Log in
Register
Search
Search titles only
By:
Search titles only
By:
Forums
New posts
Forum list
Search forums
Leaderboards
Games
Our Blog
Blogs
New entries
New comments
Blog list
Search blogs
Credits
Transactions
Shop
Blessings: ✟0.00
Tickets
Open new ticket
Watched
Donate
Log in
Register
Search
Search titles only
By:
Search titles only
By:
More options
Toggle width
Share this page
Share this page
Share
Reddit
Pinterest
Tumblr
WhatsApp
Email
Share
Link
Menu
Install the app
Install
Forums
Discussion and Debate
Discussion and Debate
Ethics & Morality
Free will and determinism
JavaScript is disabled. For a better experience, please enable JavaScript in your browser before proceeding.
You are using an out of date browser. It may not display this or other websites correctly.
You should upgrade or use an
alternative browser
.
Reply to thread
Message
<blockquote data-quote="o_mlly" data-source="post: 77682838" data-attributes="member: 434838"><p>Apparently, you don't have all the necessary "T-shirts" to claim such expertise. Although it appears you would like to imply that the science is settled, clearly it is not:</p><ul> <li data-xf-list-type="ul"><a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/37385373/" target="_blank">Can neuroscience enlighten the philosophical debate about free will?</a><br /> Delnatte C, Roze E, Pouget P, Galléa C, Welniarz Q. Delnatte C, et al. Neuropsychologia. 2023 Sep 9;188:108632. doi: 10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2023.108632. Epub 2023 Jun 27. Neuropsychologia. 2023. PMID: 37385373 Review.</li> <li data-xf-list-type="ul"><a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/26276463/" target="_blank">Free will: A case study in reconciling phenomenological philosophy with reductionist sciences.</a><br /> Hong FT. Hong FT. Prog Biophys Mol Biol. 2015 Dec;119(3):670-726. doi: 10.1016/j.pbiomolbio.2015.08.008. Epub 2015 Aug 11. Prog Biophys Mol Biol. 2015. PMID: 26276463 Review.</li> <li data-xf-list-type="ul"><a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/38236376/" target="_blank">How do we Sign a Contract if Everything is Predetermined: Does Compatibilism Help Preserve Agency?</a><br /> Gasparyan D. Gasparyan D. Integr Psychol Behav Sci. 2024 Jan 18. doi: 10.1007/s12124-023-09816-6. Online ahead of print. Integr Psychol Behav Sci. 2024. PMID: 38236376</li> <li data-xf-list-type="ul"><a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/27016174/" target="_blank">Compatibilism and Incompatibilism in Social Cognition.</a><br /> Turri J. Turri J. Cogn Sci. 2017 Apr;41 Suppl 3:403-424. doi: 10.1111/cogs.12372. Epub 2016 Mar 25. Cogn Sci. 2017. PMID: 27016174 Clinical Trial.</li> <li data-xf-list-type="ul"><a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/17599722/" target="_blank">The implications of advances in neuroscience for freedom of the will.</a><br /> Bok H. Bok H. Neurotherapeutics. 2007 Jul;4(3):555-9. doi: 10.1016/j.nurt.2007.04.001. Neurotherapeutics. 2007. PMID: 17599722 Free PMC article. Review.<br /> <br /> I don't have to support it. Sapolsky, your oft cited source, does so for me.<br /> <br /> <p style="margin-left: 20px"><em>I see two broad ways of thinking about how we might harness, co‑opt, and join forces with randomness for moral consistency. In a “filtering” model, randomness is generated indeterministically, the usual, but the agentic “you” installs a filter up top that allows only some of the randomness that has bubbled up to pass through and drive behavior. In contrast, in a “messing with” model, your agentic self reaches all the way down and messes with the quantum indeterminacy itself in a way that produces the behavior supposedly chosen.</em></p> <br /> Of course, Sapolsky terms the action as "<em>messes with the quantum indeterminacy</em>". More precisely, the agent self "<em>takes advantage of the quantum indeterminacy" </em>in order that the self, the higher-level organism, can integrate the under-determined lower-level forces to higher level needs with causal efficacy. As physicist and philosopher George Ellis explains:<br /> <br /> <br /> <a href="https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/30740063/" target="_blank">The Dynamical Emergence of Biology From Physics: Branching Causation via Biomolecules - PubMed</a><br /> <p style="margin-left: 20px"><em>The key feature allowing this to happen is the way biomolecules such as voltage-gated ion channels can act to enable branching logic to arise from the underlying physics, despite that physics per se being of a deterministic nature. Much randomness occurs at the molecular level, which enables higher level functions to select lower level outcomes according to higher level needs. Intelligent causation occurs when organisms engage in deduction, enabling prediction and planning. This is possible because ion channels enable action potentials to propagate in axons. The further key feature is that such branching biological behavior acts down to cause the underlying physical interactions to also exhibit a contextual branching behavior.</em></p> <br /> <br /> Yes. As mentioned at the outset, I think reading some <em>other</em> books looks to be good advice for you.<br /> <br /> <br /> Those who claim that a self-evident fact is in error make an extraordinary claim. Such claims require extraordinary evidence. However, your citations of evidence are not only not extraordinary, they are, sorry to say, rubbish. I've already cited the poor design problems of some but there is more.<br /> <br /> For example, the study claiming that hungry parole judges are more likely to decide to deny parole because they are hungry suffers from its non-attempt to control for other explanatory variables. The fact is that defendants without representation, who are less likely to get parole, tend to have their cases scheduled right before lunch (because they’re quick). (<a href="https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/judgment-and-decision-making/article/irrational-hungry-judge-effect-revisited-simulations-reveal-that-the-magnitude-of-the-effect-is-overestimated/61CE825D4DC137675BB9CAD04571AE58" target="_blank">The irrational hungry judge effect revisited: Simulations reveal that the magnitude of the effect is overestimated | Judgment and Decision Making | Cambridge Core</a>).<br /> <br /> Apparently, another look on your part is in order.</li> </ul></blockquote><p></p>
