Cornelius, and Richard.

By the way, see Calvin College's library: http://www.calvin.edu/academic/philosophy/virtual_library/author_names.htm

[ClementofRome]

What would we do with Gordon H. Clark in this list. Definately a reformational philosopher....what sez ye?

[Jon_]

Out of curiosity, who are the contemporary Reformed philosophers? All I know of is Plantinga, because he's the top dog in some circles. There seem to be a few Plantingas, too; Ted, Cornelius, and Richard.

By the way, see Calvin College's library: http://www.calvin.edu/academic/philosophy/virtual_library/author_names.htm
Vincent Cheung is among the most capable of any contemporary Christian philosophers I have found. You can read all of his works for free at his website, Reformed Ministries International: www.rmiweb.org (http://www.rmiweb.org).

Additionally, I just posted a review of his Ultimate Questions in the Book Reviews forum: http://www.christianforums.com/t1952359-ultimate-questions.html.

Soli Deo Gloria

Jon

[jbarcher]

:D

His 'invincible argument' ... well, I suppose it would do any good to say that not too many philosophers find TAG very compelling. If the news article quoted on Infidels was right, Bahnsen gave Martin a world of trouble on that. Though now it doesn't have many promoters. :scratch:

Anyway, I couldn't find a CV for Cheung. Do you know of one?

[Jon_]

:D

His 'invincible argument' ... well, I suppose it would do any good to say that not too many philosophers find TAG very compelling. If the news article quoted on Infidels was right, Bahnsen gave Martin a world of trouble on that. Though now it doesn't have many promoters. :scratch:

Anyway, I couldn't find a CV for Cheung. Do you know of one?
Of course they don't find it compelling. The wisdom of God is foolishness to the world. Whether or not they admit the superiority of the argument or not is inconsequential to the argument's merits. Trying to seek out a "common ground" with unbelievers will only result in Christians compromising their positions and opening themselves up to attack. This is why presuppositional apologetics provides superior arguments. Because it refuses to compromise its first principle for the purpose of establishing a neutral field for philosophical debate. Unbelievers, by nature of the noetic effects of sin and their inability to believe in God come into debates with an huge disadvantage. We should exploit this and humiliate them for their folly.

CV? I don't think I am familiar with that acronym. Could you disambiguate it?

Soli Deo Gloria

Jon

[ClementofRome]

CV = resume :)

"curriculum vita"

[Jon_]

CV = resume :)

"curriculum vita"
Ah, curriculum vitæ, of course. Thanks, Clement.

No, I don't know of any resume of Cheung, aside from the books that he has written, of course.

Soli Deo Gloria

Jon

[jbarcher]

Of course they don't find it compelling. The wisdom of God is foolishness to the world. Whether or not they admit the superiority of the argument or not is inconsequential to the argument's merits. Trying to seek out a "common ground" with unbelievers will only result in Christians compromising their positions and opening themselves up to attack. This is why presuppositional apologetics provides superior arguments. Because it refuses to compromise its first principle for the purpose of establishing a neutral field for philosophical debate. Unbelievers, by nature of the noetic effects of sin and their inability to believe in God come into debates with an huge disadvantage. We should exploit this and humiliate them for their folly.

CV? I don't think I am familiar with that acronym. Could you disambiguate it?

Soli Deo Gloria

Jon

Whoops, sorry for not seeing this, Jon. :)

I ask for his CV because I assume that the label of "capable" comes along with a deep and reaching knowledge about philosophy--in other words, a PhD or equivalent.

[ClementofRome]

Whoops, sorry for not seeing this, Jon. :)

I ask for his CV because I assume that the label of "capable" comes along with a deep and reaching knowledge about philosophy--in other words, a PhD or equivalent.

I am not sure that these things equate. I have a PhD and I am the least in the kingdom. Some of the most philosophically minded Christians I have known do not hold advanced degrees. Strangely, some of the most ridiculous folks I have known have PhD's.

Sorry, not wanting to argue, but some of the argumentation here in Semper Reformada is worthy of the title "advanced."

Blessings to you.

[Jon_]

I am not sure that these things equate. I have a PhD and I am the least in the kingdom. Some of the most philosophically minded Christians I have known do not hold advanced degrees. Strangely, some of the most ridiculous folks I have known have PhD's.

Sorry, not wanting to argue, but some of the argumentation here in Semper Reformada is worthy of the title "advanced."

Blessings to you.
Clement's got a Ph.D.! Mmm, somehow I suspected he was among the upper-crust. :thumbsup:

Soli Deo Gloria

Jon

[ClementofRome]

Clement's got a Ph.D.! Mmm, somehow I suspected he was among the upper-crust. :thumbsup:

Soli Deo Gloria

Jon

Oh for crying out loud....I only mentioned it to make a point that YOU (in particular) can argue circles around a number of folks that I know who DO have PhD's. Good grief! :P

[Jon_]

Oh for crying out loud....I only mentioned it to make a point that YOU (in particular) can argue circles around a number of folks that I know who DO have PhD's. Good grief! :P
:eek:

Wow. Actually, I'm very humbled by this. But that just goes to show you that it is of God and not him who wills or runs. I know I can't claim even a shred of credit for what I know. It is only by illumination of the Spirit that I know anything of him. Just as our Lord and Savior says, "I thank thee, O Father, Lord of heaven and earth, because thou hast hid these things from the wise and prudent, and hast revealed them unto babes" (Matt. 11:25 AV). And as the Scripture says, "Where is the wise? where is the scribe? where is the disputer of this world? hath not God made foolish the wisdom of this world?" (1 Cor. 1:20 AV), and, "But as it is written, Eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither have entered into the heart of man, the things which God hath prepared for them that love him" (1 Cor. 2:9 AV).

Soli Deo Gloria

Jon

[jbarcher]

Having a PhD isn't a necessary condition, no, to be able to bang with the big boys. However, I tend to not give the benefit of the doubt--I'm sure you can sympthasize when I say that many of those who are highly praised do not deserve it.

Case in point; I was at a forum over a year ago where someone who had memorized twenty alleged cases of biblical contradictions was considered a machine of destruction. :P

I also am a little irritated by some of the dogmatic promotions of strawman-ish arguments among Christian communities, especially when they don't come along with being able to listen for more nuanced positions. So I find myself constantly the herustic skeptic. I'm not naming any names, but it's there.

Clem, what's your doctorate in? What did you write your dissertation on? (Curious.)

[Jon_]

Case in point; I was at a forum over a year ago where someone who had memorized twenty alleged cases of biblical contradictions was considered a machine of destruction. :P
Yeah, this is the kinda stuff I'm really talking about. A presuppositional argument absolutely demolishes objections like this. There is simply no need to research the evidential counterarguments against such an attack because (according to presuppositional apologetics) the atheist would not even be able to justify a worldview outside of the biblical worldview from which he could raise such objections.

Soli Deo Gloria

Jon

[ClementofRome]

Yeah, this is the kinda stuff I'm really talking about. A presuppositional argument absolutely demolishes objections like this. There is simply no need to research the evidential counterarguments against such an attack because (according to presuppositional apologetics) the atheist would not even be able to justify a worldview outside of the biblical worldview from which he could raise such objections.

Soli Deo Gloria

Jon

Exactly! I love it! :clap:

jbarcher, check your email.

[jbarcher]

My email, eh. Thanks. And did you deliberately put in the pun? You said "argue circles"...

I'm beginning to see the same problem I had with other presuppers... but cannot yet put my finger on it. It's partly that it's sounds like an invincible position, partly that there still exist questions of reliability of the Bible, partly that I think I'm hearing something that doesn't quite, well, cohere to reality. No smear intended... until my thoughts take form they are quite rough and unprecise. I also cannot quite picture how one would argue in the manner you are suggesting.

In regards to the low-level skeptics, there's two ways I take--or both (mentioned briefly in the CA thread). Either demonstrate how their cases are inerror, or argue for the necessity of historical context in interpretation. Sometimes I need to do both; if the level I am arguing at is too high for them and they cannot understand the exegetical rationale.*

The epistemology of a lot of people today is somewhat scientific. They want "facts" and evidence. The more arguments you destruct and the more things that start pointing your way does a lot. (I don't believe the point of apologetics is to convert people; it's doomed to failure and I know the T of the TULIP agrees.) But then consider this...

We both know, I assume, that people find ways to hide if they don't want to believe. They'll manage to find some reason to keep their beliefs and they may even change some epistemology around to give their reason sufficient strength. In this case I think a body of evidence is stronger than an argument against the coherency of all non-biblical worldviews. The way it would come to be seen, I believe, is many reasons versus one argument. Also, with many reasons in the memory it calls for much more twisting and turning. Pretty soon it's like history is scary.

Anyway, keep on poking at my thoughts please, I'm sure what I'm thinking of will take shape soon.
---
*Just so you know I'm not just talk, I once pointed out that the clothing laws in the OT are coherent (and comfortable) within ancient notions of purity and wholeness (if you want a quick rundown of each I can do that). This was in response to the charge that the clothing laws were absurd. The response I got back was a repeat; not a refutation, of the original charge. This I think calls for a more fundamental approach; educating the skeptic on basic exegesis. It's basically a case of, 'Well gee, of course your decontextualized interpretations are absurd.'

Hey Socrates, let me ask you a question...
Yes?
If I plug in an ice chest downstairs, leave the house, drive down to New York in a garbage dump truck, and read the newspaper in a Starbucks, is the ice chest still on?
........(I think he needs some hemlock)

[Jon_]

*Just so you know I'm not just talk, I once pointed out that the clothing laws in the OT are coherent (and comfortable) within ancient notions of purity and wholeness (if you want a quick rundown of each I can do that). This was in response to the charge that the clothing laws were absurd. The response I got back was a repeat; not a refutation, of the original charge. This I think calls for a more fundamental approach; educating the skeptic on basic exegesis. It's basically a case of, 'Well gee, of course your decontextualized interpretations are absurd.'
One of the fundamental problems with the noetic effects of sin is that it consistently distorts the truth of Scripture. The word of God is, of course, objective revelation, in that anyone can read it; however, there comes no true knowledge of the word without the illumination of the Holy Spirit (subjective revelation). Since unregenerate men do not receive this illumination, they will never agree with your exegesis. They will always make the Scriptures say what they want them to say. If you argue that their interpretation is invalid, they can simply shoot back that your interpretation is invalid. If you say that yours is based on exegesis, they just fire back that that is only a consensus approach to interpreting the word and might be incorrect. You can argue this point back and forth until the kingdom comes. The problem is that exegesis is an inductive method, which means that it never produces a universally true outcome.

This is why it is superior to argue that for the skeptic to even be able to question the Bible he must first assume the worldview that it provides. He implicitly operates on the presupposition that the Scripture is true and provides all the necessary tenets for existence. He was made to do so. Nevertheless, because of his sinful nature, he denies this explicitly. Our job as apologists should be to point this out and show the folly of arguing against the very intellectual basis that they are using.

Soli Deo Gloria

Jon

[jbarcher]

"Since unregenerate men do not receive this illumination, they will never agree with your exegesis. They will always make the Scriptures say what they want them to say. If you argue that their interpretation is invalid, they can simply shoot back that your interpretation is invalid. If you say that yours is based on exegesis, they just fire back that that is only a consensus approach to interpreting the word and might be incorrect."

:)

Well then, this certainly is no competent Bible scholar. :D

My experience suggests otherwise, and this is one of the things I kinda want you to explain. If presupping is the way to go, how do you explain my experiences.

Among the brighter crowd of skeptics and unbelievers in general, I've been able to lay waste to interpretive relativism. I believe I've linked you to an argument for the necessity of socio-historical context in criticism. So far I've never seen a maintainable hermeneutic that does not take that context into use.

A counter-assertion against an exegesis is not an argument, and thus they are abandoning reason. Yeah, I've had people just not understand basic exegesis, and respond to a full-fledged argument by saying appealing to diversity of opinion. I typically slap them silly because that's just infantile; running away and saying that diversity of opinion entails impossibility of truth.

[Jon_]

Well then, this certainly is no competent Bible scholar. :D

My experience suggests otherwise, and this is one of the things I kinda want you to explain. If presupping is the way to go, how do you explain my experiences.
This simply begs the question, "How do you know your experiences are reliable?" How can you derive a universal truth from a particular observation? Do you really mean to appeal to your experience as true premises for such a deduction? You have not yet even begun to justify that your experiences are infallible, nor can you; therefore, how can you appeal to your experience as the premise for any valid argument?

Among the brighter crowd of skeptics and unbelievers in general, I've been able to lay waste to interpretive relativism. I believe I've linked you to an argument for the necessity of socio-historical context in criticism. So far I've never seen a maintainable hermeneutic that does not take that context into use.
I really don't understand what you're trying to express here.

(For this next section, I am going to pretend to be a skeptic and will raise some of the arguments that they typically bring. I am interested to see your responses.)

A counter-assertion against an exegesis is not an argument, and thus they are abandoning reason.
Exegesis is nothing more than an assertion because you cannot deductively show that exegesis always results in the exact same, truthful conclusion. An inductive argument (e.g., an exegetical argument) is nothing more than an assertion that appears plausible.

The burden of proof in on you. Show me a system of exegesis whereby anyone can apply its principles and always come to the same conclusion. You can't. There isn't one.

Not to mention that it cannot even begun to prove the Bible to be the word of God or to prove that the existence of a God necessarily ties to the God revealed in the Scriptures.