[QUOTE="o_mlly, post: 77682838, member: 434838"] Apparently, you don't have all the necessary "T-shirts" to claim such expertise. Although it appears you would like to imply that the science is settled, clearly it is not: [LIST] [*][URL='https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/37385373/']Can neuroscience enlighten the philosophical debate about free will?[/URL] Delnatte C, Roze E, Pouget P, Galléa C, Welniarz Q. Delnatte C, et al. Neuropsychologia. 2023 Sep 9;188:108632. doi: 10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2023.108632. Epub 2023 Jun 27. Neuropsychologia. 2023. PMID: 37385373 Review. [*][URL='https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/26276463/']Free will: A case study in reconciling phenomenological philosophy with reductionist sciences.[/URL] Hong FT. Hong FT. Prog Biophys Mol Biol. 2015 Dec;119(3):670-726. doi: 10.1016/j.pbiomolbio.2015.08.008. Epub 2015 Aug 11. Prog Biophys Mol Biol. 2015. PMID: 26276463 Review. [*][URL='https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/38236376/']How do we Sign a Contract if Everything is Predetermined: Does Compatibilism Help Preserve Agency?[/URL] Gasparyan D. Gasparyan D. Integr Psychol Behav Sci. 2024 Jan 18. doi: 10.1007/s12124-023-09816-6. Online ahead of print. Integr Psychol Behav Sci. 2024. PMID: 38236376 [*][URL='https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/27016174/']Compatibilism and Incompatibilism in Social Cognition.[/URL] Turri J. Turri J. Cogn Sci. 2017 Apr;41 Suppl 3:403-424. doi: 10.1111/cogs.12372. Epub 2016 Mar 25. Cogn Sci. 2017. PMID: 27016174 Clinical Trial. [*][URL='https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/17599722/']The implications of advances in neuroscience for freedom of the will.[/URL] Bok H. Bok H. Neurotherapeutics. 2007 Jul;4(3):555-9. doi: 10.1016/j.nurt.2007.04.001. Neurotherapeutics. 2007. PMID: 17599722 Free PMC article. Review. I don't have to support it. Sapolsky, your oft cited source, does so for me. [INDENT][I]I see two broad ways of thinking about how we might harness, co‑opt, and join forces with randomness for moral consistency. In a “filtering” model, randomness is generated indeterministically, the usual, but the agentic “you” installs a filter up top that allows only some of the randomness that has bubbled up to pass through and drive behavior. In contrast, in a “messing with” model, your agentic self reaches all the way down and messes with the quantum indeterminacy itself in a way that produces the behavior supposedly chosen.[/I][/INDENT] Of course, Sapolsky terms the action as "[I]messes with the quantum indeterminacy[/I]". More precisely, the agent self "[I]takes advantage of the quantum indeterminacy" [/I]in order that the self, the higher-level organism, can integrate the under-determined lower-level forces to higher level needs with causal efficacy. As physicist and philosopher George Ellis explains: [URL='https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/30740063/']The Dynamical Emergence of Biology From Physics: Branching Causation via Biomolecules - PubMed[/URL] [INDENT][I]The key feature allowing this to happen is the way biomolecules such as voltage-gated ion channels can act to enable branching logic to arise from the underlying physics, despite that physics per se being of a deterministic nature. Much randomness occurs at the molecular level, which enables higher level functions to select lower level outcomes according to higher level needs. Intelligent causation occurs when organisms engage in deduction, enabling prediction and planning. This is possible because ion channels enable action potentials to propagate in axons. The further key feature is that such branching biological behavior acts down to cause the underlying physical interactions to also exhibit a contextual branching behavior.[/I][/INDENT] Yes. As mentioned at the outset, I think reading some [I]other[/I] books looks to be good advice for you. Those who claim that a self-evident fact is in error make an extraordinary claim. Such claims require extraordinary evidence. However, your citations of evidence are not only not extraordinary, they are, sorry to say, rubbish. I've already cited the poor design problems of some but there is more. For example, the study claiming that hungry parole judges are more likely to decide to deny parole because they are hungry suffers from its non-attempt to control for other explanatory variables. The fact is that defendants without representation, who are less likely to get parole, tend to have their cases scheduled right before lunch (because they’re quick). ([URL='https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/judgment-and-decision-making/article/irrational-hungry-judge-effect-revisited-simulations-reveal-that-the-magnitude-of-the-effect-is-overestimated/61CE825D4DC137675BB9CAD04571AE58']The irrational hungry judge effect revisited: Simulations reveal that the magnitude of the effect is overestimated | Judgment and Decision Making | Cambridge Core[/URL]). Apparently, another look on your part is in order. [/LIST] [/QUOTE]
Insert quotes…
Verification
Post reply
Forums
Discussion and Debate
Discussion and Debate
Ethics & Morality
Free will and determinism
Top
Bottom