Yeah, I've had people just not understand basic exegesis, and respond to a full-fledged argument by saying appealing to diversity of opinion. I typically slap them silly because that's just infantile; running away and saying that diversity of opinion entails impossibility of truth.
They're absolutely right. Any inductive argument is formally fallacious because it can never be proven true. For any inductive argument there are infinite possible inferences that can be made, which means that it is impossible to prove or disprove them all, which makes any inductive argument impossible to prove. That is why I do not accept evidential proofs--they're not proofs at all. They're not even probabilities because to calculate a probability you must first know the maximum number of occurances and the number of possible true results. Since you cannot quanitify infinite inferences, you cannot even begin to formulate a probability for the truth of exegesis, which again, leaves you up a creek without a paddle.

Soli Deo Gloria

Jon

[ClementofRome]

This simply begs the question, "How do you know your experiences are reliable?" How can you derive a universal truth from a particular observation? Do you really mean to appeal to your experience as true premises for such a deduction? You have not yet even begun to justify that your experiences are infallible, nor can you; therefore, how can you appeal to your experience as the premise for any valid argument? ...

Jon

And a big thanks to Protagoras and his great, great, great (x3000) grandchild, Postmodernism! :D

[jbarcher]

The creek without paddle image is very humorous. :thumbsup: I will reply later.

That reminds me, I need to do reading on critical realism.

[Jon_]

That reminds me, I need to do reading on critical realism.
If you were implementing a presuppositional apologetic, you wouldn't need to. ;)

Soli Deo Gloria

Jon

[ClementofRome]

Vincent Cheung is among the most capable of any contemporary Christian philosophers I have found. You can read all of his works for free at his website, Reformed Ministries International: www.rmiweb.org (http://www.rmiweb.org).

Additionally, I just posted a review of his Ultimate Questions in the Book Reviews forum: http://www.christianforums.com/t1952359-ultimate-questions.html.

Soli Deo Gloria

Jon

Jon, here is an interesting refutation of Cheung. Let me know what you think:

http://www.reformed.plus.com/aquascum/cheung.htm

[jbarcher]

This simply begs the question, "How do you know your experiences are reliable?" How can you derive a universal truth from a particular observation? Do you really mean to appeal to your experience as true premises for such a deduction? You have not yet even begun to justify that your experiences are infallible, nor can you; therefore, how can you appeal to your experience as the premise for any valid argument?

I think you misunderstood, but I didn't really qualify it too much. What I'm asking is, If presupping is the way to go, how come I have success though my methods? Or, from a presupper's POV, what is really going on in my exchanges.

(For this next section, I am going to pretend to be a skeptic and will raise some of the arguments that they typically bring. I am interested to see your responses.)

Exegesis is nothing more than an assertion because you cannot deductively show that exegesis always results in the exact same, truthful conclusion. An inductive argument (e.g., an exegetical argument) is nothing more than an assertion that appears plausible.

The burden of proof in on you. Show me a system of exegesis whereby anyone can apply its principles and always come to the same conclusion. You can't. There isn't one.

Not to mention that it cannot even begun to prove the Bible to be the word of God or to prove that the existence of a God necessarily ties to the God revealed in the Scriptures.

True, exegesis is an inductive method. But even deductive methods often have premises that rest upon inductive evidence; thus the form is no necessary indicator of certainty.

What you have done is appeal to diversity, and by doing that in an unqualified way, have assumed that all exegetical arguments are equal. This is strange and simply erroneous; an exegesis that makes crucial errors by anachronism is of course inferior to one who's errors are minor.

In demanding a perfect system you also demand a perfect exegete. I have not assumed that it is necessary for a good exegesis to be arrived at by all; but merely that it holds to examination. Thus if you wish to maintain your demands, the onus is on you to show that a complete and unbiased exegetor and system can exist. Thus by demanding perfect knowledge you create more problems for yourself than you believe I have.

But a fairly callous dismissal of inductive methods on the grounds that it "appears plausible", will not do. Inference to the best explanation has six steps:

1. Explanatory scope
2. Explanatory power
3. Plausibility
4. Less ad hoc
5. Accordance with accepted beliefs
6. Comparitive superiority

The question is not merely "does it seem plausible". The question is "what is the best explanation?"

Attempting to achieve an "objective" knowledge system is in error and has not learned from the past. We all have bias, yet by being able to quantify our own systems and understand others, we are able to temporarily step "out" of part of our own systems to critically examine them.

The question of the plenary truth of the Bible is a very wide topic; covering archaeology, literature, social sciences, philosophy, and many other fields. Exegesis seeks to discover the meaning of a text; not "prove" the text is correct.

They're absolutely right. Any inductive argument is formally fallacious because it can never be proven true. For any inductive argument there are infinite possible inferences that can be made, which means that it is impossible to prove or disprove them all, which makes any inductive argument impossible to prove. That is why I do not accept evidential proofs--they're not proofs at all. They're not even probabilities because to calculate a probability you must first know the maximum number of occurances and the number of possible true results. Since you cannot quanitify infinite inferences, you cannot even begin to formulate a probability for the truth of exegesis, which again, leaves you up a creek without a paddle.

Soli Deo Gloria

Jon

You seem to be asking for objective knowledge but yet make use of postmodernism in such a way that it would contradict your request. :scratch: Mathematical certainty is quite difficult to achieve in many fields if not all. I'll be looking into Bayesian reasoning and other stuff in the future. :thumbsup:

[Jon_]

Jon, here is an interesting refutation of Cheung. Let me know what you think:

http://www.reformed.plus.com/aquascum/cheung.htm
Hey Clement,

I started on a full rebuttal of this article, but didn't have time to finish. I thought I would go ahead and post what I had, though.

I will assume the author's terminology and acronyms merely for sake of argument. In order to understand the acronyms used, you will have to read his article. In truth, I think he has oversimplified the matter, but it is not crtically important to show these distinctions as his own criticism is very much inconsistent. I have only refuted the beginning of his article, but since he first attacks Cheung's foundation and I believe I have adequately defended that foundation, none of his other arguments will follow, which means they are irrelevant.



On SS2 being incompatible with SGP.

In fact, SS2 does follow from Scripture because Scripture provides for reason through the existence of God. Christ, in particular, is revealed as the Logos, or Logic (reason, wisdom, etc.). Logic exists, and it exists within our minds through God's image. It is by logic (among other things) that we are able to learn. For instance, knowledge would be impossible if the law of noncontradiction were not true.

As reason is directly taught in Scripture (fulfills SS1) and deduction of true premises (Scriptural premises) always results in a true conclusion, it follows that what is deductively derived from Scripture is true.

This is consistent with the SGP.



On SS2 being incompatible with SGP, part 2

The author correctly observes the use of inference and the assumption of inductive practice by the authors of the Bible, especially the New Testament. What the author fails to realize is that it is only the expression of the underlying concepts that is inductive and not the concepts themselves. For instance, we would never argue that God "might" be love (induction, at best, only gives us a probability). The concepts that Scripture points to are unequivocally true.

The objection then comes, how do we know that we have made the correct deduction? How do we know that when the Scripture says "God is love" that is really doesn't mean "God is powerful"? To this we reply that it is transcendentally true. It is mere wishful thinking and argument from ignorance to say that even though the Bible says one thing it is possible that it means something else.

Another objection is that we do not have proof that Scripture is deducible. To that we reply quite the contrary! This too is transcedentally true. For instance, only Calvinist soteriology fits into a consistent biblical worldview. Arminianism is inconsistent and illogical. So while, on the surface it might appear that we could inductively reason Arminianism from the texts, this is deductively an invalid soteriology. As God is completely logical and rational, we should strive to make our understanding of the text parallel this directly. As our Lord says, "Be perfect as your Father in heaven is perfect." If God is perfect and logical, then it follows that we should strive to be perfectly logical with our evaluation of the texts.



On SS2 being incompatible with SGP, part 3

The author argues that Cheung's epsitemology is circular because it assumes that deduction is a valid proof for the principle that something can be validly deduced from Scripture. The author says that it assumes deduction is valid before it proves that deduction can be valid.

Now, this at best is just skepticism. Logic and deduction are necessary truths. When we speak of worldviews and rationalistic systems, we must assume that logic and deduction are valid ways to arrive at truth before we can even begin to establish these systems. The Scripture tells us why logic is necessarily true: because it reflects the thinking of God. Because God is logical he made everything logically, thus the only way to arrive at precise conclusions is to use logic.

If the author wishes to argue against logic, then he is free to do so and appear quite looney at the same time.

His objection here is simply invalid. Everything must first assume logic, which is precisely what the presuppositional worldview explains.



Can SGP be reconciled with SEP?

Here, the author really trips over himself. Little does he know, but he denies God's omniscience with his argument, which is:

"That is, the idea that all propositions not contained in or implied by Scripture cannot constitute knowledge, is itself either contained in or implied by Scripture (where ‘implied by’ means validly deducible, of course). . . . SEP isn’t a proposition of Scripture."

The Scriptural propositions that God is omnipotent and omniscient form the basis for SEP. I think the author has missed this point. Something is a true proposition if God knows it. What God knows he has willed through his omnipotence. God does not know anything that he has not willed. This would be a logical contradiction.

The Scriptural premise of SEP is therefore simply, "Only what God has willed is known by God and therefore knowable." This is the basis for Cheung's Occasionalism, which is attacked later and I will address later. Because the full rebuttal of this point relies on this reference to Occasionalism, I won't be able to complete it here.

Neverthesless, the author does try to refute this point with Scripture, but fails miserably. He cites Mt. 24:32, "Now learn the parable from the fig tree: when its branch has already become tender and puts forth its leaves, you know that summer is near." In the first, this argument is out of context because he is ignoring Cheung's Occasionalism which explains how this knowledge is possible. In the second, this is a parable for the second coming of Christ. It is not a literal saying, but a figurative one.

He then goes onto Acts 2:22, but this is explained by Occasionalism as well, along with any other circumstance in which knowledge is imparted to men by "occasion" of sensation.

The author clearly fails to understand that what is deduced from Scripture is not necessarily all true propositions, but the basis for all true propositions. Scripturalism does not say 2 and 2 are 4. Scripturalism does say how 2 and 2 are 4, though. Likewise is it so with sensation and other principles.

What Cheung defines is a biblical worldview, not an exhaustive copendium of every true proposition possible.



When I first came across Cheung I was somewhat enamored with his work. My head has since cleared and I now view it on a reasonable plane, but that does not mean that I no longer agree with it. In fact, I still agree with most of what Cheung presents, especially his Occasionalism and rejection of empiricism. What I disagree most with Cheung is his harsh and abrasive attitude in dealing with unbelievers. Yes, they are stupid and irrational in the grand scheme of things, but I reject the notion that bringing up such things is in anyway helpful, except perhaps for encouraging aspiring apologetists to not fear them.

In any case, I agree with much of what he writes, but take issue, in many cases, with how he rights it.

Soli Deo Gloria

Jon

[Jon_]

There are also the follower of Gordon Clark - I'm not sure to what extent they would see themselve as intellectual heirs of Kuyper or opposed to him. They would be closet to Alvin Plantinga with their evidentialist approach.
I just wanted to correct this comment concerning Clark. He was a presuppositionalist, and a more able, apt, and consistent one on that than was Van Til. Clark's philosophy is actually understandable, whereas Van Til at times is utterly incoherent, at others outright contradictory.

Clarkians are not even close to Platinga's approach. His philosophy is best summed up as the "righ to be left alone" argument. He pretty much argues that we all the right to believe whatever we want to believe and that Christianity is, at least for Christians, a valid belief. But this doesn't get anywhere.

Clark rejected every single traditional and evidential proof that was not based first and foremost in a Sciprtural worldview. He rejected all of the big eleven traditional arguments and pretty much refused to even engage in textual criticism or proofs of biblical integrity seeing them as completely unnecessary (with which I agree). Seeing as his argument was that one must first assume the Bible to be true in order to know or question anything, it is inconsistent to criticize the Bible in anyway.

Clark has probably done more to show the philosophical necessity of the doctrine of Biblical inerrancy and the Protestant doctrine of Sola Scriptura more than any other theologian besides Calvin, even though he is relatively much less well-known.

Soli Deo Gloria

Jon

[jgaive]

I just wanted to correct this comment concerning Clark. He was a presuppositionalist, and a more able, apt, and consistent one on that than was Van Til. Clark's philosophy is actually understandable, whereas Van Til at times is utterly incoherent, at others outright contradictory.



Dear Jon.

In what way would you see Van Til as incoherent and contradictory?

Jeremy

[Jon_]

Dear Jon.

In what way would you see Van Til as incoherent and contradictory?

Jeremy
An excellent example is the infamous Orthodox Presbyterian Church controversy between him and Clark over the "incomprehensibility of God." Van Til's position was that we can never known anything of God in the same way that God knows it.

If this is true, and God knows everything truly, then it follows that we can never know the truth! Or at least never in the truest sense! (But how is that any different from not knowing it truly?) This would intimate that we do not know truly know Christ as our Savior because Christ, as God, is incomprehensible.

Now, this is hardly what Van Til meant to imply, but it is nevertheless, the reduction ad absurdum (a method that Van Til himself espoused) result of his argument. Clark countered this quite well and forced the Van Til camp to its plan B argument qualitative difference. But no one would argue that there is no qualitative difference in what God knows versus what man knows. Even the stupid and rebellious heathen would acknowledge (if he were to uncharacterstically affirm a God, even for sake of argument) that God's knowledge is qualitatively different. My knowledge is qualitatively different from yours!

Herein we find the real problem of the controversy, but we also see that within the argument put forth by the Van Til camp the desire to revert back to the "argument from mystery" for God's incomprehensibility. If God's comprehensibility is a mystery, then it follows we cannot comprehend God at all. Van Til fails to specify any sense in which we do not truly understand God. He argues in return that if he could do so, then it would defeat his own argument! This is correct, but at the same time he has already defeated his own argument by asserting that God is incomprehensibly incomprehensible, meaning that we cannot even determine the manner in which we do not comprehend him. The philosophical implications lead us right back to the problem above (that we cannot know anything about God truly, meaning that everything we know about him is false).

If this were true, then we could never be saved because we could never believe on Jesus Christ in a salvific sense (the true sense that God requires).

This is just one of many examples. Another issue I have with Van Til is that his work is incredibly imprecise. You would think that a philosophy would pay careful attention to how he forms his arguments, but Van Til throws out all kinds of terminology without qualification and expects people to know what he means. This unqualified application of his own perculiar language makes identifying his points an exercise in frustration.

Soli Deo Gloria

Jon

[jgaive]

An excellent example is the infamous Orthodox Presbyterian Church controversy between him and Clark over the "incomprehensibility of God." Van Til's position was that we can never known anything of God in the same way that God knows it.

If this is true, and God knows everything truly, then it follows that we can never know the truth! Or at least never in the truest sense! (But how is that any different from not knowing it truly?) This would intimate that we do not know truly know Christ as our Savior because Christ, as God, is incomprehensible.

Now, this is hardly what Van Til meant to imply, but it is nevertheless, the reduction ad absurdum (a method that Van Til himself espoused) result of his argument. Clark countered this quite well and forced the Van Til camp to its plan B argument qualitative difference. But no one would argue that there is no qualitative difference in what God knows versus what man knows. Even the stupid and rebellious heathen would acknowledge (if he were to uncharacterstically affirm a God, even for sake of argument) that God's knowledge is qualitatively different. My knowledge is qualitatively different from yours!

Herein we find the real problem of the controversy, but we also see that within the argument put forth by the Van Til camp the desire to revert back to the "argument from mystery" for God's incomprehensibility. If God's comprehensibility is a mystery, then it follows we cannot comprehend God at all. Van Til fails to specify any sense in which we do not truly understand God. He argues in return that if he could do so, then it would defeat his own argument! This is correct, but at the same time he has already defeated his own argument by asserting that God is incomprehensibly incomprehensible, meaning that we cannot even determine the manner in which we do not comprehend him. The philosophical implications lead us right back to the problem above (that we cannot know anything about God truly, meaning that everything we know about him is false).

If this were true, then we could never be saved because we could never believe on Jesus Christ in a salvific sense (the true sense that God requires).

This is just one of many examples. Another issue I have with Van Til is that his work is incredibly imprecise. You would think that a philosophy would pay careful attention to how he forms his arguments, but Van Til throws out all kinds of terminology without qualification and expects people to know what he means. This unqualified application of his own perculiar language makes identifying his points an exercise in frustration.

Soli Deo Gloria

Jon

Thank you Jon for this cogent answer. I'm sorry you find Van Til frustrating. Thjis is often the case when we wrestle with different thinkers, Christian and non-Christian, even with those with whom we most closely agree.

I need to look at the Van Til /Clark controversy in greater detail, which I shall need to do as part of my comparative study of Kuyper, Van Til, Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven and am grateful for your summary, meanwhile. I would just comment that salvation is the act of the Triune God, not anthing we know or think. In terms of Romans 1, we suppress the truth as covenant-breakers, and need the work of the Holy Spirit to overcome this rebellion, and it is purely on the basis of the sacrifice of Christ, not anything we may do, or know, that we care saved.

From my own Trinitarian perspective, we need to see knowledge in the context of the relations bewteen the Persons of the Trinity. Obviously, firstly, the Father, Son and Holy Spirit know one another in ways which we cannot enter into. And for us, as those made in the image of God, there are different ways of knowing - if we see truth in terms of correspondence, or alternatively coherence or alternatively intrumental effectiveness alone, we will have an unbalanced picture. Only as we enter covenantally into a right relationship with God, can our thinking be orientated in the right way, situated in the right context and transformed. This is not to say that non-believers cannot gain knowledge truly of the created order, nor than believers are necessariliy right. But we are given the task of taking all thoughts captive in the light of Christ, as covenant-keepers, as Van Til puts it, rather than covenant breakers. This affects all areas of life - as Kuyper puts it: there are no areas of life over which Christ does say "mine".


Yours,

P.S. I have thoughts about a Trinitarian perspective on the arguments for the existence of God, which I shall reserve for another occasion.

[Jon_]

Thank you Jon for this cogent answer. I'm sorry you find Van Til frustrating. Thjis is often the case when we wrestle with different thinkers, Christian and non-Christian, even with those with whom we most closely agree.

I need to look at the Van Til /Clark controversy in greater detail, which I shall need to do as part of my comparative study of Kuyper, Van Til, Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven and am grateful for your summary, meanwhile. I would just comment that salvation is the act of the Triune God, not anthing we know or think. In terms of Romans 1, we suppress the truth as covenant-breakers, and need the work of the Holy Spirit to overcome this rebellion, and it is purely on the basis of the sacrifice of Christ, not anything we may do, or know, that we care saved.

From my own Trinitarian perspective, we need to see knowledge in the context of the relations bewteen the Persons of the Trinity. Obviously, firstly, the Father, Son and Holy Spirit know one another in ways which we cannot enter into. And for us, as those made in the image of God, there are different ways of knowing - if we see truth in terms of correspondence, or alternatively coherence or alternatively intrumental effectiveness alone, we will have an unbalanced picture. Only as we enter covenantally into a right relationship with God, can our thinking be orientated in the right way, situated in the right context and transformed. This is not to say that non-believers cannot gain knowledge truly of the created order, nor than believers are necessariliy right. But we are given the task of taking all thoughts captive in the light of Christ, as covenant-keepers, as Van Til puts it, rather than covenant breakers. This affects all areas of life - as Kuyper puts it: there are no areas of life over which Christ does say "mine".


Yours,

P.S. I have thoughts about a Trinitarian perspective on the arguments for the existence of God, which I shall reserve for another occasion.
For a good outside opinion of the controversy between Clark and Van Til, I would recommend the short book (only 86 easy pages) published by the Trinity Foundation written by Herman Hoeksema of the Protestant Reformed Churches. The PRC grew out of the Christian Reformed Churches, which is a Dutch Reformed denomination and not Presbyterian. His volume offers an uncommitted perspective of the controversy, something that is hard to come by in other sources (such as John Frame's passing treatment of it in his Doctrine of the Knowledge of God, and others; Frame is a loyal Van Tilian).

And I agree with what you have said. The most important aspect of our walk is to maintain a purely Christian presupposition. Where we stumble is when we start to admix worldly (un)wisdom with biblical wisdom. The resultant combination is as incompatible as oil and water.

Soli Deo Gloria

Jon

[jgaive]

Thanks Jon - I shall look it up. Let's keep exchanging views.

You can find my site on http://groups.yahoo.com/group/TrinitarianReformati

[Jon_]

Thanks Jon - I shall look it up. Let's keep exchanging views.

You can find my site on http://groups.yahoo.com/group/TrinitarianReformati
I'll do that. Could you also fill me in on the distinction between Trinitarian theology and Reformed theology? I've heard the term before, but I'm unaware of what it entails. Thanks. :)

Soli Deo Gloria

Jon

[jgaive]

Dear Jon,

Reformed theology is Calvinist theology, but you could say it is characterised by a focus on the sovereignty of God. Philosopy in the Calvinian tradition tends to be called Reformational Philsophy.

Trinitarian theology takes seriously the Trinity as a the basis of beflief. Calvin was strongly Trinitarian, but this is not always followed through stronly by Reformational thinkers - they can often be effectively Unitarian - or at least sub-Trinitarian, despite paying lip-service to Trinitarian belief.

My position is that we need to be both Reformational - that is taking seriously the sovereignty of God over every area of life, but also Trinitarian from start to finish.

Yours,

Jeremy

[Cajun Huguenot]

Dear Jon,

Reformed theology is Calvinist theology, but you could say it is characterised by a focus on the sovereignty of God. Philosopy in the Calvinian tradition tends to be called Reformational Philsophy.

Trinitarian theology takes seriously the Trinity as a the basis of beflief. Calvin was strongly Trinitarian, but this is not always followed through stronly by Reformational thinkers - they can often be effectively Unitarian - or at least sub-Trinitarian, despite paying lip-service to Trinitarian belief.

My position is that we need to be both Reformational - that is taking seriously the sovereignty of God over every area of life, but also Trinitarian from start to finish.

Yours,

Jeremy

Amen to that!!!!:amen: :clap:

In Christ,
Kenith

[ClementofRome]

Dear Jon,

Reformed theology is Calvinist theology, but you could say it is characterised by a focus on the sovereignty of God. Philosopy in the Calvinian tradition tends to be called Reformational Philsophy.

Trinitarian theology takes seriously the Trinity as a the basis of beflief. Calvin was strongly Trinitarian, but this is not always followed through stronly by Reformational thinkers - they can often be effectively Unitarian - or at least sub-Trinitarian, despite paying lip-service to Trinitarian belief.

My position is that we need to be both Reformational - that is taking seriously the sovereignty of God over every area of life, but also Trinitarian from start to finish.

Yours,

Jeremy

WOW...because I am strongly both, I never realized that the distinction was widespread or overly problematic.

[Jon_]

Dear Jon,

Reformed theology is Calvinist theology, but you could say it is characterised by a focus on the sovereignty of God. Philosopy in the Calvinian tradition tends to be called Reformational Philsophy.

Trinitarian theology takes seriously the Trinity as a the basis of beflief. Calvin was strongly Trinitarian, but this is not always followed through stronly by Reformational thinkers - they can often be effectively Unitarian - or at least sub-Trinitarian, despite paying lip-service to Trinitarian belief.

My position is that we need to be both Reformational - that is taking seriously the sovereignty of God over every area of life, but also Trinitarian from start to finish.

Yours,

Jeremy
That's an interesting perspective—one I hadn't really considered. I had frequently heard Calvinism referred to as theocentric (over and against Lutheranism, e.g., being christocentric), but wasn't really aware that it was considered theocentric to a fault (patricentric, perhaps?).

What emphases does the Trinitarian view promote above and beyond the Calvinist focus of the Trinity? Is the main thrust to integrate more of what the Triune God has done over against the Father's decrees? In a sense, I can understand this position.

Soli Deo Gloria

Jon

[jgaive]

That's an interesting perspective—one I hadn't really considered. I had frequently heard Calvinism referred to as theocentric (over and against Lutheranism, e.g., being christocentric), but wasn't really aware that it was considered theocentric to a fault (patricentric, perhaps?).

What emphases does the Trinitarian view promote above and beyond the Calvinist focus of the Trinity? Is the main thrust to integrate more of what the Triune God has done over against the Father's decrees? In a sense, I can understand this position.

Soli Deo Gloria

JonYes, that is probably right - at least for Calvin's successors who tended to concentrate on God (the Father's) decrees and did not sufficiently integrate this with the work of the Son and the Holy Spirit. This is not true of Calvin himself, who puts election under the Work of the Holy Spirit in the Institutes, nor indeed in the important covenatal strand, which is implilcitly in Calvin, but is developed later by people such as Witsius in the 17th Century, and indeed later by Abraham Kuyper.

I might also add - that your Jonathan Edwards was a profound Trinitarian thinker - sadly his insights were lost to a certain extent, although they are definately there in BB Warfield, for example. But, if it loses sight of its Trinitarian roots, Reformed thought can easliy degenerate into Unitarianism or, in the USA, into New England Transcendentalism.


Yours,

Jeremy

[Jon_]

Yes, that is probably right - at least for Calvin's successors who tended to concentrate on God (the Father's) decrees and did not sufficiently integrate this with the work of the Son and the Holy Spirit. This is not true of Calvin himself, who puts election under the Work of the Holy Spirit in the Institutes, nor indeed in the important covenatal strand, which is implilcitly in Calvin, but is developed later by people such as Witsius in the 17th Century, and indeed later by Abraham Kuyper.

I might also add - that your Jonathan Edwards was a profound Trinitarian thinker - sadly his insights were lost to a certain extent, although they are definately there in BB Warfield, for example. But, if it loses sight of its Trinitarian roots, Reformed thought can easliy degenerate into Unitarianism or, in the USA, into New England Transcendentalism.


Yours,

Jeremy
I see. I have been steadily working my way through the complete works of Benjamin Warfield and have noticed a strong emphasis in his writings on the interworkings of the Trinity. I had actually taken this for granted in Reformed circles. In fact, as I ponder the Trinity even now, I wonder how I might somehow give more glory to God as a triune God, but I cannot think of any way to do so. To me it seems so natural that God as three persons in one being would work in such distinctive ways that I simply assume the unity of the Trinity in our salvation, perseverance, and the metaphysical sustenance of the world.

Are there common specific areas in which people sometimes fall short of fully glorifying God as a triune God? For instance, a particular place in which God the Father is glorified to the detriment of the Son or Holy Spirit?

I do appreciate your patience and excellent answers. The concept of Trinitarian theology seems meritable to me, but I am just having some difficulty in applying to my own understanding of God, for example.

Soli Deo Gloria

Jon

[jgaive]

I see. I have been steadily working my way through the complete works of Benjamin Warfield and have noticed a strong emphasis in his writings on the interworkings of the Trinity. I had actually taken this for granted in Reformed circles. In fact, as I ponder the Trinity even now, I wonder how I might somehow give more glory to God as a triune God, but I cannot think of any way to do so. To me it seems so natural that God as three persons in one being would work in such distinctive ways that I simply assume the unity of the Trinity in our salvation, perseverance, and the metaphysical sustenance of the world.

Are there common specific areas in which people sometimes fall short of fully glorifying God as a triune God? For instance, a particular place in which God the Father is glorified to the detriment of the Son or Holy Spirit?

I do appreciate your patience and excellent answers. The concept of Trinitarian theology seems meritable to me, but I am just having some difficulty in applying to my own understanding of God, for example.

Soli Deo Gloria

Jon

A good place to start is my paper "What on Earth is the the Trinity?"

http://www.quodlibet.net/ive-trinity.shtml

If that makes any sense to you, then I can send you some extracts from my "Work in Progress".

Yours,

Jeremy

[Jon_]

A good place to start is my paper "What on Earth is the the Trinity?"

http://www.quodlibet.net/ive-trinity.shtml

If that makes any sense to you, then I can send you some extracts from my "Work in Progress".

Yours,

Jeremy
Okay, thanks. I'm a little busy today and tomorrow, but I'll try to read it sometime this weekend.

Soli Deo Gloria

Jon

[jgaive]

Good - let me know how you find it.

Yours,

Jeremy

[jgaive]

Jon,

You may be interested in these thoughts - i hope it is not too dense:

To see the world as emanating from one of the persons of the Trinity, say the Son, is to overlook the world of the other two persons, Father and Spirit. Certainly all things are created in the Son, and nothing is make without him. Things cannot flow directly from the being of the Son, because is requires the joint action of the Father and the Son. Since the Father and the Spirit share the being of the Son, and (provided on had a fully perichoretic understanding of the relations of the Three Persons, without the Son's being flowing, for example, from that of the Father) it cannot be said the that the bring of the world cannot be said to flow from the Father and the Sprit. If this is so, and if the bring of the Son is that of the Father and the spirit, therefore it cannot be said that the being of the world flows from the Son either. Therefore, all Trine acts are joint ones that ensure that that are distinct from the world, since, unlike a monadic problematic, so a line can be drawn from the being of the world to the being of God. By the same token, the opposite danger into which a monadic problematic can tend to: that of the discover being the reality of God and the nature of the world, so that God for all practical terms becomes irrelevant to the world. The crucial link here is the work of the Holy Spirit, who continuously brings to us the character and impress of the Son, and the translucent call of the Father. No situations, however "secular" can be free from the certainly implicit, if not explicit, disposition and sovereign engagement of the Triune Persons acting in perfect concert and complementarily.

Jeremy

[Jon_]

I was listening to a lecture by John Robbins on logic and he mentions a quote from Van Til that I actually found alarming.

We speak of God as a Person, yet we also speak of three Persons in the Godhead. As we say that each of the attributes of God is to be identified with the being of God, while yet we are justified in making a distinction between them, so we say that each Person of the Trinity is exhaustive of divinity itself, while yet there is a genuine distinction between the Persons. Unity and plurality are equally ultimate in the Godhead. The Persons in the Godhead are mutually exhaustive of one another.
This reeks of modalism. It seems to follow that if each Person is exhaustive of the other, then each must be the same as the other in composition and function, but different only in identity. That is to say, that the Father is the Son is the Holy Spirit, and can and does fulfill the functions of the others, but is different as identified separately from the Son and the Holy Spirit. This makes each Person of the Trinity merely an emanation or a mode of the Godhead and not a distinct and separate Person.

The above conclusion would lead to patripassionism, which teaches that God the Father became incarnate and suffered on the cross. If the Father is mutually exhaustive of the divinity of the Trinity, then his Personhood also exhausts that of the Son, meaning that he must have at least been present in and of the Son during the crucifixion, and not separate and distinct as reported in the Scripture ("Father, Father, why hast thou forsaken me?"). Moreover, it would have been nonsensical for Jesus to say this if he too was exhaustive of the divinity of the Trinity, for he would have had all the knowledge, purpose, and power of the Father in him. This formulation reverts the three-Person revelation of the Triune God into the monadic problem that you mention above.

In fact, as I have already expounded upon in Van Til's other writings, he denies that God's truth is ever accessible by man. You mention that the monadic problem leads to a God that exists apart from the world. This seems to be a consequence of Van Til's theology. Not only is there no real distinction (only in identity or name) between the works of the Persons of the Godhead, but he also denies that man can truly know God as he knows himself. One might then also wonder how he is able to so clumsily distort the doctrine of the Trinity.

He finishes,

God is a one-conscious being; and yet, he is also a tri-conscious being.
This is a very clear contradiction, as is the above.

Non-Christians often make the objection that the Trinity is contradictory. But this is wholly invalid in the orthodox formulation that God is one being and three Persons. Since we speak of him being one in being, but three in Persons, there is no contradiction, as we are speaking in different senses. But Van Til discards this orthodox Christian view, probably because he no longer assigns difficulty to biblical contradictions—he accepts them as valid. The result is that he converts the doctrine of the Trinity into an illogical doctrine. More importantly, this departure brings with it overtures of centuries old heresies, which the church had endeavored to refute since the end of the apostolic era.

Van Til is emphatic that God is one Person, numerically one, a single individual Person, but also three Persons that are mutually exhaustive of each other, thus showing God to be truly One. This is nothing but Unitarian doctrine disguised as orthodox understanding of the tri-Person distinction.

Soli Deo Gloria

Jon

[Jon_]

Another gem from Van Til: "It is precisely because we at the [Westminster] Seminary are concerned to defend the Christian doctrine of revelation that we refuse to make any attempt at stating clearly any Christian doctrine or the relation of any Christian doctrine to any other Christian doctrine."

Does this mean that Westminster teaches no relation between Christ's redemptive work and justification by faith? If so, then all Westminster is an heretical, apostate institution. If not, then Van Til is a liar.

Soli Deo Gloria

Jon

[jgaive]

Another gem from Van Til: "It is precisely because we at the [Westminster] Seminary are concerned to defend the Christian doctrine of revelation that we refuse to make any attempt at stating clearly any Christian doctrine or the relation of any Christian doctrine to any other Christian doctrine."

Does this mean that Westminster teaches no relation between Christ's redemptive work and justification by faith? If so, then all Westminster is an heretical, apostate institution. If not, then Van Til is a liar.

Soli Deo Gloria

JonDear Jon,

What is the reference for that quotation?

Jeremy

[Jon_]

Dear Jon,

What is the reference for that quotation?

Jeremy
Robbins didn't give it, unfortunately. Let me see if I can't find it on the Internet.

Soli Deo Gloria

Jon

[Jon_]

I do have a reference to a very similar quote as the first one, and I would venture to suggest that the entire quote is probably taken from the same source. I actually recognized it as soon as Robbin started reading it because Reymond quotes it in his A New Systematic Theology.

You can find it in Van Til's An Introduction to Systematic Theology. The sum of it comes from pp. 220, 228, & 229-230. Robbins might be borrowing additional material from other pages, as well.

Soli Deo Gloria

Jon

[Jon_]

Allow me to give the full quote from Reymond as it goes on to highlight Van Til's heterodoxy in even more vivid detail.God is a one-conscious being, and yet he is a three-conscious being . . . the work ascribed to any of the persons is the work of one absolute person. . . . It is sometimes asserted that we can prove to men that we are not asserting anything that they ought to consider irrational, inasmuch as we say that God is one in essence and three in person. We therefore claim that we have not asserted unit and trinity of exactly the same thing.

Yet this is not the whole truth of the matter. We do assert that God, that is, the whole Godhead, is one person . . . within the ontological Trinity we must maintain that God is numerically one. He is one person. . . . Yet, within the being of the one person we are permitted and compelled by Scripture to make the distinction between a specific or generic type of being, and three personal subsistences (Van Til, in Reymond, A New Systematic Theology of the Christian Faith, p. 108, emphasis in Reymond).


Van Til is clearly a Unitarian, only paying lip service to the Trinity.



Soli Deo Gloria

Jon

[jgaive]

Allow me to give the full quote from Reymond as it goes on to highlight Van Til's heterodoxy in even more vivid detail.God is a one-conscious being, and yet he is a three-conscious being . . . the work ascribed to any of the persons is the work of one absolute person. . . . It is sometimes asserted that we can prove to men that we are not asserting anything that they ought to consider irrational, inasmuch as we say that God is one in essence and three in person. We therefore claim that we have not asserted unit and trinity of exactly the same thing.

Yet this is not the whole truth of the matter. We do assert that God, that is, the whole Godhead, is one person . . . within the ontological Trinity we must maintain that God is numerically one. He is one person. . . . Yet, within the being of the one person we are permitted and compelled by Scripture to make the distinction between a specific or generic type of being, and three personal subsistences (Van Til, in Reymond, A New Systematic Theology of the Christian Faith, p. 108, emphasis in Reymond).

Van Til is clearly a Unitarian, only paying lip service to the Trinity.



Soli Deo Gloria

Jon
Dear Jon,

Thank for these quotes, which I have noted and will follow up in due course. Meanwhile, I am sending you what I have to hand: Van Til's terminology (in saying that God is a Person) is unfortunate, but I don't think he is a Modalist, as he clearly believes in the simultaneous eternity of all three Persons.
For Van Til neither the unity nor the diversity can be derivative, since if either are, God is that respect correlative to the created order (either as unity to the diversity of creation, or diversity to its unity) to quote Van Til[/url]:



“The Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost are each a personality[url="#_ftn2"][2] (#_ftn1) and together constitute the exhaustively personal God. There is an eternal, internal self-conscious interaction between the three persons of the Godhead. They are consubstantial. Each is as much God as are the other two. The Son and the Spirit do not derive their being from the Father. The diversity and the unity in the Godhead are therefore equally ultimate; they are exhaustively correlative to one another and not correlative to anything else.”[3] (#_ftn3)



For Van Til, the unity and plurality of the Persons of the Trinity are equally ultimate.




[2] (#_ftnref2) Use of the term “personality” is perhaps unfortunate – the Father’s personality is possessed and revealed by the Son, and the Spirit has not a separate personality but is “the Spirit of Christ”. Perhaps a better term would have been “personhood”.


[3] (#_ftnref3) Cornelius Van Til, Apologetics (class syllabus, Westminster Theological Seminary, Philadelphia, 1959), p. 8




See Rousas J. Rushdoony, "The One and the Many Problem - the Contribution of Van Til" in E.R. Geehen, ed., Jerusalem and Athens: Critical Discussions on the Theology and Apologetics of Cornelius Van Til (Nutley, N.J.: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1971, pp. 339-48, This is a major point of discussion, see Lee Irons, "Van Til's Philosophical Misuse of the Trinity", 1997 (formerly http://members.aol/ironslee/index.htm) who accuses Van Til (and to a lesser extent Calvin and Warfield as well!) of Modalism for allegedly denying the eternal generation of the Son from the Father so that “each [Person] is co-extensive with the divine essence in the same way that the attributes of God are" (p. 10). My view is that Irons rests his case on a profound misunderstanding of both Calvin and Van Til, neither of whom, to my knowledge, deny the eternal generation of the Son from the Father; but he does have a point in his critique of Van Til's account of the Trinity as "absolute person "(which is not too different from that of Barth's position in this regard, and equally problematical). Most usefully, he highlights the shortcomings of Van Til's approach (not shared by Calvin or indeed Edwards) in insufficiently ruling out the inter-changeability of Persons (a charge which could also be leveled more strongly indeed against Augustine in the latter’s De Trinitate).


Yours,

Jeremy

[Jon_]

No, I honestly do not think Van Til was a modalist, either. After all, we have to keep in mind that he was an irrationalist. If he contradicts himself, he is actually being consistent with his philosophy, which allows for such patently absurd contradictions. Against this kind of waxing liberalism I am highly polemical, as it effectively leads to a progressive dilution of the Scripture. Van Til himself and his most astute student, John Frame, have both said that all teaching of Scripture is "apparently contradictory." It would take nothing more than a rationalist streak being introduced into their philosophy to effectively ruin their doctrine of biblical inerrancy, as the rational response to any contradiction is to discard it. Apart from that, Van Til, Frame, Rushdoony, North, and any other number of Vantillians are clearly nothing more than Christians fideists. One must then ask what distinguishes their theology (which masquerades as Reformed, but obviously is not) from neo-orthodoxy. After all, there is no necessary component of their theology that should omit the neo-orthodox view, or any other view, for that matter. Any opposing view could simply appeal to the doctrine of "apparent contradiction" to prove their case.

Soli Deo Gloria

Jon

[jgaive]

No, I honestly do not think Van Til was a modalist, either. After all, we have to keep in mind that he was an irrationalist. If he contradicts himself, he is actually being consistent with his philosophy, which allows for such patently absurd contradictions. Against this kind of waxing liberalism I am highly polemical, as it effectively leads to a progressive dilution of the Scripture. Van Til himself and his most astute student, John Frame, have both said that all teaching of Scripture is "apparently contradictory." It would take nothing more than a rationalist streak being introduced into their philosophy to effectively ruin their doctrine of biblical inerrancy, as the rational response to any contradiction is to discard it. Apart from that, Van Til, Frame, Rushdoony, North, and any other number of Vantillians are clearly nothing more than Christians fideists. One must then ask what distinguishes their theology (which masquerades as Reformed, but obviously is not) from neo-orthodoxy. After all, there is no necessary component of their theology that should omit the neo-orthodox view, or any other view, for that matter. Any opposing view could simply appeal to the doctrine of "apparent contradiction" to prove their case.

Soli Deo Gloria

Jon
Sorry, Jon, I notice that I have not replied to this. I must do so in due course.



Jeremy

[Jon_]

Sorry, Jon, I notice that I have not replied to this. I must do so in due course.

Jeremy
No rush. After reading that again months after I originally wrote it, I find little that is actually defensible and plenty that is nothing more than opinion on my part.

Soli Deo Gloria

Jon

[ClementofRome]

No rush. After reading that again months after I originally wrote it, I find little that is actually defensible and plenty that is nothing more than opinion on my part.

Soli Deo Gloria

Jon

False humility is not attractive on you Jon! ;)

[Jon_]

False humility is not attractive on you Jon! ;)
I must like the taste of feet; because I seem to chew on mine all too frequently.
;)

Soli Deo Gloria

Jon